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Abstract 
This thesis reports an investigation into the applicability of Forgas's (1992a, 1992c, 
1994a, 1995b) Affect Infusion Model (AIM) to health judgments made by healthy 
people. According to the AIM, the extent of mood influence on judgments depends on 
the information processing strategy used and the length of processing time. Findings of 
mood-congruence for some health judgments (Salovey & Birnbaum, 1989) suggested 
that complex stimuli requiring elaborate processing could be expected to be particularly 
influenced by mood and hence result in mood-congruent judgments (Forgas, 1994a). 
A preliminary experiment established suitable audiovisual and autobiographical 
methods of inducing happy, neutral and sad moods. A programme of seven experiments 
was conducted which tested the AIM, and more particularly tested the hypothesis that 
people in an induced sad mood would take longer to process information and make 
more pessimistic judgments than people in an induced happy mood. 
In three experiments, happy or sad (and in two of these experiments neutral) moods 
were induced and health judgments made. The findings lacked consistency with the 
AIM. Possible methodological issues were examined and ruled out as explanations for 
lack of affect infusion. 
A replication of Salovey and Birnbaum's (1989) Experiment 3 on health judgments was 
run with the addition of the health items developed for the experiments reported in this 
thesis. There was partial confirmation of Salovey and Birnbaum's findings of reduced 
optimistic bias for people in a sad mood making judgments of negative health events. A 
final experiment involved the breaking down of the items of this study into four sub-
types to establish under what circumstances affect infused judgments. Processing times 
were assessed separately for negative and positive items, enabling testing of the 
processing time aspect of the AIM, in relation to Salovey and Birnbaum's finding of 
mood effects with negative health judgments. Results again provided partial 
confirmation of Salovey and Birnbaum's mood-congruence findings. However, even 
when mood congruence was demonstrated, this was not associated with differences in 
processing time as predicted by the AIM, either for Salovey and Birnbaum's items or 
for those developed for this series of experiments. 
The lack of finding of an association between processing time and mood congruence, 
when it occurred, indicates difficulties for the AIM. The predictions of the model do not 
apply in a straightforward way to health judgments made by healthy people. It is 
suggested that an optimistic bias might sometimes result in motivated processing 
reducing the likelihood of mood effects in health judgments. An examination of 
Forgas's model in relation to the Interacting Cognitive Subsystems model (Barnard & 
Teasdale, 1991) is proposed as an area for further research. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
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Chapter 1 
Tell me where is fancy bred ... in the heart or in the head? 
The Merchant of Venice I11.163 
Introduction 
"In a sense we have two brains, two minds - and two different kinds of intelligence: 
rational and emotional. How we do in life is determined by both - it is not just IQ, but 
emotional intelligence that matters. Indeed, intellect cannot work at its best without 
emotional intelligence. Ordinarily the complementarity of limbic system and neocortex, 
amygdala and prefrontal lobes, means each is a full partner in mental life. When these 
partners interact well, emotional intelligence rises as does intellectual ability." 
(Goleman, 1996, p. 28). Despite the traditional view of mind as comprising affect as 
well as cognition and conation, affect has only recently assumed a prominence in the 
discipline of psychology (Fiedler & Forgas, 1988; Hilgard, 1980; Watson & Tellegren, 
1985). 
This thesis explores of an aspect of the relationship between emotion and cognition. In 
particular, the influence of mood on health judgments is examined in the context of 
Forgas's (1992a, 1992c, 1994a, 1995b) Affect Infusion Model (AIM) for social 
judgments. Chapter 2 assesses definitional issues and examines the historical and 
theoretical contexts for a study of affective influence on cognition. It is concluded that 
although it is generally accepted that affect influences cognition, the mechanisms for 
such influence have lacked a consistent and empirically substantiated theoretical 
framework. Chapter 3 examines one possible framework, the AIM (Forgas, 1992a, 
1992c, 1994a, 1995b) which describes four possible strategies for the making of social 
judgments. According to the AIM, judgments resulting from strategies involving more 
detailed processing are more subject to affective influence than those involving less 
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processing. Chapter 4 examines research findings about health judgments and assesses 
health judgment findings in relation to the AIM. A summary of Chapters 2, 3 and 4 is 
presented in Chapter 5, followed by the rationale for the ensuing research. The eight 
experiments comprising the experimental program are presented, appropriately 
grouped, in Chapters 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. The findings reported in Chapter 6 were 
presented at conferences as Dobber and Ball (1995a) and those of Chapter 7, as they 
accumulated, as Dobber and Ball (1995b; 1996). In Chapter 11, the results are 
summarised, and the implications of the findings for health judgments and for the 
applicability of Forgas's AIM to health judgments are discussed. 
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Chapter 2 
Affect and Cognition 
Historical context 
The "two minds, the emotional and the rational, operate in tight harmony for the most 
part, intertwining their very different ways of knowing to guide us through the world" 
(Goleman, 1996 pp. 8, 9). This ancient perceived dichotomy between the emotional and 
the rational, was mirrored in folk psychology by a distinction between the heart and the 
head. The heart/head contrast has also been related to a subjective/objective dichotomy 
(Parrott, 1995). In the context of scientific enquiry, emotions have usually been 
ignored, or, where they have been given any status, have been labelled for the purpose 
of controlling them (Oatley and Jenkins, 1992). However, in the latter part of this 
century, emotion has assumed a greater prominence, with, for example, Watson and 
Tellegen (1985, p. 219) indicating that "psychology has rediscovered affect" and 
O'Rorke and Ortony (1994), with their calculus theory of emotion, acknowledging that 
emotions and cognitions are inextricably intertwined. A prerequisite for the study of 
affective influences on cognition was a recognition of their importance. Such a 
recognition has been followed by a series of struggles to interpret and reconcile 
conflicting data obtained from such studies. 
Another traditional view of the mind involved not only the heart and the head, but also 
a third component. Such a triad of affect (feeling), cognition (thinking) and conation 
(motivation and behaviour), indicates that cognitive psychology had not been viewed as 
entire unto itself (Hilgard, 1980). However affect, cognition and conation were dealt 
with mainly in isolation, with affect often neglected (Fiedler & Forgas, 1988). Zajonc 
(1980) noted that to define feeling and thinking was almost to embrace a dualist 
philosophy. Such a substratum might provide reason for the historical hesitation to 
recognise affective influence on cognition. 
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Neither the behaviourist paradigms (Skinner, 1953; Watson, 1913), nor the cognitivist 
paradigms (e.g. Neisser, 1967) incorporated affective processes. The behaviourists saw 
such processes as internal and therefore irrelevant, and the cognitivists saw them as 
disruptive to normal cognition (Forgas, 1994a). More recently the effects of the 
emotions were perhaps neglected because the computer — as a model of the brain — 
provided no convenient analogue (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). 
However the "New Look" approach to the study of perception which became influential 
in the middle of the twentieth century (Bruner, 1957; Bruner & Postman, 1947a, 1947b; 
Bruner & Taj fel, 1961; Erdelyi, 1974; McGinnies, 1949; Pettigrew, 1958; Prentice, 
1961; Schachter and Singer, 1962; Tajfel, 1957) emphasised the roles of emotion and 
motivation and later Zajonc (1980) argued for more attention to affective phenomena in 
social psychology. Rather than assuming affect to be post-cognitive as did James 
(1890), Zajonc (1980) appealed to Wundt's notion of the temporal primacy of affect: 
"the clear apperception of ideas in acts of cognition and recognition is always preceded 
by feelings" (Wundt, 1907, pp. 243-244). Zajonc (1980) related affective reactions to 
faster and more primitive organismic responses, and, conversely, cognitive reactions to 
higher, slower functions. Zajonc (1968) had found that participants' ratings of more 
frequently presented test stimuli were more positive than ratings of less frequently 
presented ones. That is, greater exposure to particular stimuli was enough to make them 
preferred. Moreland and Zajonc (1977, 1979) and Innes (1977) studied the role of 
stimulus recognition in what has been termed the mere exposure phenomenon (because 
mere exposure was enough to make one stimulus preferred over another). This was 
supported later by a meta-analysis of research over 1968-1987 by Bornstein (1989), 
although the underlying mechanism for the phenomenon was not clear (Axelson & 
Brinberg, 1989). The findings of Moreland and Zajonc (1977) indicated that stimulus 
recognition is not a necessary condition for the mere exposure effect, suggesting the 
occurrence of pre-attentive processing. Social settings provide a way in which 
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emotional and cognitive inter-relationships can be studied, without the reductionist 
tendencies of cognitive information processing paradigms (Fiedler & Forgas, 1988). 
Contemporary psychologists (for example Greenwald, 1992; Kihlstrom, Bamardt & 
Tataryn, 1992; Kitayama, 1990) have recently revisited the "New Look", investigating 
pre-attentive, unconscious or subliminal processing, and confirmed that cognitive 
processes include unattended, but nevertheless registered stimuli, including affectively 
laden stimuli. 
Tetlock and Levi (1982) explored perspectives on the relationship between cognition 
and motivation (cf. Bradley, 1978; Heider, 1958) in social psychology in the context of 
attribution bias, and noted the reluctance of psychologists to acknowledge motivational 
and affective influences in the making of judgments. They indicated that motives can 
influence an individual's attention at various stages of information processing, at 
reception, retrieval and integration, as well as at response (c.f. Erdelyi, 1974). They 
drew attention to the limitations imposed by a purely cognitive account of the making 
of judgments. People were not to be seen as "intuitive scientists" (Kelley, 1967), merely 
collecting and analysing information. Their preferences were also subject to emotional 
influence. Tajfel's (1978) theory of social identity, later developed with Turner (Tajfel 
& Turner, 1986), incorporated a motivational aspect, whereas much of the preceding 
empirical research on intergroup relations had been in cognitive terms. 
Affect, attitude and motivation, as constructs, all involve two aspects: how the world is 
and how it might be, as well as a combination of those aspects. That is, affect, attitude 
and motivation all involve positive and negative judgments by people in response to 
both their external (outside the person) and internal (inside the person) environments. 
In this way motivation and affect are distinct from cognitive dimensions. 
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How are affect and cognition defmed? 
Cognitions, according to the philosopher, Flew (1979), are mental processes connected 
with understanding, formulation of beliefs, and knowledge acquisition. Feelings, 
emotions, mood, "affections" and "passions" have been less clearly defined, and 
viewed as aspects of motivation. "Cognition is a generic term used to designate all 
processes involved in knowing" (Hilgard, 1980, p. 6). Affect was a term used in 
association with a person's "mental disposition", as "desire, passion", and, in 
contradistinction to the intellect, as "opposite to reason" (Little, Fowler, Coulson, 
Onions & Friedrichsen, 1973). Isen (1984), noting the difficulties in defining affect, 
proposed that definitions might be clarified through further experimental study of 
affect. However, this has inherent difficulties as researchers need to have defined the 
object of their study in order to plan and implement research. As well as noting the 
difficulties involved in defining affect, Isen also acknowledged the difficulty of 
defining emotions, feelings and moods. In fact, different researchers use slightly 
different definitions, with these sometimes differing in their turn from common usage. 
Sometimes affect has been defined in cognitive terms. For example, Tucker (1981) 
defined two sorts of cognition. He described syncretic cognition as holistic, synthetic 
and affective, and analytic cognition as sequential, logical and reason-oriented. Laird 
(1991) also subsumed affect under a cognitive mantle, proposing that cognition is 
knowledge about the outside world and affect is cognition — knowledge or perception — 
about the self. He indicated that when researchers run experiments on emotion, they 
emphasise feelings, whereas these are but one aspect of several constituents of emotion. 
According to Laird, an emotional event actually comprises at least six components: an 
eliciting event, event appraisal, autonomic response patterns, expressive behaviour, 
instrumental action and feeling. Any of these could mediate cognitive effects. However 
experimenters often ask participants to report only their feelings. 
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Branscombe (1988) defined cognition in terms of the internal processes involved in 
acquiring, storing, transforming and retrieving information, with associated theoretical 
issues being how information is represented in memory and what processes operate on 
these mental representations. Definitions of emotion usually refer to its precursors and 
such definitions are complicated by the fact that quite similar precursors may appear to 
elicit quite different emotions. Any satisfactory theory of emotion needs to explain how 
individuals respond differently in the same context (Branscombe, 1988). 
From a sociocultural perspective, Armon-Jones (1985) proposed that emotions are 
responses to environmental occurrences which are presented through "specific modes 
of social organisation, normative expectations, beliefs and values". Emotions were to be 
understood, not as natural and passive states, but rather as "socially determined patterns 
of ritual action". Emotions could be viewed as socially constructed experiences: only 
some of the emotions experienced by children are validated by adults and peers 
(Armon-Jones, 1985) and hence the emotions shown in a community are shaped by that 
community. Scherer (1996) defined emotion as a hypothetical and multiple construct 
comprising feeling, action tendency, and cognitive content, serving the purposes of 
social signalling, behavioural flexibility, processing of information between stimulus 
and response, and the regulation and control of experience. 
Mayer and Salovey (1988, p. 88) defined affect somewhat differently, as a "generic 
process that might be emotional or due to other physiological processes such as the 
variation between sleep and wakefulness". Mood was seen to be more specific, 
referring to "a feeling state (e.g., angry, happy, sad) that involves multiple 
psychological subsystems including the hormonal, facial expressive, postural, and 
cognitive systems", with emotions referring to short term moods. Forgas (1994a), 
however, used the term affect as an overarching term for two separate categories, mood 
and emotion, with moods being low intensity, diffuse, relatively enduring affective 
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states with no salient antecedent cause and with little cognitive content, and emotions 
being more intense, short-lived, with a salient cause and with clear cognitive content. 
Salovey and Mayer (e.g. Mayer & Geher, 1996; Mayer & Salovey, 1993; Mayer & 
Salovey, 1995, Salovey & Birnbaum, 1989; Salovey & Mayer, 1990) integrated 
emotion and cognition as concepts by developing the notion of emotional intelligence 
(Salovey & Mayer, 1990) whereby arousal of mood and emotions would result in 
changes in attentional focus and memory retrieval. This would enable explicit 
awareness of one's own moods, management of emotions, self-motivation, recognition 
of emotion in others and handling of relationships (Goleman, 1996; Salovey & Mayer, 
1990). 
Are affect and cognition separable from other constructs? 
As well as debate as to whether affect and cognition are separate from each other, there 
is discussion as to whether they are constructs distinct from yet other constructs. For 
example Fiedler and Stroehm (1986) found an increased level of arousal in subjects in 
response to self-relevant material. Such a phenomenon would be explicable in terms of 
(i) Laird's (1991) view that feelings are cognitions which pertain to a person's self-
concept and also with (ii) Riskind's (1989) view that mood induction involves cognitive 
priming which increases retrieval of data consistent with self-cognitions. Arousal level 
may be interpreted by the individual as emotion. In particular, self-referent information 
has been found to have unique perceptual and social effects (Markus & Smith, 1981). 
Self-referent information has also been found to be emotion-laden (Zajonc, 1980), and 
to be able to provoke automatic attention responses (Bargh, 1982). Some models of 
mood and cognition, for example that of Barnard & Teasdale (1991), take such effects 
into account. Izard (1993) also emphasised individual differences in her discussion of 
the role of emotions in evolution and adaptation. She proposed a hierarchical model 
with four types of emotional activating systems, three involving non-cognitive 
information processing (neural, sensorimotor and motivational) and one involving 
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cognitive processing. According to her model, each level operates continuously and 
interacts in providing the background emotionality characteristic of an individual, 
activating particular emotions in response to change. 
Affect and cognition in relation to attitudes and judgments 
Issues relating to affect and cognition are important in understanding the formation and 
modification of attitudes and the making of judgments. "An attitude is a mental and 
neural state of readiness, organised through experience, exerting a directive or dynamic 
influence upon the individual's response to all objects and situations with which it is 
related" (Allport, 1935, quoted in Allport, 1968, p. 68). The nature of attitude, and 
attitude change, has been well summarised by writers such as Allport (1935/68), 
McGuire (1969) and more recently by Eagly and Chaiken (1993), Olson and Zanna 
(1993) and Ostrom, Skowronslci and Nowak (1994). Attitudes are fundamental to 
judgments and also influence behaviour. 
Whether attitudes and judgments result from affective or cognitive mechanisms or from 
both, has been the subject of debate. The lack of definition of emotion and cognition as 
distinct entities and particularly the question of whether they are separate or interacting 
systems, have been important issues. When people make a judgment, such a judgment 
is likely to be thought to lie at the cognitive end of a cognition-emotion axis, with the 
brain computing a response by some sort of statistical strategy, via for example 
cognitive algebra (Anderson, 1974, 1981, 1989). For example, judgments could be 
thought of as cognitive operations based on attention, learning, recall and associative 
processes (Wyer & Srull, 1989). However most judgments are made in a social context 
(cf. Eiser, 1991) and are likely to have emotional associations and consequences. It is 
unlikely that such judgments — social judgments — will be purely "cognitive". Kaplan 
(1991) proposed that theoretical issues relating to choices between affective primacy, 
cognitive primacy, or affective/cognitive interaction models can be sidestepped by 
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adopting Schwarz and Clore's (1988) and Anderson's (1989) proposal that information 
about a target comes from both affective and cognitive sources. 
In summary, historically, psychology has left affect in the wings while cognition took 
centre stage. Definitions of affect and cognition and descriptions of their relationship 
with other constructs have often been marked by lack of precision and consensus. The 
relationship between affect and cognition has been the subject of debate, with topics 
such as self-relevance, arousal level, attention and consequent inter- and intra-
individual differences in processing being widely discussed. 
Mood and judgments 
The study of affective influence, on cognitive processes in general and on social 
judgments in particular, has been marked by attempts to reconcile the varied findings 
obtained. One of the most comprehensive models to reconcile findings relating to 
affective influences on social judgments has been Forgas's AIM (1992a, 1992c, 1994a, 
1995b). This model, which is discussed in detail in the next chapter, proposes four 
processing categories to describe and predict affective influence on social judgments. 
These four processing categories are defined in terms of two aspects of the cognitive 
search (defined as the scanning through memory for specific facts or information, 
Reber, 1985). The first aspect is search extent which can be partial or full, and the 
second is search strategy which can be closed or open. Although other frameworks 
would be possible, these four resulting processing categories — direct access, motivated, 
heuristic, substantive — are adopted for reasons of convenience, continuity and 
consistency, as headings for the discussion which follows. 
Direct access processing 
The combination of a full search and a closed (directed) strategy yields what Forgas 
referred to as direct access processing, where judgments are made from direct access of 
stored material. As indicated by Forgas (1994a) this strategy has received little attention 
12 
in social judgment theory, although such judgments would arguably be common. 
Hence, empirical support for direct access processing as described in the AIM has often 
been deduced from experiments which had other objectives. 
Motivated processing 
In terms of the AIM, the combination of a partial search and a closed (directed) strategy 
yields motivated processing which is geared towards attaining or retaining a preferred 
mood (e.g. Forgas, 1994a). Some of the complexities of asymmetrical findings on mood 
influence in studies of negative and positive moods can be accounted for by motivated 
processing (Forgas, 1994a). The influence of negative affect appears to be more 
complex than that of positive affect, with negative states apparently triggering 
conflicting tendencies. Negative mood sometimes results in pessimism, but at other 
times in attempts to engage in positive thinking. Isen (1984) noted the consequent 
difficulty in predicting whether behaviour would be congruent with negative affect. She 
highlighted the paradoxical situation that some research findings indicated that negative 
feelings resulted variously in reduced, increased or unchanged helping behaviour. Isen 
(1984) proposed that such asymmetry is consistent with the self-regulatory models of 
Mischel (1973) and Bandura (1973, 1977) whereby people employ strategies likely to 
improve negative mood. Isen (1984) inferred that the influence of negative affect on 
cognitive processes might mediate the behavioural effects described, indicating that 
negative affect influences memory and judgment in more complex and less predictable 
ways than does positive affect. 
Sedikides (1994) used mood repair to interpret his findings that judgments (self 
descriptions) were at first congruent with sad mood but that mood incongruence 
followed. He proposed that the mechanism of mood repair might account for 
inconsistency in findings of mood effects. 
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Heuristic processing 
Whereas direct access and motivated processing involve focused searches and are not 
expected to be subject to mood influence, heuristic and substantive processing involve 
more open-ended search strategies and, according to the AIM, allow mood influence. 
These two strategies show mood influence and precisely because of this are the two 
which have most theoretical, and associated experimental, antecedents reported in the 
mood literature. 
The AIM indicates heuristic processing to be likely when the target of the judgment is 
simple or typical, personal relevance is low, specific motivational goals are lacking, 
cognitive capacity is limited and the situation does not require accuracy and detailed 
processing. Forgas (1994a) suggested that in these circumstances affect is likely to be 
used as information (cf. Schwarz & Clore, 1988). This type of processing builds on the 
notion of humans as "cognitive misers", a notion developed by Taylor (1981), positing 
that people minimise processing (Fiske 8z Taylor, 1991). 
Such a processing strategy finds support in Isen's (1984) summary of research findings 
for the influence of positive feelings, in that people who feel happier have ready access 
to positive material in memory and tend towards optimism in their expectations and 
behaviour. They also act to maintain their positive feeling states and solve problems by 
using simplifying strategies. Mackie and Worth (1989) explained their findings of 
processing deficits in people in a positive mood subjected to persuasive messages, by 
proposing that people in an induced positive mood might use less cognitive capacity 
than those in whom no mood had been induced. Mackie and Worth (1991) provided an 
explanation for the failure of positive moods consistently to result in increased 
persuasion: they proposed that positive mood, while apparently being associated with 
reduced attentional and processing capacities, might paradoxically also allow the 
possibility of greater flexibility and creativity. 
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Substantive processing 
The AIM proposes that substantive processing is likely when the judgmental target is 
complex or atypical, cognitive capacity is adequate, there is no specific motivational 
goal, but the judge is motivated to be accurate, perhaps due to situational demands. Of 
the four proposed styles, substantive processing has received most attention, as it is that 
which is assumed usually to occur. The principal model underpinning this type of 
processing was provided by Bower (1981, 1991) as discussed below. 
Some models for affective influence on cognitive processes 
Various models have been put forward to account for affective influence on cognition. 
Forgas (1994a) described affect-as-information (Schwarz & Clore, 1988) as important 
in heuristic processing and the affect-priming associated with Bower's (1981, 1991) 
network theory as important in substantive processing. These models are discussed, 
followed by frameworks developed by Anderson (1983), Branscombe (1988), Fiedler 
(1990), Teasdale and Barnard (e.g. 1993), and Wyer and Srull (1989), . 
Affect-as-information 
Schwarz and Clore (1988) reviewed models accounting for affective influence on 
judgments involving mood congruent recall from memory (Bower, 1981; Isen, 1984; 
Isen, Shalker, Clark & Karp, 1978). They proposed an alterative model whereby. 
inferences are drawn from an affective state in a controlled way rather than with mood 
congruent material being automatically recalled. That is, affect is used as information. 
They proposed that future research should identify the conditions under which 
individuals are likely to use recalled information and be subject to mood congruence 
effects, and when current feelings are likely to be used to inform a judgment. Schwarz, 
Strack, Kommer and Wagner (1987) found strong mood effects for judgments of global 
life satisfaction, but not for judgments of satisfaction in relation to specific issues. From 
this it seemed that affect was used as information for judgments of global life 
satisfaction, but not for specific issues. 
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Bower's (1981, 1991) network theory and affect priming 
Studies by Bower (1981) demonstrated the influence of affective state on all sorts of 
cognitive processes. He proposed an associative network theory to account for his 
findings of mood state dependent memory and mood congruent recall. His theory was 
descended from the more general semantic network theory of cognitive psychology 
(Anderson & Bower, 1973; Collins & Quillian, 1969) and posited emotion nodes in an 
associative network and the spreading of activation throughout it. Affective influence 
on cognition involved a system whereby events were grouped according to their 
associated emotions, resulting in state dependent memory, with a selective focus on 
events consistent with current mood and selective retrieval of events from memory. 
Although this should occur in natural as well as laboratory situations (Bower, Monteiro, 
& Gilligan, 1978; Carlson & Hatfield, 1992), Bower and Mayer (1989) failed to find 
consistent evidence for mood dependent retrieval with six studies. 
In 1991, Bower reviewed his associative network theory and described it as involving a 
number of emotion nodes biologically wired into the brain. Some innate and some 
learned environmental situations could activate a particular emotion node. When this 
happens, as the result of particular recognition rules, activation spreads to a variety of 
indicators including characteristic physiological and facial expressions, to memories of 
events associated with that emotion, and to interpretive rules for classifying the social 
world. The amended network model assumed that the attitudinal object could be 
associated directly with the affective valence, as well via the belief, as supposed in the 
1981 model. The model sums positive and negative evaluations and so is algebraic (cf. 
Anderson, 1974; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) so that the greater the quantity of data 
available to the subject, the less the influence of an extra piece of information. 
Bower (1991) proposed that emotional influences could arise via various mechanisms. 
Earlier learning could influence interpretation of a present event as positive or negative. 
Mood could increase a person's attention to mood congruent facts and also the extent of 
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rehearsal of such facts. These two factors could result in stronger associations from the 
attitude object to the fact and to the congruent valence node, leading to a correlation 
between biases in recall and judgment. Mood at judgment time could spread and 
indirectly influence the apparent activation level of the positive versus negative valence 
node attached to the attitude object, which would distort the relative valences in a mood 
congruent direction. The mood prevailing at judgment time would temporarily move 
the judgment in the direction of the congruent valence node as was found by Clore 
(1985). 
Implications for his amended model were outlined by Bower (1991) as follows. 
(i) Emotional influence could be widespread, affecting topics temporally 
removed from the event or memory that created the mood as found by 
Johnson and Tversky (1983). 
(ii) The latency of an affective decision about an attitudinal object would be in 
inverse proportion to the dominance of one valence node over the other, 
consistent with findings of Forgas and Bower (1987). 
However, Bower (1991) saw some problems with the amended model, for example, the 
effect of the prevailing mood can be over-ridden by a strong, pre-formed opinion as 
demonstrated by Schwarz and Clore's (1988) life satisfaction study. Bower 
acknowledged that the model needed further development and lacked parsimony. 
In his critique of Bower's (1981) model, Blaney (1986) distinguished between state 
dependent memory and mood congruence as follows. State dependent memory involves 
mood at the time of learning being associated with superior remembering of the 
material when the person is in the same mood. This has been best substantiated in 
relation to drug-induced states, for example cigarette smoking induces a state which 
influences recall (Peters & McGee, 1982). Mood congruence assumes that material is 
more likely to be stored and/or recalled when its affective content is related to current 
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mood. For example, Clark and Teasdale (1982) showed that depressed people tested on 
two separate occasions indicated fewer happy memories when more depressed and 
more when they were less depressed. Blaney indicated that overall, while the evidence 
for state dependent memory was mixed, evidence for mood congruence was consistent 
and that Bower's model inadequately distinguished between effects of state dependence 
and mood congruence. The model assumes automatic processing. Blaney saw Bower's 
model as being similar to Tompkin's (1981) view of affect as amplification of 
responses evoked by stimulation of "retrieved memories" and "constructed thoughts". 
He also compared it with depth of processing models underlying research on self-
schemas in depression (cf. Ingram, 1994). However Blaney emphasised the need to 
distinguish between mnemonic effects of mood per se and mnemonic effects of 
cognitive structures associated with mood such as self-image and self-schemata. Mayer, 
Gayle, Meehan and Haarman (1990), in an experiment involving 196 participants, 
found mood congruence which was not confounded by instructional manipulations, by 
reported mood strength or by personality variables. They interpreted their findings in 
terms of a model involving spreading activation due to cognitive priming rather than to 
mood as such. 
Singer and Salovey (1988) comprehensively evaluated Bower's (1981) network theory 
of affect and concluded that there was some empirical support for the theory — results 
for congruency in encoding have been consistent with its predictions. They indicated, 
however, that experimental findings are not entirely supportive: for example, there are 
more reliable findings of happy mood congruence than of sad mood congruence. Mood 
maintenance and repair were proposed as a possible underlying mechanism for the lack 
of consistency with the model. Stegge (1991) suggested that Bower's model was too 
simple to explain the complex relationship between affect and cognition. Stegge 
emphasised the role of motivational, social and cultural factors in mediating mood 
influence on cognition and advocated greater attention to the circumstances in which 
mood influences cognition. Rinck, Glowalla and Schneider (1992) found mood- 
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congruent learning for strongly emotive words: people induced with a sad mood 
recalled strongly unpleasant words better and those induced with a happy mood recalled 
strongly pleasant words better. However they found mood incongruence for weakly 
emotive words. They concluded that mood does not produce mood congruent learning 
directly and automatically, as implied by a simple network model of emotion, but in a 
more complex way than represented in Bower's model. They proposed a two-
component processing model with variations in task or materials being responsible for 
the different findings. 
Bower's (1981) model was considered inadequate by Isen (1984). She discussed the 
work of Johnson and Tversky (1983) in relation to the predictive validity of a spreading 
activation model and found Bower's model to be unsupported by their findings. 
Reading about a serious health event influenced predictions of unrelated negative life 
events as much as it did more closely related serious health events. Alternative 
explanations put forward by Isen were: 
(i) with a schema or contexualist theory (e.g. Bransford, 1979), feeling would 
function in a similar way to meaning and lead to a deeper level of 
organisation (Craik & Lockhart, 1972) or to a more elaborated 
representation (Craik & Tulving, 1975), and 
(ii) given the instantaneous processing of affect (Zajonc, 1980) and its 
experiential quality, affect could be both semantic and experiential. 
Wyer and Srull's (1989) model 
Wyer and Srull (1989) outlined a detailed and complex model for social information 
processing including affective influences on processing and judgment. Their model, 
appears to be a descendant of Bower's (1981) model, with emotions represented by 
concepts. These concepts are contained in a "semantic storage bin" in a Permanent 
Storage Unit, that is in long term memory. When a person experiences internal 
reactions an emotion concept (e.g. anger) can be activated by the Encoder/Organiser, a 
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higher order interpreter used when there are specific goal-related processing objectives, 
and inferences may be made. Additionally, emotion concepts, either specific or generic, 
may be found in referent bins; recall of a thought can result in re-experiencing 
associated feelings. Emotion concepts can also be represented in relation to specific 
goals such as the elimination of an unpleasant emotion (cf. motivated processing). 
Wyer and Srull saw Bower's (1981) model as involving a closer association between 
emotion and cognition nodes than their own more complex model. Both models are 
quite different from Zajonc's (1980) model with its independent systems for affect and 
cognition. 
Anderson's ( 1983) model as developed by Branscombe (1988) 
Branscombe (1988) held the view that affect and cognition are processed within the 
same system. He adapted Anderson's (1983) model of information processing to take 
affective phenomena into account. Anderson's model was seen as useful because of its 
distinction between procedural and declarative knowledge, each having different 
properties of storage, representation and activation. Declarative knowledge was seen as 
a propositional network with concepts in long term memory represented as 
associatively linked nodes (cf. Bower). Procedural knowledge involved "condition-
action pairs" which are selected and fired when the conditions match the external 
environment or fit models retained in working memory. According to Branscombe, 
both affect and cognition could be processed at or below the level of awareness. 
• Interacting Cognitive Subsystems model (Barnard & Teasdale, 1991; Teasdale, 
1993; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993) 
Teasdale (1993) itemised problems with Bower's model. As regards mood congruence, 
problems are both empirical — with failure to replicate mood state dependency — and 
theoretical — in that too many nodes would be required, diluting mood effects to 
become negligible. Additionally, the model fails to account for the distinction between 
cold and hot cognition (Zajonc, 1980) and for the fact that emotional experiences can be 
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remembered without, as well as with, emotion. Barnard and Teasdale (1991), Teasdale 
(1993), and Teasdale and Barnard (1993) extended Barnard's (1985) Interacting 
Cognitive Subsystems (ICS) framework to include the interaction of cognition and 
emotion and provided a possible solution for the problems inherent in Bower's model. 
The ICS approach involves qualitatively distinct types of information codes at various 
levels (Barnard & Teasdale, 1993). These codes have the following functions. 
Three encode sensory information 
(i) Acoustic, 
(ii) Visual, and 
(iii) Body state. 
Two encode information required for effector action 
(i) Articulatory for speech and 
(ii) Limb. 
Two encode immediate structural level descriptions capturing recurring 
irregularities in sensory code patterns encountered 
(i) Morphonolexical from irregularities in acoustic code and 
(ii) Object from Visual code; and 
Two encode specific and generic levels of meaning 
(i) Propositional, e.g semantic networks 
(ii) Implicational integrates lower codes and captures high level 
irregularities in the world, body and mind producing models of 
experience. 
The ICS model, then, assumes two levels of meaning — specific and holistic — with 
emotional processes linked only to holistic meaning. 
Some insights from Fiedler's (1990) analysis 
Fiedler (1990) provided a useful summary of the principles underlying most studies of 
affect and cognition. These were mood congruency (Bower & Cohen, 1982; Nasby & 
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Yando, 1982; Snyder & White, 1982), state dependency (Weingartner, Miller & 
Murphy, 1977) and resource allocation (Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988). According to Fiedler, 
mood congruency involves the relationship between a person's mood state and the 
affective tone of the stimulus, resulting in an interaction between mood and stimulus 
valence. State dependency involves an interaction between people's mood states at the 
time of learning/encoding and at retrieval/recall. Resource allocation involves an 
interaction between emotional influences on memory and the quantity of cognitive 
resources taken up with competing tasks. Although these principles appear intuitively 
obvious, Fiedler (1990) indicated that they are not always supported by experimental 
findings (Bower & Mayer, 1985; Clark & Teasdale, 1985; Mecklenbrauker & Hager, 
1984). He nonetheless indicated that this lack of positive evidence might be the result 
of weak mood manipulation, poorly controlled material or other experimental problems. 
Hasher, Rose, Zacks, Sanft and Doren (1985) however, had found that naturally 
occurring mood variations among university students did not usually lead to cognitive 
effects. Fiedler's (1990) view was that these findings were too readily dismissed by 
their critics. 
Another issue dealt with by Fiedler (1990) was that of self-reference as a catalyst for 
emotional influences on cognition. Theoretical explanations for the dependence of 
cognition on emotional factors in the case of self-reference, have included that: 
(i) self-schemata suppose that experience about the self is more highly 
elaborated and organised than other knowledge structures (Markus, 1977) 
and 
(ii) material related to the self is emotionally arousing (Bock, 1988). 
Fiedler opted for an interpretation of emotional influence on cognition in terms of the 
particularly active nature of information related to the self and the high involvement of 
"productive" elements. 
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Fiedler (1990, 1991) also reinforced the need for clarification of theoretical and 
empirical concepts, and emphasised that the empirical evidence for classical mood 
effects on memory, person judgment, and social interaction is equivocal. As an 
alternative to Bower's network theory, he proposed a dual-force model involving two 
alternative processes or forces, those of passive conservation of given information 
and/or those of active generation of new information. 
Some other issues 
Mood congruent memory and natural mood 
Mood congruence has been explained by spreading activation models of memory (e.g. 
Bower, 1981; Collins & Loftus, 1975). For these models to be upheld mood congruent 
memories would be expected with natural, as well as with induced, mood. Findings 
have been equivocal. Some experimenters (Mayer, Gashke, Braverman & Evans, 1992; 
Mayer & Hanson, 1995) have failed to establish mood congruent judgments with 
natural mood, but Mayer, McCormick and Strong (1995) were able to demonstrate such 
mood congruence. These different findings might have been due to experimental 
conditions. The following have been proposed as conditions under which mood effects 
are likely to be obtained: (i) correlating a single pleasant-unpleasant dimension of mood 
with a single pleasant-unpleasant dimension of the cognitive response of interest, (ii) 
counterbalancing valence of items, (iii) temporal proximity of task and mood measure 
(iv) use of ambiguous items (Mayer & Hanson, 1985), and (v) testing participants in the 
absence of extraneous mood-biasing or lengthy tasks (Mayer, McCormick & Strong, 
1995). The difference between natural and induced mood received attention in the work 
of Kwiatowski and Parkinson (1994) who found differences in the performances of 
naturally depressed and induced-depressed people. Naturally depressed participants 
showed no deficits in a word recall task compared with non-depressed, but induced-
depressed people showed poorer recall. 
23 
Personality and mood/cognition 
Mayer and Salovey (1988) assessed findings on the implications of personality for the 
ways that mood and cognition affect each other. They examined the interaction between 
moods originating in both state and trait domains. They also noted a further layer of 
complexity in the experience of mood, a meta-mood experience, whereby people have 
cognitions about their moods while having them. Mayer and Gaschke (1988) identified 
five factors describing such cognitions, with thoughts only sometimes congruent with 
mood. Hence mood control could be dependent on evaluations people make of their 
moods, with healthier personalities more able to regulate their moods. Such meta-mood 
beliefs were found by Mayer, Mamberg and Volanth (1988) to influence judgments but 
surprisingly, mood repair efforts did not. (An example of an effort at mood repair given 
by these authors was "I am thinking good thoughts to cheer up my bad mood") Mayer, 
Salovey, Gomberg-Kaufman and Blaney (1991) emphasised that emotion-related 
experience (with physical, emotional and cognitive dimensions) includes mood 
management processes which moderate the management of the mood (resulting in 
thoughts of action, suppression, denial). Such an ability to monitor, discriminate 
between and act upon, one's own emotions, or those of others, was described by Mayer 
and Salovey (1993) as emotional intelligence and this ability can result in mood 
regulation (cf. also Barnard & Teasdale's, 1991, ICS model). 
Mayer and Salovey (1988) proposed that people can moderate affect because mood is 
self-relevant or because self-relevant information can lead to changes in cognition. 
Regarding the first, Salovey and Rodin (1985) found that self-relevant mood inductions 
produced more consistent and more symmetrical results than did empathic procedures. 
Regarding the second, independent of mood, self-relevance enhances memory for 
emotional material (Miall, 1986; Rogers, Kuiper & Kirker, 1977) perhaps because of a 
greater depth of processing (Craik & Tulving, 1975). Findings of Rogers, Kuiper and 
Kirker (1977) indicated that self-reference involves a powerful encoding process, with 
the self acting as a superordinate schema involved in the processing, interpretation and 
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memory of personal information. Blaney (1986) found that participants encouraged to 
focus on the self-relevance of stimuli showed greater mood congruent processing 
effects than those asked to focus on other (semantic, or phonemic) aspects. For 
judgments involving the choice of a suitable working partner, Forgas (1989) found 
similar effects for personal relevance. Pietromonaco and Markus (1985) found a direct 
relationship between self-relevance of judgments and mood effects in depressed people. 
A question arising is: under what conditions does the self-relevance of an issue result in 
mood congruence and when does mood repair occur? This is relevant for predicting the 
type of processing which will occur (e.g. substantive or motivated). 
Markus and Wurf (1987) summarised the information processing consequences of the 
self-structure as follows. People show a heightened sensitivity to self-relevant stimuli 
(Bargh, 1982). Self-congruent stimuli are efficiently processed (Markus, 1977). Self-
relevant stimuli show enhanced recognition and recall (Markus, 1980). Individuals 
make confident behavioural predictions in self-relevant domains (Anderson, 1984) and 
individuals are resistant to information incongruent with their self-structure (Markus, 
1977). Markus and Wurf (1987) emphasised the dynamic nature of the self-concept, 
seeing it as an active, interpretive structure, fundamental to a person's affective and 
cognitive systems, integral to establishing meaning, and involved in the regulation of 
affect. Sherman, Judd and Park (1989) endorsed the notion of the dynamic self, which 
involved a stable core self and a working self and also involved changing in response to 
environmental demands. Mackie and Skelly (1994) proposed that the activation of the 
self-concept when self-relevant information is involved was likely to result in the 
formation and maintenance of attitudes congruent with the self-concept. 
Salovey (1992) found that both positive and negative, but not neutral, moods induced 
self-focused attention. In terms of natural mood states, Pyszcynski, Holt and Greenberg 
(1987) examined depressed and non-depressed people's judgments of the probability of 
positive and negative life events occurring to themselves and to others and found that 
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depressed people were less optimistic than non-depressed people. Ellis and Ashbrook 
(1988) appealed to reduced allocation of resources (Kahneman, 1973) to explain the 
effect of depressed mood on memory. Their idea was that the depressed mood itself 
occupied or blocked some of the available cognitive capacity. 
Dual process models to explain the role of affect in social judgment 
The material so far reviewed points to the processing of information in dual or multiple 
ways. Models for information processing recognise that individuals have limited 
attentional capacity and therefore need mechanisms to determine how much attention 
will be devoted to a particular task. 
Affect has been conceptualised as influencing social judgments, either by providing 
information, with such models accounting for mood congruent judgmental biases, or by 
influencing processing strategies. The two information accounts are referred to as 
affect-as-information and affect-priming models. The affect-as-information model (e.g. 
Clore & Parrott, 1991) is based on an attributional framework with people using their 
affective state to make judgments. The affect-priming model (e.g. Forgas & Bower, 
1988) proposes a selective activation and greater availability of mood-primed 
associations in constructive processing of social information. Processing strategy 
explanations emphasise the influence of mood on processing strategies, with a varying 
extent of mood influence depending on the style of processing used (Chaiken & Eagly, 
1983; Clark & Isen, 1982; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). 
Clark and Isen (1982) adopted Posner and Snyder's (1975) distinction between 
automatic and controlled processing to explain the complex ways that feelings 
influence behaviour. Clark and Isen proposed that automatic priming of compatible 
material might occur in association with both positive and negative feelings. 
Controlled, effortful processes might be used to move the feeling state in a positive 
direction. Persuasion research has also yielded dual processing models (Chaiken, 1980, 
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1987; Petty and Cacioppo, 1981, 1986) with some similarity to each other, but different. 
from the dual process model proposed by Clark and Isen (1982). 
Petty and Cacioppo (1981, 1986) put forward an Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) 
in the context of the role of affect in persuasion. They proposed that attitudes are 
formed, and changed, by effortful, elaborative central route processing and after such 
attitudes are formed they are relatively persistent and predictive of behaviour. However 
because people are "cognitive misers" (Taylor, 1981) some attitudes are formed, and 
changed, by shallower peripheral route processing with the resultant attitudes being 
less persistent, and less predictive of behaviour. The model predicts that high personal 
relevance would also be associated with more elaborative processing. Cacioppo and 
Petty (1982) found that people's need for cognition influenced the type of processing 
used with a high need for cognition associated with more elaborative processing. Affect 
was predicted to be used as information or to bias information processing when people 
were highly motivated, but used as a peripheral cue when motivation or ability were 
low, or when people were uncertain about the importance of the issues (Petty, 
Cacioppo, Sedikides & Strathman, 1988). 
Chaiken (1980, 1987) also advocated a dual processing system referred to as systematic 
processing for detailed, attentive processing and heuristic processing for that occurring 
when simple cues were used. To a considerable extent these terms parallel the central 
versus peripheral route processing of Petty and Cacioppo (1986). 
Bohner, Chaiken and Hunyadi (1994) contrasted the differing predictions of the 
heuristic-systematic (HSM) and the elaboration likelihood (ELM) models and specified 
the particulars of their applicability. They indicated that the models differ in the relation 
between the processing modes: the routes for the ELM are alternative whereas with 
HSM the processes can occur simultaneously and thus heuristic processing, for 
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example, could bias systematic processing. Their experiment supported the bias 
hypothesis and simultaneous processing of the HSM. 
Fiedler (1988) built on Kelly's (1955) description of therapeutic progress whereby 
people increased their ability to broaden and narrow their focus as the situation 
warranted. Fiedler suggested that such a loosening and tightening of constructs could 
describe the cognitive processes used by people in positive and negative moods 
respectively. "Loosening" would correspond to heuristic processing and "tightening" to 
systematic processing. 
In summary, dual process models, that is, models which allow for different types of 
processing according to different circumstances - for example, attentional capacity, 
amount of distraction, the importance of the processing outcome - have made an 
important contribution to our understanding of how emotional factors might influence 
social judgments. 
Conclusions 
It is now generally acknowledged that affect influences cognition. The mechanisms for 
such influence are the subject of considerable observation, experimentation and debate, 
which have not yet provided a consistent and generally accepted overarching 
conceptual framework. 
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Chapter 3 
Forgas's Affect Infusion Model for Social Judgments 
Development of the Affect Infusion Model 
The difficulty of developing an overarching conceptual framework accounting for the 
various and varied findings in relation to affective influences on cognition has been 
generally acknowledged. Such a difficulty was highlighted by Forgas (1991b) who 
outlined as many as four types of theoretical framework for understanding the effect of 
mood on social judgments, namely, 
(i) information storage and retrieval models, based on cognitive research on 
memory processes (Bower, 1981, 1991; Isen 1984), 
(ii) attributional or judgmental heuristic models (Schwarz & Clore, 1988), 
(iii) information integration models (Anderson, 1974), and 
(iv) models focusing on alternate processing strategies and processing capacity 
variables (Chaiken, 1980, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981, 1986). 
These models are referred to in the course of this thesis. Over the current decade, 
Forgas (1992a, 1992c, 1994a, 1995b) has developed a model which accounts for many 
of the experimental findings in relation to affect and social judgments — a particular 
aspect of cognition. 
The history of the development of the AIM can be sketched as follows. Forgas and 
Bower (1987) thought of cognitive priming models, for example, Bower's (1981) 
network model, as providing a reasonable, if still not completely adequate, account of 
their findings of mood congruence in relation to person perception. They indicated that 
sociocultural variables should be incorporated into such cognitive priming models to 
account for the complex processing involved in making social judgments (cf. Clore, 
1985; Forgas, 1981, 1983). They considered that their data might be partly accounted 
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for by other theoretical models derived from research into social comparison processes 
(Festinger, 1954; Wills, 1981), misattribution theory (Clore, 1985) and by the effects of 
self-esteem. However, Forgas and Bower (1987) thought that cognitive priming models 
(Bower, 1981, Clark & Isen, 1982), which enabled predictions about judgment times 
and memory, provided better accounts of their findings. 
Forgas (1989, 1991d) emphasised the importance of the personal relevance of a 
decision in influencing the extent of mood effects on cognition and Forgas, Bower and 
Moylan (1990) investigated mood effects on attributions people made for their 
achievements. They recognised that transient moods might influence attributions in at 
least two ways: 
(i) by influencing cognition and processing strategies (Bower, 1981; Clore & 
Parrott, 1991; Isen, 1984; Levanthal, 1980), and 
(ii) by influencing motivation (Bradley, 1978; Clark & Isen, 1982; Stephan & 
Gollwitzer, 1981; Swann, Pelham & Krull, 1989; Wills, 1981). 
Their finding that sad mood resulted in self-deprecation was consistent with cognitive, 
rather than motivational, theories (Forgas, Bower & Moylan, 1990). 
Forgas (1992c) proposed a multi-process model, built on those of Brewer (1988), 
Fiedler (1990) and Petty, Gleicher and Baker (1991), to account for mood effects on 
social judgments. The four processing strategies Forgas identified in this and 
subsequent papers were direct access, motivated, heuristic and substantive processing. 
These four strategies involved full or partial information search extent, open-ended or 
closed processing and a range of processing depths. Forgas (1992a) described his model 
as a new and comprehensive model of social judgmental processes. He drew upon, and 
integrated, informational theories, particularly affect-priming (Bower, 1981, 1991) and 
affect-as-information (Clore & Parrott, 1991; Schwarz & Clore, 1988) as well as 
process-oriented models, for example, the dual process models (Fiedler, 1990; Isen, 
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1987; Petty, Gleicher & Baker, 1991; Schwarz, 1990). He outlined four assumptions 
about social judgment processes. 
(i ) Alternative processing strategies are available. This assumption was an 
extension of the dual-process models for attitude formation and change of 
Chaiken (1980, 1982, 1987), Chaiken, Liberman and Eagly, (1989) Eagly 
and Chaiken (1983) and Petty and Cacioppo (1981, 1986). 
(ii) Mood effects depend on the processing strategy used. 
(iii) Affect can sometimes influence both the processing strategy used and the 
judgment itself, either indirectly through priming or directly as information. 
(iv) People use the least effortful strategy required by the circumstances, that is 
they are "cognitive misers" (Petty, Gleicher & Baker, 1991; Taylor, 1981). 
Forgas's (1992a) model indicated four types of processing, with the type of processing 
used influencing the extent of affective influence on a judgment. The four judgment 
types, dealt with here in the order used by Forgas, were as follows. 
(i) A direct access strategy involves a full search with a closed (directed) 
search strategy whereby pre-existing judgments are retrieved and 
implemented. This strategy is used when the target of the judgment is well-
known and familiar, the judgment has no personal relevance to the judge, no 
motivational, affective or cognitive forces are present and additionally that 
the situation does not require detailed processing. 
(ii) A motivated processing strategy involves a partial search extent and a 
closed (directed) search strategy. It was compared by Forgas (1992a) with 
Zajonc's (1980) model whereby preferences guide inferences. Here the 
judgment is motivated. That is, it is driven by a specific pre-existing goal 
such as to maintain or to repair mood. Such processing is likely when the 
target is unfamiliar and there is no pre-existing assessment available, the 
judge has a strong objective in making the judgment, and the search 
involves the selective pursuit of a motivational goal. 
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(iii) A heuristic processing strategy is an effort-minimising method relying on 
any available simplifications, and involves a partial search and an open-
ended search strategy. It is likely when the target is simple or typical, the 
issue has low personal relevance to the judge, who has no specific 
motivation, limited cognitive capacity, and may be in a positive mood. 
Accuracy is not deemed important and the situation does not require detailed 
processing. 
(iv) A substantive processing strategy involves a full search extent and an open 
search strategy. It involves selecting, learning, and interpreting novel 
information about a target and relating this to pre-existing knowledge to 
make a judgment. It is likely when the target is atypical, unusual or 
complex, the judge has no specific motivational goal, has adequate cognitive 
capacity, may be in a negative mood, wishes to be accurate, and where the 
situation imposes demands. It was described, nevertheless, as being 
automatic and uncontrolled. 
Forgas's (1992a) multi-process model posited mechanisms for two different types of 
affective influences on judgments. These were mechanisms for: 
(i) informational effects which may be due to indirect priming (Bower, 1981) 
or to a direct informative function of feelings (Schwarz & Clore, 1988) and 
(ii) process effects which influence information-processing strategies and 
judgments (Fiedler, 1991; Isen, 1984). 
These mechanisms provided the basis for mood congruency in judgment, with mood 
congruency occurring because mood provides relevant information for use in making a 
judgment, either indirectly through primed associations (Bower, 1981, 1991), or 
directly through misattribution (Schwarz & Clore, 1988). According to the multi-
process model, affect-priming is likely with substantive processing, and affect is likely 
to be used as information with heuristic processing. 
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Forgas (1994a) named his integrative multiprocess theory the Affect Infusion Model 
(AIM) of social judgments adopting the term affect infusion to refer to "the process 
whereby affectively loaded information influences and becomes part of the judgmental 
process, entering the judge's constructive thought processes, and eventually colouring 
the judgmental outcome" Forgas (1994a, p. 2). In the use of this term he drew upon 
Feshbach and Singer's (1957) account of affective influence on cognition. Feshbach 
and Singer had proposed that when a specific affective state is aroused there is a 
tendency for it to become connected to "contemporaneous percepts and ideation". They 
described the process as "the infusion of cognition with affect" and incorporated the 
psychodynamic notion of projection, a process whereby a person ascribes his or her 
own emotions or beliefs to another (Reber, 1985) as the mechanism for such influence. 
Forgas's AIM might therefore be economically depicted as in Figure 3.1 which shows 
how four judgmental strategies can result, depending on whether the information search 
process is closed (directed) or open, and whether the search extent is partial or full. 
Conceptual issues 
Forgas (1994a) recognised a lack of agreement in definitions of terms relating to 
emotion. He defined affect as including both mood and emotions. Moods were defined 
as being low intensity, diffuse and enduring feeling states with no salient cause and 
little cognitive content. Emotions were defined as higher intensity, short-lived feeling 
states with a definite cause and clear cognitive content. Additionally, Forgas saw moods 
rather than emotions as having the more significant effects on cognition. 
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Search 
Process 
Search Extent 
Partial Full 
Closed 
(No/little 
affect 
infusion) 
Target: 
Judge: 
Situation: 
MOTIVATED 
eg mood control 
unfamiliar 
•motivated 
no pre-existing assessment 
Target 
Judge: 
Situation: 
DIRECT ACCESS 
eg stereotyping 
well known or familiar 
•no personal relevance 
•no motivational forces 
•no affective forces 
•no cognitive forces 
no situational force mandating 
elaborative processing 
Open 
(Affect 
infusion) 
Target: 
Judge: 
Situation: 
HEURISTIC 
affect as information 
eg misattribution 
simple or typical 
• low personal relevance 
•no specific motivation 
•cognitive capacity limited 
does not require accuracy 
nor substantive processing 
Target: 
Judge: 
Situation: 
SUBSTANTIVE 
affect-priming 
complex or atypical 
•no specific motivational goal 
•adequate cognitive capacity 
requires accuracy 
Figure 3.1 
	
A representation of Forgas's Affect Infusion Model (AIM) for the 
processing of social judgments. 
Evidence in support of, and contrary to, the AIM 
The phenomenon of mood congruence (i.e. the better memory of material when 
affective content is related to current mood) has been established over many types of 
judgments (Bower, 1981; Clark, Milberg & Ross, 1983; Forgas, 1994b; Forgas & 
Bower, 1987; Forgas, Bower & Krantz, 1984; Forgas & Moylan, 1987; Forgas & 
Moylan, 1991; Erber, 1991; Isen, Shalker, Clark & Karp, 1978; Johnson & Tversky, 
1983; Mathews & Bradley, 1983; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Teasdale, Taylor & Fogarty, 
1980). Forgas's AIM proposed that the occurrence and extent of such mood effects 
depended on the type of processing strategy used, with mood effects being most likely 
when constructive processing is used, that is, under heuristic and substantive 
processing. Affect-as-information was proposed as the underlying mechanism for 
heuristic processing and affect-priming for substantive processing. 
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Evidence related to direct access judgments 
Forgas (1994a, 1995b) indicated that although direct access judgments are probably 
common, such judgments have been the subject of few specifically focused studies. 
Hence evidence tends to arise as a by-product of studies with other goals. Forgas 
indicated that Srull (1983, 1984) found no affective influences in judgments on familiar 
products, in contrast to his finding of mood effects with unfamiliar products. Patterns 
found by Srull (1983, 1984) were echoed by findings of Schwarz, Stack, Kommer and 
Wagner (1987), who found that for specific judgments mood effects were non-
significant, but for the more complex global judgments mood effects were strong, with 
mood apparently being used as a source of information. Levine, Wyer and Schwarz 
(1994) likewise found a similar pattern for specific, compared with global, self-esteem 
issues. 
Salovey and Birnbaum (1989) in their experiment with healthy participants reported no 
mood effects for health judgments about familiar positive health events, in contrast to 
their findings of mood effects with unfamiliar negative health events. Their negative 
health event items were: contracting some form of cancer, being a victim of fire, being 
the victim of a violent street crime, developing high blood pressure, becoming an 
alcoholic, developing diabetes, developing arthritis, being involved in an automobile 
accident and having a stroke. As positive health event items Salovey and Birnbaum 
used the following: achieving great cardiac fitness, regularly maintaining a well-
balanced diet, regularly maintaining an exercise program, lowering cholesterol levels, 
being in great physical shape, learning relaxation skills and reducing tension, 
maintaining ideal body weight and reducing exposure to toxic substances. Forgas 
(1994a) suggested that the lack of mood congruence for positive health events might be 
due to access of pre-formed opinions. It is at least arguable, though, that it would be no 
easier for people to access information on positive than on negative items. Also, it 
could be argued that the health items actually used by Salovey and Birnbaum (1989) 
were not, on the whole, ones with which students would be particularly familiar. 
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In summary, Forgas (1994a) noted an absence of mood effects precisely as his AIM 
predicted for direct access processing. 
Evidence related to motivated processing 
Forgas (1994a) also reported on studies showing lack of affect infusion under 
conditions for motivated processing. Forgas (1989, 1991d) found no evidence of affect 
infusion in partner choices, where, instead of using affective information, subjects 
focused on, and made judgments assisting in, mood repair. Weary, Marsh and Gleicher 
(1991), Weary, Marsh and McCormick (1994) and Erber and Erber (1994) all found no 
evidence of affect infusion in conditions of motivated processing. Achee, Tesser and 
Pilkington (1994) provided another example of lack of affect infusion in motivational 
processing with their findings indicating maintenance of a stable self-evaluation. 
Sedikides' (1994) findings however, indicated that the situation might be more complex 
than allowed for by the AIM. He found evidence that mood repair seemed to occur after 
initial mood effects, with mood congruence being registered first, and with this being 
followed by mood incongruence. Such a shift of processing style would require 
building sequential processes into the AIM and giving it a temporal dimension. 
In summary, although there is evidence that motivated processing obviates affect 
infusion as hypothesised by the AIM, it is arguable that this has not been universally 
upheld in experimental findings. 
Evidence related to heuristic processing 
Forgas (1994a) reported results of a number of studies (e.g. those of Bower, 1981; 
Clore & Byrne, 1974; Forgas & Moylan, 1987; Isen, 1984; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; 
Srull, 1983; Schwarz, Strack, Kommer & Wagner, 1987) which were all run in 
conditions likely to call on heuristic processing, where significant mood effects were 
found for judgments about people, life events and life satisfaction. Forgas viewed mood 
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congruency in judgments as occurring through misattribution (heuristic processing) or 
because affect informs a judgment through primed associations (substantive 
processing). 
Evidence related to substantive processing 
Of particular relevance to this thesis is Forgas's (1994a) description of affect infusion 
under substantive processing. He indicated that the most basic judgments requiring a 
degree of substantive processing (cf. Kelly, 1955) are likely in the observation and 
interpretation of ongoing social behaviours such as those reported by Forgas, Bower 
and Krantz (1984) who found mood congruent effects when happy and sad subjects 
made judgments about videos of their interactions the previous day. Forgas further 
suggested that more complex stimuli requiring more elaborate processing could show 
even greater influence of mood, giving as a possible example, the findings of Salovey 
and Birnbaum (1989) that some health judgments made by healthy people were subject 
to mood influence. Also in support of the model were the findings of Forgas, Bower 
and Moylan (1990), who, following Heider (1958) and Weiner (1980), studied the role 
of affect in inferences and found that affect significantly influenced causal attributions, 
particularly for participants in a sad mood. 
Mood congruent effects on persuasion were found by Bohner, Chaiken and Hunyadi 
(1994). Petty, Gleicher and Baker (1991) found greater mood effects when the message 
was personally relevant or ambiguous and when subjects had a high need for cognition, 
defined by Cacioppo and Petty (1982, p. 116) as "the tendency for an individual to 
engage in and enjoy thinking" in understanding and making sense of the world. 
Wegener, Petty and Klein (1994) found that subjects with a high need for cognition, 
and therefore tending to use substantive processing rather than heuristic, showed an 
influence of happy mood in judgments. This did not apply to those with a lower need 
for cognition. For subjects with a high need for cognition, positive arguments were 
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more effective for those in a positive mood, and negative arguments for those in a 
negative mood. Again this did not apply to subjects with a low need for cognition. 
Because of the importance of processing differences in the AIM, Forgas (1994a) 
emphasised the importance of response time data in providing evidence for evaluating 
different processing styles. In their study of mood influence on impression formation 
Forgas and Bower (1987) reported that response time data supported the cognitive-
priming principles of Bower's (1981) "spreading activation" model and Clark and 
Isen's (1982) cognitive priming model. Participants took longer learning about mood 
consistent details but made mood consistent judgments faster, than with mood 
inconsistent details and judgments. Happy participants formed more positive 
impressions and judgments than did sad. Cued recall and recognition memory were 
better for mood consistent characteristics, with positive mood having a greater effect on 
judgments and memory than negative mood. 
The AIM predicts that the more a person thinks about a judgment, the greater the 
likelihood of affective influence. This was upheld by an experiment in which Forgas 
(1992d) manipulated mood and also task difficulty, by varying the "typicality" of target 
students, from a verbal description, e.g. whether a medical student fitted the commonly 
held student stereotype. Consistent with the AIM, Forgas (1994a) found greater mood 
effects on processing and judgmental latencies for atypical than for typical targets. In an 
experiment controlling for cognitive priming effects, pictures of well-matched or badly-
matched couples were used as target stimuli (Forgas, 1993a, 1995a). Affect infusion 
and judgmental processing latencies were greater for atypical couples than for typical 
couples. Forgas (1994b) found that people induced with a sad mood made more 
negative judgments about themselves than did those induced with happy moods. The 
predictions of the AIM were also upheld in relation to negotiation outcomes and 
strategies (Forgas & Moylan, 1995). 
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Other evidence for the AIM 
Support for the AIM comes also from the following findings. 
(i) Sedikides' (1995) findings were in accordance with his differential sensitivity 
hypothesis, itself based on Forgas's AIM. Central and peripheral self-conceptions were 
found to be differentially sensitive to the influence of mood. Peripheral self-conceptions 
were influenced by mood, which Sedikides interpreted as being due to their being less 
elaborated and held with less certainty, allowing affect-infusion. However, central self-
conceptions were unaffected by mood having incurred direct access or motivated 
processing. 
(ii) Bohner, Crow, Erb and Schwarz's (1992) study of affective influences on 
persuasion found that people in an elated mood were less likely to engage in systematic 
processing than those in neutral or mildly depressed moods, again consistent with the 
AIM. 
(iii) Most studies where mood congruence has been established have involved 
experimental manipulations of mood followed by the making of judgments. A variant, 
as in the work of Forgas and Moylan (1987), involved movie-goers who had just 
viewed affectively toned films and who were then asked to make judgments. Mayer, 
McCormick and Strong (1995) also found evidence for mood congruent memory 
associated with natural mood. 
Assessment of the model, its strengths, limitations and boundaries 
The AIM in relation to Abele and Petzold's (1994) findings 
Challenges in establishing a theoretical framework for mood influence on social 
judgments were explored by Abele and Petzold (1994) who indicated the difficulty in 
arriving at an empirical decision between two models, because existing models arrive at 
similar predictions for the influence of mood on judgments and the assumptions 
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underlying the mediating processes are often not clearly delineated. They adopted an 
information integration approach (cf. Anderson, 1981) to clarify mechanisms 
underlying mood influences on social judgments. They made the following assumptions 
about the processes mediating the impact of mood on social judgment. Mood acts: 
(i) as a prime for the retrieval and/or generation of additional information, 
(ii) as a cue for the change of meaning of incoming information, 
(iii) as information to be directly incorporated into the judgment, and 
(iv) as information for selective weighing of incoming stimuli, with negative 
mood leading to selective attention and to a selective weighing of 
information. 
In work involving induction of negative and positive mood with audiovisual material, 
they confirmed a mood congruency effect and found that the final judgment was 
consistent with an averaging process of mood dependent global impression formation 
and mood independent stimulus information. 
Abele and Petzold (1994) discussed their findings in relation to other models. For 
example the mood-as-information model (Schwarz & Clore, 1983) could be viewed as 
having two strategies as extremes on an information integration continuum. On the one 
hand the mood could be used to make a judgment, or, on the other, the stimulus could 
be used if the mood had been discredited. Likewise, the amended network model 
(Bower, 1991) involved a strength of association between object and valence nodes, 
equivalent to the weighing of information. Of the four processing strategies proposed 
by Forgas (1992c), Abele and Petzold saw their information integration approach as 
most closely related to his substantive processing strategy. The characteristics of 
substantive processing are a full search for information and no pre-determined outcome 
of the judgment. Both the substantive processing strategy and the information 
processing approach predict a stronger mood influence for atypical than for typical 
information. Global impressions were also shown by their study to be mood dependent. 
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However, predictions concerning information quantity would differ between the 
models, with Forgas's substantive processing strategy predicting stronger mood 
influence with more information whereas the information integration paradigm makes 
the opposite prediction as the weighting of mood would be reduced. This issue remains 
unresolved because there have been empirical findings in favour of both assumptions 
(Abele & Petzold, 1994). 
Schwarz and Clore's (1996) assessment of the AIM 
Clore and Parrott (1994) acknowledged the value of Forgas's (1992a) framework 
accommodating both affect priming and affect as information accounts of affective 
influence on judgments. One of the few attempts to assess the AIM has been provided 
by Schwarz and Clore (1996) who commended its attempt to integrate the array of 
mechanisms proposed for the way that affect and cognition influence each other. 
Schwarz and Clore endorsed the principal features of the AIM. However they indicated 
that its ambiguities highlight the inadequacy of current knowledge. Problems Schwarz 
and Clore detailed in relation to the model were as follows. 
(i) Mood is assumed not to play a part in the direct access strategy, but 
stereotyping, an example of use of the direct access strategy given by Forgas (1992a), 
was found by Bodenhausen, Kramer and Susser (1994) to be more likely to be used 
when people are in a good, rather than bad, mood. 
(ii) The conditions identified by the model as triggers for the various strategies were 
seen to be problematic, with evidence inconclusive and compatible with various 
assumptions. Such ambiguity was exemplified by the AIM proposing that complex 
judgments trigger substantive processing, and simple tasks heuristic processing, 
whereas Schwarz, Strack, Kommer and Wagner (1987) suggested that feelings are used 
as an heuristic to simplify complex tasks: experiments had not distinguished between 
mood-as-information and mood congruent recall. Schwarz and Clore (1996) also asked 
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whether reliance on feelings as a source of information necessarily reflected an 
heuristic processing strategy, indicating that in the case of judgments of liking, mood is 
likely to reflect the most accurate information available. 
(iii) Different findings as regards symmetry and asymmetry in relation to happy and 
sad moods raise further issues. Schwarz and Clore (1996) examined the assumptions 
that sad mood triggers substantive processing and mood congruent recall and 
elaboration, and that good mood triggers heuristic processing. Such assumptions would 
imply that the impact of a happy mood reflects the use of mood-as-information 
processes, and that, by contrast, the impact of sad mood would reflect mood congruent 
recall processes. Schwarz and Clore (1983) had found to the contrary that the impact of 
sad moods was more reliably eliminated with misattribution manipulations than was the 
impact of happy moods. Also, according to Singer and Salovey (1988), although happy 
participants are more likely to recall positive material, sad participants are not more 
likely to recall negative material. They noted difficulties in reconciling these findings 
with the rather symmetrical effects of happy and sad moods in studies cited by Forgas 
(1992a) as evidence for mood congruent recall in social judgments. 
Overall then, the model, in distinguishing between four processing strategies, is able to 
account for the variability in mood effects on judgments, but is not always predictive. 
Some findings contrary to predictions of the AIM 
As indicated previously, the findings of Curren and Harich (1994) were opposite to 
what might be expected on the basis of the AIM. Curren and Harich took the intuitive 
view that when people make an evaluation which is personally relevant they are likely 
to think carefully to avoid making errors and that mood is less likely to influence the 
judgment. If an evaluation were less important, people were more likely to use heuristic 
processing and mood was more likely to influence a judgment. Contrary to the 
predictions of Forgas's (1992a, 1992c, 1994a, 1995b) model their expectations were 
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supported by their findings. In relation to (i) personal computers and (ii) a course 
outline of relevance to the participant group, they found that, after mood inductions, 
involving (i) film or (ii) false feedback about achievement, decisions were not 
influenced by good or bad mood when the evaluation had been manipulated to be 
important to the student participants. 
Another finding contrary to the AIM was that of Storchheim (1995). Unlike Curren and 
Harich, whose hypotheses were drawn up without reference to Forgas's model, her 
experiment was conducted to test it. Her participants, who had been induced with happy 
or sad moods with an autobiographical mood induction, showed no tendency towards 
mood congruent bias in judgments of applications of males and female for a 
stereotypically male job (cf. Forgas, 1992b; 1992d; 1993a; 1995a). She proposed that 
motivated processing might preclude mood effects in value-laden judgments, although, 
on the basis of the model, measurements of response time suggested that substantive 
processing was likely to have occurred. 
The AIM is elegant in defining four processing strategies for making social judgments. 
Despite its apparent complexity, it is in essence a simple model defining the principle 
that the greater the extent of processing the greater the extent of affect infusion. Given 
the existence of evidence contrary to the predictions of the AIM, an exploration and 
elaboration of this principle is indicated. 
Some theoretical issues 
Some more general theoretical issues in relation to Forgas's (1992a, 1992c, 1994a, 
1995b) model are as follows. 
Are the quadrants of Forgas's model logically consistent? 
It might be expected that the quadrants of the model, when represented as in Figure 3.1, 
might show contrasting characteristics (present or absent) from quadrant to quadrant 
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according to search process and search extent. However, such contrasts are not always 
apparent. 
To what extent are the quadrants of Forgas's model distinct? 
The model indicates that the degree of affect infusion into judgments varies along a 
processing continuum but the four processing strategies are in fact identified as 
alternatives to each other. Although Forgas apparently does not view these strategies as 
discrete options, combinations of strategies are not dealt with by the model. Such a 
simplification is reasonable for conceptual purposes but has implications for the 
running of experiments. Experimental manipulations would need to be such that 
processing style was reasonably constant throughout the making of judgments during 
an experimental session. 
'Multiplier effect' inherent in Forgas's model 
Substantive processing is more likely when the judge is in a negative mood (Forgas, 
1994a). Indeed, a fundamental feature of the AIM is that sad mood is likely to be 
associated with a greater depth of processing and therefore with a longer processing 
time. Another feature is that the longer the processing time, the greater the opportunity 
for mood to influence a judgment. There would therefore seem to be a multiplier effect 
intrinsic to the model, with negative mood increasing the very type of processing which 
enables mood most to affect judgments, and positive mood minimising that type of 
processing and therefore its own effects on judgments. This feature is not clearly spelt 
out in descriptions of the AIM. 
Some queries about some assumptions of the model 
(i) 	In describing affect infusion there is an assumption that the entity affect exists. 
However there is still doubt as to what constitutes affect. An assumption of the model 
appears to be that affect is not a product of thought. This may well be the case, but it is 
neither a certainty nor a necessity. 
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(ii) Motivation is arguably inseparable as a construct from information processing 
(Tetlock & Levi, 1982) yet Forgas assumes it is separate. 
(iii) Affect is assumed to influence judgments in two ways: firstly by affect-priming 
of affect-related contents and secondly as a means of providing information to the 
individual about his/her evaluation. These two different affective constructs need to be 
further delineated and their relationship defined. Affect-as-information might just as 
well be the mental product of cognitive algebra (Anderson, 1981) rather than affect per 
se, in the sense of the term as used in relation to affect-priming. 
(iv) Affect appears to be a basis for 'motivational judgment' with negative mood 
resulting in behaviours intended to result in mood repair. The non-involvement of affect 
in such a strategy might be queried. 
(v) Erber and Erber (1994) investigated mood incongruent recall and mood self-
regulation, and found the effort involved in retrieving a memory which was incongruent 
with prevailing mood to be partly responsible for mood alleviating effects of mood 
congruent recall. They also found that although mood congruent recall occurred in the 
absence of a motivation to change their mood, people make an effort to regulate mood, 
particularly sad mood, when a situation requires level-headedness. This appears 
inconsistent with Forgas's model which suggests that people in a sad mood think most 
about decisions. 
(vi) Forgas noted the lack of agreed definitions for the terms: affect, feelings, 
emotions and mood. His decision to focus on moods, which are more enduring, rather 
than on emotions, which are brief, in an effort to integrate affect into psychological 
research, seems a reasonable one. Other experimenters (e.g. Frost & Green, 1982) 
however, have indicated difficulties in inducing an enduring mood state and therefore 
the length of time a mood endures might be an issue in experimental work. Hence, if 
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the AIM explains moods, not emotions, and as it could be argued that experiments tend 
to involve manipulation of emotion, not mood, their direct relevance to the AIM could 
be considered problematic. 
What is a social judgment? 
A question which inevitably arises is: what constitutes a social judgment? Such a 
judgment might be conceptualised as relating to judgments only in interpersonal 
contexts. However the term appears to have taken on more inclusive connotations and 
to include judgments in a social context. A subsidiary issue, then, relates to determining 
or defining precisely what cognitions might be considered to be social in character. To 
what other sorts of judgments might Forgas's model extend and on what bases? Forgas 
(1991b) in his introduction to Emotion and Social Judgments, included other judgments 
which involve the self and/or others under the umbrella of social judgments. Examples 
he gave are: reactions to socio-political slogans, perception of fear in others, judgments 
about the self and others and health judgments. 
One of the earliest uses of the term 'social judgments' was by Sherif and Hovland 
(1961). Sherif s theory related to attitude change and emphasised the role of a person's 
perception and judgment of a persuasive communication, with such judgments 
mediating attitude change; the term "social judgment" embraced "social issues and 
communication concerning them" (p. 11). They conceptualised that a "social reference 
scale" was used by members of groups in judgments in relation to political, religious, 
ethical and aesthetic issues for example. Such scales were said to be psycho-social in 
origin, and were gauged against social realities, and defined and regulated the 
individual's relationship with other people and groups. Eiser (1991) defined social 
judgment in terms of how people make sense of the social world but also indicated a 
lack of consensus as to what the social world includes. 
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Summary 
The AIM is a multi-process model which accounts for varied findings for mood effects 
on social judgments, in terms of four different processing strategies used in the making 
of such judgments. The model integrates informational theories such as the affect-
priming of Bower's (1981, 1991) network model and affect-as-information (Clore & 
Parrott, 1991; Schwarz & Clore, 1988) and dual-process model (e.g. Fiedler, 1990; 
Isen, 1987; Petty, Gleicher & Baker, 1991; Schwarz, 1990). Many empirical findings 
can be accounted for in terms of the AIM but its adequacy as a predictive model has 
been questioned. 
The AIM then, despite some contradictory findings, provides a way of integrating the 
complex array of findings in relation to mood effects on judgments which, rather 
broadly, could be described as being social in nature. According to the model, affect is 
most likely to influence such judgments during the more elaborative substantive or 
heuristic processing. 
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Chapter 4 
Health Judgments 
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Chapter 4 
Health Judgments 
Rationale for investigation of affect infusion and health judgments 
The stimulus for the investigation of mood effects on health judgments reported in this 
thesis was Forgas's (1994a) suggestion that perceptions of symptoms, health efficacy 
and expectations of future disease (Salovey & Birnbaum, 1989) were "complex stimuli 
that require more elaborate processing" than those which involved observation and 
interpretation of interpersonal behaviours (Forgas, Bower & Krantz, 1984) and 
therefore might show "even greater mood effects". 
Health related behaviours 
Over the last three decades an increasing emphasis on reducing, as well as curing, 
illness has led to the development of theories for understanding health related 
behaviours (Sheridan & Radmacher, 1992). These include self-efficacy theory 
(Bandura, 1977, 1982; Beck & Frankel, 1981; O'Leary, 1985) the health belief model 
(Becker, 1974; Becker & Rosenstock, 1987) and the theory of reasoned action / theory 
of planned behaviour (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Ajzen & Madden, 1986; Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 1975). A detailed analysis of these theoretical models is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, but these models and their concepts inform the discussion of health judgments 
which follows. 
Early researchers in behavioural health, Turk, Rudy and Salovey (1984), noted that in 
the USA the most common causes of death involved health risk behaviours such as a 
high cholesterol diet, sedentary lifestyle, obesity, cigarette smoking, excessive 
consumption of alcohol and failure to wear seat-belts. In their investigation of 
correlations between the perceived importance, and the frequency of performance, of 
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health-protective activities they found a "reasonably high degree of consistency" 
between attitudes and behaviours in the three groups measured: college students, high 
school teachers and nurses. This was consistent with the general findings of a strong 
attitude-behaviour relationship by Eagly and Chaiken (1993) in response to the 
concerns raised by Wicker (1969). Further, they found that two dimensions — the degree 
of effectiveness of the behaviour and the amount of effort involved in the behaviour — 
between them accounted for 57% of the variance, providing support for the health 
belief model. The authors indicated that public health agencies had typically been 
concerned with conveying information on behaviour without sufficiently considering its 
effectiveness. 
O'Leary (1985) found that perceived self-efficacy was important in determining health-
promoting behaviour of people attempting to reduce drug, alcohol and cigarette use, for 
those aiming to increase exercise levels, and for speed of recovery from illness and 
trauma. She also found self-efficacy beliefs to be important in predicting health 
behaviour in smoking-cessation relapse, pain management, eating disorders, cardiac 
rehabilitation and adherence to preventive health programs. 
Kreitler and Kreider (1991) provided a psychological profile of the health-oriented 
individual indicating links between health-orientation and well-being. They found that 
high scorers on health orientation scored higher on various factors including love, joy, 
contentment, emotional reactions, positive day-dreams, internal control and hostility, 
and lower on factors including depression, anxiety and somatic complaints. 
Reasons for studying links between mood and health 
'Rational' models might be of limited use in predicting health related behaviour 
because they do not take account of uncertainty about outcomes, cognitive and 
emotional overload from awareness of risks and the dynamics of performing a 
behaviour (Adler, Kegeles & Genevro, 1992). Similarly, Gold (1993) pointed out that 
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the theory of reasoned action assumes 'off-line' rather than 'on-line' processing (Hastie 
& Park, 1986), akin to 'cold' rather than 'hot' cognitions (Zajonc, 1980). An 
investigation of the influence of 'hot' cognitions on judgments seems indicated. For 
example, Gold (1993) dealt with the relationship between mood-congruence, or non-
mood-congruence, and health related behaviours, specifically in terms of sexual risk-
taking. He indicated a need for more research on mood, attitude change and behaviour 
specifically in relation to the remedy/prevention of human immuno-deficiency virus 
(HIV/AIDS). Richard, van der Pligt and de Vries (1995) also highlighted the 
importance of affective factors in safer sexual practices, with their findings indicating 
the greater predictive power of affective factors over the components of the theory of 
planned behaviour. 
Selye's (1956) work provided a model linking stress with physiological consequences 
for the human body. Salovey, O'Leary, Stretton, Fishkin & Drake (1991) indicated that 
medical practitioners and psychotherapists have observed associations between 
psychological distress, expressed as depression and anxiety, and physical symptoms, 
such as back pain, headaches, dizziness, bowel and bladder irregularities and gastric 
problems. The provision of appropriate treatment for such psychological and physical 
difficulties depends on an accurate separation of psychological from physiological 
sources in medical diagnoses. They suggested that mood change might result in 
changes in the evaluation of physical symptoms, and subsequently in health and illness 
judgments. Mood might directly influence physical health: Husband (1994) discussed 
ways in which the activities of bodily systems involved in emotion influence activities 
of other aspects of bodily function including the immune system. 
However, a cautionary note was sounded by Watson and Pennebaker (1989), who, 
recognising the assumption of current health psychological models that stress adversely 
affects health, collected measures of personality, health and fitness, stress and current 
emotional functioning and found that both self-report ratings of health and of stress 
52 
were correlated with negative affect. They concluded therefore that stress and health 
associations are likely to be over-estimated. Also, Anderson and Lobel (1995) found 
that positive natural mood, and negative natural mood, along with perceived 
vulnerability to illness and 'vitality' (strength, appetite, vigour and energy) significantly 
contributed to self-assessed health, independent of physical symptoms and disease. 
They proposed that the association of mood and vulnerability with self-assessed health 
might also be related to the commonly held belief that stress results in ill-health. 
Types of studies of health judgments 
Often the focus in health judgment studies has been on symptomatology, but more 
recently, the influence of moods on perceptions of physical symptoms and judgments 
about health has been considered (Salovey, O'Leary, Stretton, Fishkin & Drake, 1991). 
Investigations of health judgments made by healthy people have traditionally drawn on 
models such as those provided by self-efficacy theory, the health belief model and the 
theory of reasoned action (Turk, Rudy & Salovey, 1984). 
Mood influence on self-efficacy beliefs 
Kavanagh and Bower (1985) found that happy and sad moods influenced self-efficacy 
judgments, for example on interpersonal and athletic activities. They interpreted their 
results in terms of Bower's (1981) network theory, having ruled out three other 
explanations: 
(i) that instead of mood, results were due to the cognitive priming of the 
particular mood induction technique (romantic success/failure), 
(ii) that network theories predict a gradient rather than a generalisation across 
domains, and 
(iii) that mood influences the calibration or anchoring of the likelihood rating 
itself so that a happy mood causes people to use high numbers and a sad 
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mood low numbers on a rating scale, this last being rejected on the basis that 
Wright and Bower (1981) had shown otherwise. 
Optimistic bias and health 
Weinstein (1980) found that student subjects displayed an unrealistic optimism 
("optimistic bias") about the likelihood of both positive and negative life events for 
themselves, perhaps due not only to cognitive errors, but also to motivational factors. 
Rodin and Salovey (1989) proposed that, perhaps because of attributional processes, 
people underestimated their own risk, relative to that of other people, for illnesses and 
for negative life events including ill health. People who have not experienced major 
negative life events would see themselves as particularly invulnerable. They noted a 
decrease in optimistic bias in people in dysphoric moods demonstrated by findings of 
Johnson and Tversky (1983) and Salovey and Birnbaum (1989) who found such moods 
to be associated with increased estimates of risk. 
Taylor and Brown (1988, 1994) emphasised the value of unrealistic optimism in 
helping people to feel better and to cope more successfully as well as to recover quickly 
from health related stressors although this has been contested by Block and Colvin 
(1994) and Colvin & Block (1994). Peterson & Bossio (1991) indicated that optimism 
fosters general health. More generally, Schwarzer (1994) stressed the importance of 
optimistic self-beliefs, because they help in goal-setting, action initiation and 
motivation, thereby facilitating behaviour change. 
Correlational studies by Kulik and Mahler (1987) demonstrated an optimistic bias in 
both healthy and unhealthy people. However, whereas healthy people showed 
equivalent optimistic bias for health and non-health events alike, ill participants 
expressed greater feelings of vulnerability to future illness of any type, than to future 
non-health problems. 
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Scheier and Carver (1987) reviewed reports of research findings on the relationship 
between dispositional optimism and physical well-being in terms of positive health 
outcomes. They suggested that helpful coping strategies facilitated by optimism might 
be associated with efficient functioning of the immune system. Optimism was thought 
to be associated with problem-solving coping and both optimism and pessimism with 
emotion-focused coping. Problem-solving coping strategies were advocated by Lazarus 
(1966) as an effective way of dealing with stress by removing or reducing threat. 
Emotion-focused coping, however, has the advantage of reducing distress and this in 
turn makes coping easier (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). 
Millar and Millar (1995) proposed and established that thinking about behaviour aimed 
at protection against disease, would lead to more negative moods than thinking about 
health promotion behaviour, because resulting cognitions can threaten perceptions of 
good health. This could provide an alternative account for Salovey and Birnbaum's 
(1989) differential findings on mood for negative and positive health events, although it 
would require negative questions to be presented en bloc, not interspersed with positive 
questions as Salovey and Birnbaum presented them. 
Mood and judgments of health status 
Research findings in clinical and health psychology suggested that mood influences 
judgments of health status (Croyle & Uretsky, 1987). In view of the high number of 
somatic ailments reported by depressed people, health psychologists had suggested that 
emotional state might influence subjective health appraisals in non-clinical populations. 
Croyle and Uretsky ran two experiments, specifically to ascertain whether mood 
influenced subjective appraisals of health, and, more generally, to study mood effects 
on judgment. Their first experiment involved the induction of happy and sad moods 
with videos. Participants were then asked to imagine an illness-related scene (a sore and 
bruised arm of unknown origin), to indicate their response to such a scenario (visiting 
the doctor, degree of concern, assessment of whether illness/disease was indicated) and 
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then to make judgments of their own actual health status (poor to excellent). There were 
no differences between mood groups for the imagined scenario. However, when asked 
to make judgments about their real life situation, those participants induced with a 
positive mood judged their health more favourably than those induced with a negative 
mood. Their second experiment investigated factors mediating the effect of mood on 
the participant's current health status perceptions. Mood inductions were followed by 
participants being asked to imagine an illness-related or an illness-unrelated scenario. A 
third group was not presented with a scenario. The authors proposed that this might 
indicate that negative mood influences subjective appraisals of health by increasing the 
accessibility of illness-related memories. Mood-regulation was proposed as important 
in maintaining positive self-appraisal of health. They highlighted the importance of 
elucidating whether memory and judgment might be independently influenced by mood 
(cf. Fiske & Taylor, 1984). Their investigations indicated that negative mood can 
influence health judgments by increasing the accessibility of illness-related memories 
(Isen, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). 
Noting the associations between psychological distress and physical illness and the lack 
of verification of a causal path between the two, Salovey and Birnbaum (1989) 
investigated mood effects on health related cognitions. Their work followed that of 
Croyle and Uretsky (1987) who had shown that healthy people in whom a sad mood 
had been induced made lower ratings for their health status than those in a happy mood. 
Salovey and Birnbaum noted that as well as influencing symptom appraisal, mood is 
likely to influence other health cognitions including self-efficacy beliefs (Bandura, 
1977) and the perceptions of costs, benefits and efficacy of the behaviour (Becker, 
1974). They proposed that Wright and Mischel's (1982) findings, that positive affect 
resulted in people forming optimistic expectations about future performances and 
negative affect in pessimistic expectations, might generalise to the health area. People's 
beliefs about their vulnerability to illness and about risk likelihood were cited as other 
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health cognitions which might be influenced by mood (Becker, Haefner, Kasl, Kirscht, 
Maiman & Rosenstock, 1977; Weinstein, 1982, 1983). 
Salovey and Birnbaum (1989) ran three experiments involving students being induced 
with happy, neutral or sad moods and then being asked to make various health 
judgments which they predicted would be mood-congruent. Two of their experiments 
used participants with colds or 'flu, and a third used healthy people. Procedures for all 
three experiments were quite similar. Their third experiment, involving healthy people, 
will be dealt with here in more detail, as it was the one most directly related to the 
present research. 
Their first experiment involved sick people, who had been induced with a happy, 
neutral or sad mood. They were asked to rate their physical symptoms, their perceived 
ability to carry out illness-alleviating behaviours and their expectation of the outcome 
efficacy of such behaviours. The natural mood of the participants apparently over-rode 
effects of induced mood in some instances and the variances differed across mood 
groups. Therefore the use of correlations of actual mood score with ratings given by 
participants rather than analysis of variance was proposed as being more likely to pick 
up mood effects. This experiment indicated mood-congruence effects on appraisal of 
some symptoms and on health-behavioural efficacy. The authors proposed two possible 
explanations. 
(i) Sad mood might have promoted self-focused attention, thereby directly 
influencing symptom appraisal. 
(ii) Sad mood might facilitate the recall of congruent material. 
The second experiment also involved sick people, but this time investigated mood 
effects on perceived vulnerability to future positive and negative health events. In 
contrast to the findings of Johnson and Tversky (1983) for various sorts of risks, 
analysis of variance on ratings for the three mood groups showed little effect on sick 
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people's judgment of future events. However the correlation between participants' 
reported mood and estimates of future positive events was significant. The authors 
suggested that the participants, being ill, might have based future judgments on their 
current state, resulting in an attenuation of mood effects. Ill subjects showed sex 
differences with respect only to health self-efficacy, with men reporting greater self-
efficacy for illness alleviating behaviour than did women. 
The third experiment was carried out with healthy people to test this explanation. 
Participants were 33 undergraduate psychology students. The mood induction 
procedure, for this, as for the previous two experiments, was five minutes of tape-
recorded instructions for participants to relax and then to imagine a situation that would 
leave them feeling in a happy, neutral or sad mood (Wright & Mischel, 1982). They 
reported choosing this procedure because it had been shown by Brewer, Doughtie and 
Lubin (1980) to be more effective than Velten's (1968) method of mood inducing self-
statements. 
Mood prior to induction was assessed using the Profile of Mood States (POMS, 
McNair, Lorr & Droppleman, 1971). Cold and 'flu symptoms were assessed using a 
modified version of the Wahler Physical Symptoms Inventory (Wahler, 1968). After 
the mood induction procedure mood ratings were made to establish that the required 
moods — happy, neutral or sad — had been successfully induced. The dependent 
variables were drawn from participants' likelihood estimations (for the average student 
and for themselves) for 14 health related outcomes (both positive and negative). 
Participants made likelihood ratings on a 7-point scale (1 = extremely unlikely, 
7 = extremely likely). Participants' perceived vulnerability, with separate scores for 
positive and negative health events, was calculated by subtracting their estimates for the 
average student from their estimates for themselves. 
58 
Their results indicated that there were no gender differences for any likelihood ratings 
for healthy subjects. Although mood congruence was not found on positive health items 
it was demonstrated on negative health items: the sad group gave the highest ratings for 
negative health events, followed by neutral and then happy groups. Further, participants 
always maintained an optimistic bias in making health estimates for themselves relative 
to others, but this was much larger in happy people than in sad people, in whom such 
bias was attenuated. 
Salovey and Birnbaum (1989) suggested that mood might have had a greater effect on 
negative items than on positive items. For negative items there would be little previous 
experience, rendering the judgments more hypothetical and therefore subject to greater 
affective influence. For positive items there is likely to be a pre-existing knowledge-
base on which the person could draw (Mayer & Salovey, 1988). 
The researchers reported that comparison of the results of the third experiment with the 
second showed that current health status moderated mood effects on health judgments. 
An optimistic bias was maintained with sick and with healthy participants, with both 
happy and sad people believing negative outcomes were more likely for others than 
themselves. This was attenuated in sad, healthy people and accentuated in happy, 
healthy people where the accessibility of self-relevant knowledge apparently resulted in 
less effect of mood. It was suggested that mood affects health related behaviour by 
influencing judgments of self-efficacy and risk, with shifts in judgments reflecting 
mood-induced changes in attentional focus and memory retrieval (cf. emotional 
intelligence as defined by Salovey & Mayer, 1990). 
As a result of their findings, Salovey and Birnbaum (1989) suggested some possible 
mechanisms for the occurrence of mood influence. Negative mood might result in 
increased self-focus, possibly because it clarifies the affective experience (Scheier & 
Carver, 1987). Affect should also increase the accessibility of mood-congruent material 
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(Blaney, 1986; Gilligan & Bower, 1984; Isen, 1984, Mayer & Salovey, 1988; Singer & 
Salovey, 1988). Such mood-congruent material need not relate to the experience which 
caused the current mood (Bower, 1981). Judgments are often based on what is easily 
accessible (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) thereby enabling mood-congruence in 
judgments (Mayer & Bremer, 1985; Mayer & Volanth, 1985). Mood can influence the 
categorisation of information in memory (Mayer, 1986). Overall, they concluded, mood 
should influence health-appraisal, risk estimates, and expectations of efficacy and 
outcome, by facilitating recall of either pleasant or unpleasant memories related to 
health or illness. This was seen to be further substantiated by Croyle and Uretsky's 
(1987) finding of mood effects on health appraisal and illness reporting after an 
imagined health scenario. 
Some explanations for mood effects on health judgments 
Pyszczynski, Holt and Greenberg (1987) found evidence that the high level of self-
focus associated with depressed people was associated with their relative pessimism 
compared with non-depressed people on judgments of the probability of future positive 
and negative life events occurring to themselves and others. 
Salovey, O'Leary, Stretton, Fishkin and Drake (1991) indicated the value of the 
laboratory induction of mood states followed by self-judgments of physical health as a 
paradigm for understanding the association between mood and health, and reviewed 
Salovey and Birnbaum's (1989) findings. They compared their findings of the 
association of mood and efficacy expectations with Kavanagh and Bower's (1985) 
findings on romance, on athletics and on altruism (Salovey, 1986; Salovey & 
Rosenhahn, 1989). They proposed that whereas Salovey and Birnbaum's participants 
could draw on accessible self-knowledge about positive health events (such as diet) the 
negative events involved thinking about possible occurrences at an indeterminate time 
for which there was unlikely to be relevant self-knowledge. This provided an 
explanation for the finding of mood effects on negative health events (but not on 
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positive health events) with healthy subjects. They pointed out that mood has a stronger 
impact on judgments which are not firmly anchored (Sherif & Hovland, 1961) in pre-
existing knowledge (Forgas & Bower, 1987). Hypothetical judgments were thought to 
be more likely to be influenced by affect as it provides a substantial proportion of 
information in an information-poor context (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). Skelton and 
Strohmetz (1990) found that health cognitions were rendered more accessible after their 
participants had been asked to make abstract decisions about health connotations of 
common words. 
Because health information is often ambiguous and difficult to understand, Salovey, 
O'Leary, Stretton, Fishkin & Drake (1991) considered that contextual factors such as 
mood were more likely to influence its interpretation (cf. Forgas, 1994a). Taking into 
account various levels of analysis, Salovey et al. (1991) described possible mechanisms 
to explain the associations between mood and health judgments: 
(i) mood-congruent recall, 
(ii) mood induced shifts in attentional focus (attention to self when sad): 
(a) at cognitive level and 
(b) at physiological level. 
The authors suggested that, at the physiological level, changes in mood would alter 
endocrine and immunological functioning and affect health status. However mood 
effects at the immunological level would be more likely in the longer rather than in the 
immediate term. 
Medical care-seeking 
On the basis of their findings, Salovey and Birnbaum (1989) suggested that a sad mood, 
in intensifying the illness experience, might result in a sick person being more likely to 
seek medical care. Also because depressed mood increases the accessibility of illness 
related memories (Croyle & Uretsky, 1987) an illness is likely to be diagnosed as more 
serious if a patient is in a sad rather than in a happy mood. However, sad mood 
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apparently reduces efficacy beliefs and hence health-promoting behaviours (Salovey & 
Birnbaum, 1989). Stretton, Salovey and Mayer (1992) investigated the role of concern 
for health in health relevant cognitions and behaviours and found that people concerned 
about a health problem might not necessarily report it. As negative mood has been 
shown to influence people's perceptions of personal risk of disease, they therefore 
proposed that negative mood might lead to feelings of vulnerability that increased the 
apparent likelihood of illness, thereby increasing the level of health concern. They 
indicated that the findings of their study suggested that health concerns, e.g. in 
hypochondriasis, could be altered by interventions focused on negative mood and self-
awareness. 
Asymmetrical mood effects 
Research following on from that of Croyle and Uretsky (1987) and Salovey and 
Birnbaum (1989) was performed by Abele and Hermer (1993). They assessed findings 
reported in the literature for the effects of positive compared with negative mood on 
self-appraisal of health as inconclusive. Watson and Pennebaker (1989) had assumed 
that mood effects on health self-appraisal were due to 'negative affectivity' assuming it 
almost axiomatic that people in a negative affective state make more negative 
judgments. Croyle and Uretsky's findings of correlations between mood and health 
judgments for negative, but not positive mood, had supported this view. Salovey, 
O'Leary, Stretton, Fishkin and Drake (1991) also predicted that health judgments 
would be more distorted by negative than by positive mood. Their basis was that 
negative mood is associated with increased self-focus resulting in an increased 
awareness of bodily symptoms with an associated tendency towards unfavourable 
health judgments. However their findings only partially supported this idea. Scheier and 
Carver's (1987) interpretation of their findings was that positive mood resulted in 
response bias. This was supported by Salovey and Birnbaum's (1989) finding of a 
stronger influence of positive mood than of negative mood on unrealistic optimism. 
Abele and Hermer (1993) concluded that apparently the relative impact of negative 
62 
compared with positive mood depends on the task, but that overall there are more cases 
of negative mood induced bias in health judgments than there are positive. 
Abele and Hermer's (1993) experiments covered a greater range of health risks than 
those of Salovey and Birnbaum (1989). Also, the negative outcomes and time intervals 
for the probability estimate were more specific: they asked for estimates of headaches 
within four weeks, accidents within a year. Like Salovey and Birnbaum they used an 
autobiographical mood induction and they checked the autobiographical material for 
health and illness content. They used an 11-point rating scale to assess mood before and 
after the judgment task. Also like Salovey and Birnbaum, they asked participants to 
make ratings for themselves and also for other people their age. 
Their experiment investigated the influence of positive compared with negative mood 
on: 
(i) self-appraisal of health status, in terms of present health, future health risk 
and unrealistic optimism, and 
(ii) appraisal of the noxiousness of unhealthy behaviours, for example, no 
regular exercise, regularly less than eight hours sleep, unbalanced diet for a 
long period of time. 
Negative mood was found to result in more negative appraisals, except for unrealistic 
optimism. Positive mood was associated with higher noxiousness ratings of unhealthy 
behaviours than negative mood. Mood effects were independent of sex, health locus of 
control and number of days' illness during the year, which they had thought might 
moderate the relationship between mood and health judgments. Like Salovey and 
Birnbaum (1989), Abele and Hermer found that women appraised future health-risks 
less favourably than did men, but there were no other sex differences for other variables 
including mood. Participants in a sad mood always made the most unfavourable health 
judgments. Positive mood rarely led to more positive health-appraisal than did the 
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control condition. Unrealistic optimism regarding hypothetical future events was more 
influenced by positive than negative mood, as also found by Salovey & Birnbaum 
(1989). Abele and Hermer thought that the hypothetical nature of their unrealistic 
optimism task might both prevent a stronger influence of negative mood and facilitate 
optimistic bias. Applications they saw from their work were that mood repair 
treatments, over and above their intrinsic advantages, might also be expected to 
improve the extent of health protective behaviours. As they indicated, their research left 
unanswered the question of whether positive mood leads to behavioural effects as well 
as to increased cognitive vigilance. 
Assessment of health judgment findings in relation to the AIM 
Forgas (1994a) indicated that affect infusion during substantive processing can be 
established through the analysis of response time data: an association between mood 
effects and processing time was fundamental to Forgas's AIM. None of the studies 
reviewed involving mood and health, including that of Salovey and Birnbaum (1989), 
has involved a measure of response time. Although Abele and Hermer (1993), Croyle 
and Uretsy (1987), and Salovey and Birnbaum (1989) found some mood effects in 
relation to health judgments consistent with Forgas's model, associated measures of 
processing time would be necessary for its validation with respect to health judgments. 
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Chapter 5 
Rationale for Experimentation and Research Aims 
Issues relating to affect and cognition are important in understanding the formation and 
modification of attitudes and the making of judgments. The study of affective 
influences on cognitive processes in general, and on judgments in particular, has been 
characterised by attempts to reconcile the conflicting data commonly obtained. Forgas's 
(1992a, 1992c, 1994a, 1995b) AIM provided an integrative framework accounting for 
many of the experimental findings in relation to affect and social judgments. Forgas's 
model proposed that the extent to which mood influences a judgment, that is, the extent 
to which affect infuses it, is predicated on the cognitive processing style used. Heuristic 
and substantive styles, which involve more extensive processing, were more likely to 
bring about affect infusion than direct access and motivated styles, which involve less 
processing. Some findings of Salovey and Birnbaum (1989) in relation to health 
judgments were interpreted by Forgas (1994a) as providing evidence of affective 
influence during substantive processing. 
The original plan for this research 
The research reported in this thesis began in 1994 in an attempt to investigate mood 
influences on attitude change and persuasion, by juxtaposing Forgas's (1994a) AIM for 
social judgments, with information processing models of attitude change, such as those 
of Chaiken and Eagly (1983), Eagly and Chaiken (1993) and McGuire (1969). The 
research plan was 
(i) to develop a suitable non-verbal technique for inducing happy, neutral and 
sad moods, 
(ii) to confirm affect infusion in judgments in a specific area of interest, and 
(iii) to investigate affective influences on attitude change. 
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Judgments and attitude change were to be investigated specifically in relation to health 
issues. 
Research rationale 
The overall rationale for the research was as follows. According to Forgas's (1994a) 
AIM for social judgments, and based on Salovey and Birnbaum's (1989) findings, 
healthy people in a sad mood should take longer to process health-relevant information 
and be more pessimistic about both the possibility and the outcome of modifying their 
behaviour than those in a happy mood. These judgments were to be tested over a range 
of health judgments and health related messages. 
In relation to more specific issues concerning persuasive messages, rationales were as 
follows. 
(i) For mood inductions, a non-verbal technique was considered preferable to 
prevent interference with the content of persuasive messages. 
(ii) Rhodes and Wood (1992) had found that persons of moderate self esteem 
were more influenced by persuasive messages and therefore a self esteem 
inventory (Marsh, 1991, Self Description Questionnaire III: Subscale for the 
General Self) was administered. 
(iii) Affective influence on persuasion was more likely in people with a high 
need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Petty, 
Gleicher & Baker, 1991; Wegener, Petty & Klein, 1994) and therefore a 
short form of the need for cognition scale (Cacioppo, Petty & Kao, 1984) 
was administered. 
The self esteem and need for cognition scales were used so that participants of 
moderate self esteem and/or with a high need for cognition could be chosen, if 
necessary, for later experiments on persuasion. 
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In the light of the experimental findings as this study progressed, however, it was 
decided to narrow down the research to replicating Salovey and Birnbaum's (1989, 
Experiment 3) findings and investigating the applicability of Forgas's AIM to health 
judgments. 
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Chapter 6 
Experiment 1: A Comparison of some Non-verbal Methods of Inducing 
Mood, with Each Other, and with an Autobiographical Method 
The aim of this experiment was to establish an effective non-verbal method for 
inducing happy and sad moods. Effective mood induction techniques are important 
because, as Ellis and Ashbrook (1988) observed, for causality to be inferred a true 
experiment is necessary and this requires (successful) mood manipulation. An effective 
non-verbal method, if available, was considered important in case any verbal content 
should confound judgments of verbal material for use in proposed experiments 
investigating mood effects on persuasive messages. Additionally, non-verbal methods 
were expected to lead to more effective mood retention (Stein & Bransford, 1979). 
A variety of methods for the induction of temporary mood states has been developed 
for studies in both clinical and laboratory contexts (see Martin, 1990). However the 
more effective methods, such as self-statement, autobiographical recall, imagery, 
hypnotic suggestion and performance feedback, have often been closely associated with 
self-concept or have involved verbal content. A problem with material related to the 
self-concept is that it might confound effects in judgment studies (Klein & Kihlstrom, 
1986). Again, with verbal mood induction methods, verbal content in the induction 
procedure could interfere with the effects of verbal messages planned for use in the 
originally proposed studies. 
In addition to being a verbal method, the traditional Velten (1968) mood induction 
method which uses self-statements, has the disadvantage that it induces the required 
mood in only 50% of participants (Martin, 1990). Music, unaccompanied by any other 
stimulus, would seem to be an ideal non-verbal means of modifying mood. However it 
has been suspected by some researchers of being ineffective, possibly because it lacks a 
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semantic priming component (Fiedler, 1991). Also music is quite variable in its mood 
effects, because of subjective prior associations (Green, Rogers & Elliman, 1995). It 
was therefore considered useful to find and validate a mood induction procedure not too 
closely related to the self-concept and free of verbal material. 
This experiment therefore tested the relative effectiveness of four types of mood 
induction: audio-only (music with no words), visual-only (a silent sequence from a 
film), audiovisual (these audio and visual presentations presented together) and a 
standard autobiographical verbal induction (cf. Baker & Guttfreund, 1993; Martin, 
1990; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Wright & Mischel, 1982). Stimuli shown in earlier pilot 
studies as likely to induce a happy, neutral or sad mood, were used. 
Prior to mood inductions a short form of the need for cognition scale (Cacioppo, Petty 
& Kao, 1984) was administered. This was to investigate the parameters of need for 
cognition (Nc) scores for the participant pool (university students) because Petty, 
Gleicher and Baker (1991) had found that people with a high need for cognition more 
frequently processed persuasive messages substantively and therefore, according to 
Forgas's (1994a) AIM would be more likely to show affect infusion. 
Hypotheses 
The hypotheses for this experiment were that with effective mood inductions 
(i) participants subjected to happy mood inductions would make mood ratings 
significantly higher than baseline ratings 
(ii) participants subjected to sad mood inductions would make mood ratings 
significantly lower than baseline ratings 
(iii) participants subjected to neutral mood inductions would make mood ratings 
not significantly different from baseline ratings. 
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Method 
Participants 
Forty-eight university students, 24 males and 24 females, of mean age, M = 21.87 years 
(SD = 6.70) were recruited to participate in a pilot study for experiments on attitude 
change. 
Design 
A 4 x 3 factorial design was used. Induction method (audio-only, visual-only, 
audiovisual, autobiographical) was a between subjects factor and mood type (happy, 
neutral, sad) was a within subjects factor. Order of mood induction type was 
counterbalanced. The dependent variable was mood rating. The design is shown in 
Appendix A. 
Apparatus and materials 
A participant consent form provided information to prospective participants. The (short 
form) 18 item need for cognition scale (Cacioppo, Petty & Kao, 1984), entitled a 
"social cognition questionnaire" in participant questionnaire sheets, was administered 
before any other intervention. Copies of all protocols for this experiment are found in 
Appendix A. 
Sound and visual stimuli were presented to participants from a videorecorder and a 34 
cm television screen. Headphones were worn by all participants for audio, visual and 
audiovisual presentations. A blindfold was worn for the audio-only condition. 
Participants whose mood was induced by autobiographical induction were seated at a 
desk in the same room as that used for audio and/or visual inductions. 
A previous pilot study with 18 participants had been used to establish that the sound 
and visual stimuli for mood induction were appropriate for happy, neutral and sad 
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moods (cf. Forgas, 1991d; Forgas; 1993a, Forgas, 1994b; Forgas, Bower & Moylan, 
1990). Sound tracks, containing music but no words, were chosen from different 
musical sources (happy: various Scott Joplin tracks, neutral: Richard Clayderman's A 
Dream of Love, sad: some Elegaic Melodies of Edvard Grieg). Visual tracks were 
edited from happy, neutral and sad portions of the film The Gods must be Crazy, all 
with the sound track removed. Autobiographical mood induction stimuli (Baker & 
Guttfreund, 1993; Martin, 1990; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Wright & Mischel, 1982) 
were typed instructions for participants to write about happy or sad incidents in their 
lives and for the neutral condition participants were instructed to describe the street in 
which they had lived at the age of about 10 years. 
Questionnaires were used to ascertain mood before, between and after inductions (cf. 
Forgas, 1991d). Each questionnaire was similar and comprised eight bipolar scales with 
a sad/happy analogue scale embedded in second position amongst other distractor 
scales: alert/drowsy, calm/excited, lethargic/energetic, attentive/dreamy, interested/- 
bored, depressed/elated and muzzy/focused (cf. Bond & Lader, 1974; Herbert, Johns & 
Dore, 1976). A sample of such a questionnaire, entitled 'Visual Analogue Scale' forms 
Appendix A5. The purpose of the distractor scales was to prevent mood awareness or 
compliance effects. On the first page participants were asked to tick a box indicating 
their sex and to write their age in years. They were then asked to mark a position on a 
relaxed/tense practice rating scale. 
Procedure 
After reading information about the experiment, having questions answered and 
completing a consent form, each participant was tested alone in a sound attenuated 
room with controlled lighting level (Schwarz & Clore, 1983), while seated at a desk at a 
distance of 1.5 metres from a television screen. It was explained that factors such as 
attention and relaxation levels influence the extent of attitude change and that, after 
completing a questionnaire, participants would be encouraged to relax and at various 
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times asked to answer questions "relating to attention level and so on". Participants 
were told that the study would involve (whichever one applied in their case): 
presentation of music, video track, combined music and video, or an autobiographical 
task, to which they were ask to attend carefully. Participants were naive as to the mood-
inducing intention of the experiment until the debriefmg at its conclusion. 
Each participant was asked to complete a social cognition questionnaire: the shorter 
version of the need for cognition scale. Participants were then encouraged to relax. This 
was in order to standardise levels of physiological arousal (cf. Clark, Milberg & Erber, 
1987; Revelle & Loftus, 1990) and involved a few minutes of abdominal breathing 
followed by an exercise in tensing and relaxing of the hands. Participants were then 
asked to breathe slowly and to allow the whole body to let go and to relax. 
The first mood ratings were then completed to provide a baseline measure of mood. Sad 
(1) was the lowest possible score and (9) happy the highest. Three ten-minute mood 
inductions, of happy, neutral and sad valence, were then presented in counterbalanced 
order. After each induction, mood ratings were again completed. All mood inductions 
were of the same type (audio only, visual only, audiovisual or autobiographical) and 
presented with only sufficient time between them to allow for the completion of the 
rating. 
At the conclusion of the experiment, participants had the purpose of the study, and the 
nature of their particular mood manipulation, explained to them. Those who had 
received a sad mood induction were offered the opportunity of viewing the audiovisual 
happy mood induction. 
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Results 
The need for cognition (Nc) score had an overall mean, M = 13.11 (SD = 3.49). The 
scores ranged from 3 to 18, where Nc = 0 would indicate the lowest possible need for 
cognition and Nc = 18 the highest possible. 
As a validation check, the ratings made prior to mood inductions (baseline) were 
correlated for the sad - happy scale with the other scales amongst which it was 
embedded. There were only two significant correlations. Over the 48 participants, 
(df = 46, two-tailed test) there was a highly significant correlation between the ratings 
given on the sad - happy scale with those for the depressed - elated scale (r = .66). 
There was also a significant, although smaller, correlation between the ratings on the 
sad - happy scale with the lethargic - energetic scale (r = .29). 
An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests. All F-tests involving more than 
two repeated measures had p-values corrected using the Geisser-Greenhouse correction 
for non-homogeneity of variance. 
The results are shown in Figure 6.1, which shows the change in mood for each of the 
induction methods for each of the intended mood types. Mood rating change was 
measured for each of the mood types in terms of their difference from the preceding 
induction by subtracting the previous mood rating from current rating, giving rise to 
three categories (happy - preceding mood, neutral - preceding mood, sad - preceding 
mood). 
A 3 (Mood type) x 4 (Induction method) x 2 (Sex) ANOVA, where mood type was 
within subjects, and induction method and sex were between subjects factors, and the 
dependent variable was mood rating change, showed a significant main effect for mood 
type, F(2,80) = 15.18, p < .001. There was a significant interaction between mood type 
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and induction method, F(6,80) = 2.66, p = .021. There were no significant effects 
involving sex. Preliminary studies had ruled out the experimental situation and the 
relaxation process as affecting mood. 
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Figure 6.1 	Change in mean mood ratings for each of the mood induction 
methods. Vertical lines depict standard errors of the means. 
Separate ANOVAs were then performed for each induction method. These one way 
analyses of variance (within subjects) showed significant main effects for mood for all 
except the audio induction method as shown in Table 6.1. Results of contrast analyses 
between pairs of means are shown in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.1 	Results of ANOVA Performed on Induction Method 
induction method F value p-value 
audio F(2,22) = 0.20 .724 
visual F(2,22) = 3.69 .043* 
audiovisual F(2,22) = 7.99 .005* 
autobiographical F(2,22) = 9.97 .001* 
Note. 	p-value adjusted using the Geisser-Greenhouse correction. 
*Significant at p = .05. 
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Table 6.2 Contrast Analyses for Mean Ratings of Participants in Happy, Neutral 
and Sad Mood Groups. 
Happy vs. Sad Sad vs. Neutral Happy vs. Neutral 
induction method F value 	p-value F value 	p-value F value 	p-value 
audio 91,11)=0.19 	.560 91,11) = 0.38 	.459 91,11) = 0.03 	.752 
visual F(1,11) = 7.14 	.015* 91,11) = 0.85 	.364 91,11) = 3.07 	.095 
audiovisual F(1,11) = 15.92 	.001* 91,11). 4.78 	.047* F(1,11). 3.25 	.093 
autobiographical 91,11). 16.86 	.001* 91,11). 12.75 	.002* 91,11). 0.29 	.583 
Note. p-value adjusted using the Geisser-Greenhouse correction. 
* Significant at p =.05. 
For happy compared with sad mood ratings, significant differences were found for all 
induction methods except the audio. For sad compared with neutral mood ratings, 
significant differences were found for audiovisual and autobiographical induction 
methods. However significant differences between happy and neutral mood ratings 
were more problematic — mean differences failed to reach significance for any of 
induction methods, although audiovisual and visual methods resulted in most separation 
between these moods. 
Matched pairs t-tests (one-tailed) were used to ascertain whether the changes were 
significantly in the predicted direction compared with the baseline (taking into account 
preceding mood). The hypotheses were that participants subjected to happy mood 
inductions would make mood ratings significantly higher than baseline ratings, that 
participants subjected to sad mood inductions would make mood ratings significantly 
lower than baseline ratings and that participants subjected to neutral mood inductions 
would make mood ratings not significantly different from baseline ratings. The results 
are shown in Table 6.3, which shows that these hypotheses were upheld for visual-only, 
audiovisual and autobiographical induction methods, but not for the audio-only method. 
As seen in Figure 6.1 the autobiographical method used in this experiment produced 
greatest separation between happy and sad moods. The audiovisual method used 
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produced the most nearly symmetrical separation between the three moods. As the sad - 
happy scale was on ordinal scale these conclusions have indicative value only. 
Table 6.3 Results of Matched-pairs t-tests (one tailed) Showing Differences 
between Measurements of Induced Mood and Preceding Mood 
Happy Neutral Sad 
Induced mood t value Mean (SD) t value 	Mean (SD) t value Mean (SD) 
audio -0.74 -0.325 (1.519) -0.56 	-0.217 (1.330) -1.61 -0.592 (1.272) 
visual 2.62* 0.933 (1.235) -0.44 	-0.192 (1.657) -1.99* -0.783 (1.220) 
audiovisual 2.25* 1.208 (1.858) -0.11 	-0.042 (1.346) -5.23* -1.558 (1.196) 
autobiographical 2.44* 1.217 (1.730) 1.29 	0.708 (1.908) 4.31* -2.683 (2.156) 
Note. 	p = .05 at t= ±1.79; df =11 
*. Significant at p = .05. 
Discussion 
Across all mood induction types combined, the scores for the sad - happy scale 
correlated significantly with the depressed - elated scale. The only other scale which 
correlated significantly, although to a much smaller extent, with the ratings for the sad - 
happy scale was the lethargic - . energetic scale. These results support the construct 
validity of the sad - happy scale. 
Differential results were produced for sad/happy mood. The combined effect of 
audiovisual as compared with separate audio and visual inductions was apparently 
additive for sad mood, but in the case of happy mood the audio plus visual effect might 
have been entirely due to the visual component. Also, the audiovisual induction, in 
requiring attention to both auditory and visual stimuli, is less likely to have been subject 
to mood-incongruent thoughts than audio and visual separately. The visual induction 
itself might occupy more attention than the audio-only. Since the video and audio 
stimulus channels were not related in content, participants would be led to select 
between them. This might well have led to a much greater proportion of attention being 
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directed at the visual stimulus, especially when visual stimuli are inherently more 
attention-provoking. 
Of the mood induction methods trialed, the visual-only, audiovisual and 
autobiographical methods were found to be effective in inducing happy and sad moods. 
The finding that audio stimuli (music) did not result in the required mood ratings is 
consistent with the findings of Fiedler (1991). Martin (1990) listed music, and also 
autobiographical recall, solitary recollection and film, as inducing required mood in 
75% of cases. However, she indicated that participants were also requested to use any 
other effective means to develop mood, and therefore, in the research findings she 
reviewed, music was not isolated as being solely responsible for a high success rate. 
As regards the induction of a neutral mood, only audiovisual and autobiographical 
inductions resulted in significant differences between sad and neutral moods and none 
of the stimuli resulted in significant differences between happy and neutral moods. 
In summary, the non-verbal audiovisual mood induction trialed was found to be a 
satisfactory alternative to the autobiographical induction for inducing happy and sad 
moods. 
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Chapter 7 
Experiments 2,3 and 4: Mood Influence on Health Judgments 
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Chapter 7 
Experiments 2,3 and 4: Mood Influence on Health Judgments 
According to Forgas's (1994a) Affect Infusion Model for social judgments, people in a 
sad mood should take longer to process health-relevant information and be more 
pessimistic about both the possibility and the outcome of modifying their behaviour, 
than those in a happy mood. 
Experiment 2 was designed to test this prediction across a spectrum of health related 
behaviours: alcohol, nicotine and cannabis use, exercise, fat, fruit and vegetable 
consumption, ultraviolet exposure and safer sexual practices, in people with happy, 
neutral and sad moods. These moods were induced in the laboratory by non-verbal 
material (10 minutes of selected video-track with music) developed in the experiment 
described in Chapter 6. Thirty males and thirty females were first assessed for self-
esteem and need for cognition in preparation for the originally planned studies on 
persuasive messages (see Chapter 5). Mood was induced and pre- and post-induction 
mood ratings were made on 9-point scales embedded between distractor items to 
prevent mood awareness or compliance effects. After presentation of health-relevant 
information, participants indicated their current behaviour, made risk assessments, 
indicated their perceived chances of modifying their behaviour and estimated the 
outcome of such change. All questionnaires and responses for Experiment 2 were dealt 
with via computer. 
Because mood effects were not sufficiently strong in Experiment 2, Experiment 3 used 
an autobiographical mood induction to replace the audiovisual. Mood effects were still 
not evident and therefore a third study, Experiment 4 involved the substitution of 
pencil-and-paper for the computer-administered testing of Experiments 2 and 3. 
Experiment 4 involved 30 females, with a further 14 females again responding via 
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computer and functioning as a control group. For this experiment mood inductions were 
again audiovisual. 
Hypotheses for Experiments 2,3 and 4 
First hypothesis 
If Forgas's model applies to health judgments then participants in whom a sad 
mood is induced will make more pessimistic judgments about both the possibility 
and the outcome of modifying their behaviour; and those in whom a happy mood 
is induced will more make more optimistic judgments (with neutral mood in 
between). 
Second hypothesis 
If Forgas's model applies to health judgments then participants in whom a sad 
mood is induced will have a longer processing time; and those in whom a happy 
mood is induced will have a shorter processing time (with neutral mood in 
between). 
Separate predictions are made on the basis on the basis of Forgas's model and each of 
these predictions was tested by appropriate analysis of variance. 
82 
Experiment 2: Audiovisual Mood Induction and Computer-administered 
Items 
Method 
Participants 
Sixty first-year Psychology students, 30 males and 30 females, of mean age, M = 24.87 
years (SD = 9.02) were recruited to participate in an experiment described as a social 
judgment study. 
Design 
A 2 x 3 between subjects factorial design was used, with factors (and levels), sex (male, 
female) and mood induction (happy, neutral, sad). Dependent variables were perceived 
risk, perceived chance of modifying behaviour, estimated outcome of such behavioural 
modification, and response time. 
Mood induction and manipulation checks 
Moods were induced by the audiovisual method described in Chapter 6. Mood 
assessments were made before and after the mood induction, and at the end of the 
experiment (cf. Bohner, Chaiken & Hunyadi, 1994). Participants made ratings on a sad 
- happy scale with 9 major points, embedded among distractor scales and other items, 
which were different for each of the three assessments. (These scales were identical 
with pencil-and-paper formats, and can be found in Appendix B). The effectiveness of 
mdod manipulation and maintenance was analysed using a 3 (Occasion) x 3 (Mood) x 2 
(Sex) design, where occasions were: pre-induction (pre), post-induction (post) and end 
of experiment (end). 
Apparatus and materials 
An IBM compatible 386SX computer running Visual Basic for Windows was used to 
administer questionnaires, to record responses and to measure response times. 
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Participants made their responses using a mouse. The first computer screen asked for 
the participant's name and presented practice items so that participants could write 
answers, respond Y or N (for yes or no) in a box and make a rating by clicking on a 
button, or on a scale. Preliminary questionnaires used were a self-esteem inventory 
(Marsh, 1991, Self Description Questionnaire DI Subscale for the General Self) and a 
need for cognition scale (NCS) - short form (Cacioppo, Petty & Kao, 1984). Copies of 
protocols for this experiment form Appendix B. Questionnaires were scored as 
recommended by their respective authors. 
Confidence and expectancy items consisted of items on various health topics, and were 
of the form: 
Given your current and likely future exercise level, how likely do you think you are 
to have cardiovascular disease before the age of 70? 
What do you believe would be your chances of sticking to a regular exercise 
program over the next six months if you decided to? 
How likely do you think you are to have a heart attack by the age of 70 if you 
maintained a regular exercise program? 
Mood induction videos were presented on a 34 cm television set. Videos were those 
with audiovisual content described in Chapter 6. That is, sound tracks were derived 
from different musical sources (happy: various Scott Joplin tracks, neutral: Richard 
Clayderman's A Dream of Love, sad: some Elegaic Melodies of Edvard Grieg) all of 
which were free of verbal content. Visual tracks were edited from happy, neutral and 
sad portions of the film The Gods must be Crazy, with the sound track removed. 
Procedure 
Each participant was tested alone. After participants had read and signed a consent 
form, all work except for the mood inductions was undertaken at the computer. 
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When participants were seated at the computer, they were presented with the following 
as constituting the first experiment. After some experience using the computer for 
practice examples they completed the self-esteem inventory and need for cognition 
scale (short form). The first mood assessment was then made, after which participants 
were seated at a desk in front of a video-player and monitor, to experience their 
assigned mood induction: happy, neutral or sad. They were then asked to return to the 
computer. The second mood assessment followed. 
Participants then proceeded with what was presented as a second experiment. Another 
set of practice examples appeared on the screen but participants were told that there was 
"no need to do that again because you've already done that for the first experiment". 
Confidence and expectancy ratings were then made. A third mood assessment and a 
post-experimental awareness questionnaire followed. Participants were debriefed on the 
use and purpose of the mood induction procedure and on the rationale of the 
experimental program. Those who had been induced with a sad mood were offered the 
opportunity to see the happy video and/or have further debriefing. 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analyses 
Baseline data 
Analyses of variance, all of the form, 3 (Mood induction) x 2 (Sex), confirmed that 
there were no prior significant differences between groups induced with happy, neutral 
or sad moods as regards age, self-esteem, need for cognition or facility with using the 
computer (ascertained by response times on need for cognition questionnaires). 
Mood checks 
Figure 7.1 shows mean mood ratings on the sad - happy scale for mood induction 
groups pre-induction, post-induction and at the end of Experiment 2. Analysis of 
variance on the basis of a 3 (Occasion) x 3 (Mood induction) x 2 (Sex) design showed a 
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significant Occasion x Mood induction interaction, F(4,108) = 6.94, p = .001 (with 
Geisser-Greenhouse correction). As can be clearly seen, moods were manipulated in the 
intended direction, but were not maintained until the end of the experiment. 
Figure 7.1 
Pre 	 Post 
	
End 
Rating occasion 
Mean mood ratings for mood induction groups, happy, neutral and 
sad, at pre-induction, post-induction and end of Experiment 2. Vertical 
lines depict standard errors of the means. 
For pre-induction, post-induction and end of experiment, analyses of variance of the 
form 3 (Mood induction) x 2 (Sex) were performed on mood ratings on the sad - happy 
scale. 
(i) At pre-induction (pre) there were no significant effects, and in particular 
there were no significant differences between the three groups prior to the 
mood induction procedures, 
(ii) Immediately post-induction (post) there was a significant main effect for 
mood, F(2,54) = 5.04, p = .010, with Student-Newman-Keuls (SNK) tests 
showing a significant difference in mood between sad and happy groups. 
There were no other significant effects. 
(iii) At the end of the experiment (end) no significant differences remained, 
showing that induced mood did not persist until that stage. 
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It would seem therefore that any mood effects would be more likely to be found in 
responses to earlier rather than to later items. 
Testing the major hypotheses: impact of mood on health judgments 
Impact of mood on health ratings 
Participants made ratings on the three aspects that follow for a range of behaviours and 
practices. 
1. The likelihood of encountering specific problems given their current 
behaviour. 
2. Perceived chances of modifying their current behaviour in a healthy 
direction. 
3. The improvement they expected might result from such a change. 
All participants responded to aspect 1. for all behaviours. Participants did not respond 
to 2. or 3. relating to alcohol use, nicotine use, or cannabis use if they were non-users of 
that particular substance. All participants rated 2. and 3. for the other behaviours (i.e. 
exercise, fat consumption, fruit and vegetable consumption, safer sexual behaviour or 
protection against ultraviolet radiation). 
These three aspects yielded three optimism scores as dependent variables used in a 
3 (Mood induction) x 2 (Sex) analyses of variance. Where necessary raw scores were 
reversed so that more optimistic scores would be expressed as higher ratings. Scores 
were: 
(i) Current prediction 
(ii) Chances of change 
(iii) Predicted change in health (expected improvement rating minus likelihood 
rating given current behaviour, i.e. score on 3 - score on I). 
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Current prediction across all behaviours 
Mean ratings, summed across all behaviours, for perceived likelihood of encountering 
problems in the given area of behaviour given current practice for the three mood 
induction methods were: 
Happy M = 49.75 (SD = 9.53) 
Neutral M = 52.05 (SD = 10.46) 
Sad M = 54.60 (SD = 9.39) 
There were no significant effects. Nor were the means in the order predicted by the 
AIM. 
Current prediction for specific behaviours 
Figure 7.2 shows the means for perceived likelihood of encountering problems in the 
given area of behaviour given current practice. 
Alcohol 	Nicotine Cannabis Exercise 	Fat 	Fruit & Veg. Safer Sex Ultraviolet 
Intake/Use 
Figure 7.2 	Perceived likelihood of encountering problems in the given area of 
behaviour, given current practice, with happy, neutral or sad mood, 
for Experiment 2. (N = 60.) Vertical lines depict standard errors of 
the means. 
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Exploratory analyses of variance indicated no significant effects involving mood for 
any of the behaviours investigated. Effects for sex were found for nicotine and exposure 
to ultraviolet radiation. 
For nicotine, mean rating by females was M = 7.70 (SD = 1.73), and for males M = 6.27 
(SD = 2.29) and these were significantly different, F(1,54) = 7.45, p = .009. That is, 
females rated themselves as less likely to have problems resulting from their current 
and previous nicotine use than did males. 
For exposure to ultraviolet radiation, mean rating by females was M = 6.00 (SD = 2.15), 
and that of males M = 4.40 (SD = 2.39) and these were significantly different, 
F(1,54) = 7.17, p = .010. Females predicted fewer problems resulting from their current 
behaviour than did males. 
In summary, although the AIM predicts that participants induced with a sad mood 
would make more pessimistic ratings than those induced with a happy mood, this 
experiment found no evidence for such an effect with the Current prediction variable. 
Because alcohol, nicotine and cannabis were used by only some participants, the 
Chances of change and Predicted change measures dealt with next included only scores 
of users of these drugs. The other behaviours were common to all participants and were 
therefore rated by all of them. 
Chances of change 
Chances of change across all behaviours 
Mean ratings, summed across all behaviours (other than alcohol, nicotine and cannabis 
use) for chances of change in behaviour given current practice for the three induced 
mood types were: 
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Happy M = 36.20 (SD = 4.69) 
Neutral M = 34.25 (SD = 5.31) 
Sad M = 36.00 (SD = 5.57) 
These mean ratings were not significantly different from each other and therefore failed 
to support the AIM. There was a significant interaction between mood induction and 
sex, F(2,54) = 3.97, p = .025. This is illustrated in Figure 7.3 and shows a tendency for 
males in a sad mood to rate themselves as less likely to be able to change their 
behaviour than did females, whereas participants of both sexes induced with happy and 
neutral moods, responded similarly. Means comparisons (contrast analysis) indicated 
significant differences in scores between neutral females and sad females (p = .011) and 
between sad males and sad females (p = .004). 
Sex 
Figure 7.3 	Interaction between induced mood and sex for chances of 
modifying behaviour (summed ratings from exercise to UV 
protection) with happy, neutral or sad mood. Vertical lines depict 
standard errors of the means. 
Chances of change for specific behaviours 
Figure 7.4 shows mean perceived chance of successfully modifying behaviour in the 
given area given a decision to do so. 
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Figure 7.4 	Perceived chances of successfully modifying behaviour in the given 
area given a decision to do so with happy, neutral or sad mood, for 
Experiment 2. (Alcohol, N= 53; nicotine, N = 14; cannabis, N= 16; 
others, N= 60.) Vertical lines depict standard errors of the means. 
Exploratory analyses of variance showed no significant effects involving mood or sex, 
for nicotine (for those who smoked), cannabis (for users), exercise, or safer sex. 
For users of alcohol, there was a main effect for mood, F(2,47) = 3.72, p = .032, with 
the happy group being the most optimistic about the chances of change, M = 8.59 
(SD = 0.62), followed by the sad group, M = 7.72 (SD = 1.87), with the neutral group 
being the least optimistic about their chances of reducing their alcohol intake, M = 7.28 
(SD = 1.71). SNKs showed that only the mean scores of the happy and neutral groups 
were significantly different from each other. 
For fat intake, there was a significant interaction between mood and sex, 
F(2,54) = 3.68, p = .032. Figure 7.5 shows sad males to be more pessimistic about their 
chances of modifying their behaviour than sad females. Means comparisons (contrast 
analysis) indicated this difference to be statistically significant (p = .003). The only 
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other significant differences between means were between sad males and neutral males 
(p = .034), and between sad males and neutral females (p = .044). 
Sex 
Figure 7.5 	Interaction between induced mood and sex for chances of 
modifying behaviour (fat intake) with happy, neutral or sad mood. 
Vertical lines depict standard errors of the means. 
For fruit and vegetable consumption, there was a significant effect for sex, 
F(1,54) = 5.65, p = .021, with females rating themselves as having a greater chance of 
modifying their fruit and vegetable intake than did males. Mean scores were males: 
M = 7.07 (SD = 1.87), and females: M = 8.00 (SD = 1.08). 
For exposure to ultraviolet radiation, there was a significant effect for mood,. 
F(2,54) = 5.43, p = .007, with participants in whom a happy mood had been induced 
rating their chances of reducing their exposure most likely (mean rating M = 7.85 
(SD = 1.14)), followed by the sad mood group (mean rating M = 7.40 (SD = 1.39)) and 
then the neutral mood group (mean rating M= 6.15 (SD = 2.25)). SNKs showed 
significant differences between scores of the happy and neutral groups and also 
between sad and neutral groups. 
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Predicted change 
Predicted change across all behaviours 
Mean ratings, summed across all behaviours (other than alcohol, nicotine and cannabis 
use) for predicted change in behaviour given current practice for the three mood 
induction methods were: 
Happy M = 3.95 (SD = 3.86) 
Neutral M = 2.00 (SD = 3.29) 
Sad M = 3.00 (SD = 4.95) 
Although the means for happy and sad (but not neutral) were in the predicted order, 
analysis of variance indicated no significant effects. 
Predicted change for specific behaviours 
Figure 7.6 shows means for predicted change in health resulting from a behaviour 
change in the given area. 
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Figure 7.6 	Predicted change with happy, neutral or sad mood, for 
Experiment 2. (Alcohol, N. 53; nicotine, N= 14; cannabis, N= 16; 
others, N = 60.) Vertical lines depict standard errors of the means. 
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Exploratory analyses of variance showed no significant effects involving mood or sex 
for alcohol (for users), nicotine (for smokers), cannabis (for users), fat consumption, 
fruit and vegetable consumption, safer sex or exposure to ultraviolet radiation. 
There was a significant effect for mood on predicted change in health with exercise, 
F(2,54) = 4.45, p = .016. In this instance, the predictions of participants induced with 
happy and sad moods were in accord with the AIM and indeed SNK tests showed that 
the mean scores (as depicted in Figure 7.6) for happy and sad mood groups were 
significantly different from each other. The scores for neutral and happy groups were 
also significantly different although the position of neutral scores was not as predicted 
by the AIM. 
Impact of mood on processing time 
Impact of mood on processing time across all behaviours 
When response time was summed across all ratings (other than for alcohol, nicotine and 
cannabis use), mean response times (in seconds) for each induction method were: 
Happy M = 172.10 (SD = 44.04) 
Neutral M = 187.50 (SD = 38.25) 
Sad M = 194.65 (SD = 47.21) 
These response times were in the predicted order, but a 3 (Mood induction) x 2 (Sex) 
ANOVA showed no significant main effects or interactions. 
Impact of mood on processing time for specific behaviours 
Figure 7.7 shows mean response times for each item for each of the three moods. In the 
case of alcohol, nicotine and cannabis, response times are given only for users. 
94 
0 Happy 
12 Neutral 
Sad 
Response 8D - 
Time (secs) 
- 
Alcohol 	Nicotine Cannabis Exercise 	Fat 	Fruit & Veg Safer Sex Ultraviolet 
Intake/Use 
Figure 7.7 	Response times with happy, neutral or sad mood, for Experiment 2. 
(Over 5 items relating to alcohol, 6 to nicotine and 6 to cannabis; 3 
items for each of the others. Alcohol, N = 53; nicotine, N= 14; 
cannabis, N= 16; others, N=60.) Vertical lines depict standard 
errors of the means. 
A 3 (Mood induction) x 2 (Sex) ANOVA for users only of alcohol, nicotine or 
cannabis, in confidence and expectancy ratings in these behaviours, and for all 
participants for exercise, fat consumption, fruit and vegetable consumption, safer sexual 
behaviour or protection against ultraviolet radiation, showed no significant main effects 
or interactions. 
That is, the hypothesis that people in whom a sad mood had been induced would take 
longer to process information than those in whom a happy mood had been induced was 
not upheld. 
A summary of findings related to mood in terms of number of participants, N, and 
p-values, is given in Table 7.1. 
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Table 7.1 	Summary of Mood Main Effects in Experiment 2. 
Preliminary analyses 
Age 
Mood before inductions 
Mood after induction 
Final mood (end of experiment) 
60 
60 
60 
60 
.538 
.177 
. 010* 
.947 
p-values 
Main analyses RT Opt 1 Opt 2 Opt 3 
Sum of analyses with 60 participants 60 .257 .288 .394 .307 
Alcohol 60 n/a .363 n/a n/a 
Alcohol 53 drinkers only .928 Na .032*  .164 
Nicotine 60 n/a .254 n/a n/a 
Nicotine 14 smokers only .897 n/a .931 .654 
Cannabis 60 n/a .206 Na 
Cannabis 16 cannabis users only .763 n/a .191 .779 
Exercise 60 .507 .142 .775 .016* 
Fat items 60 .235 .065 .649 .072 
Fruit & veg. intake 60 .447 .265 .633 .630 
Safer sex 60 .270 .828 .355 .699 
UV 60 .815 .641 .007 * .958 
Note. 	significant at p = .05 
Variables: Mood type (Happy, Neutral, Sad), Sex (Male, Female) 
Key: 	RT: Response time 
Opt 1: Optimism score (first) i.e. Prediction, given current behaviour 
(negative optimism score) 
Opt 2: Optimism score (second) i.e. Chances of change 
Opt 3: 
n/a 
Optimism score (third) 
not available/applicable 
i.e. Predicted change in health, given behavioural change 
Correlations 
Because ambient mood might be more pervasive than induced mood, correlational 
analyses were run between final mood and optimism ratings (cf. Salovey & Birnbaum, 
1989) and between mood and processing time. The results are included in the summary 
Table 7.2. These analyses showed a negative correlation between mood after 
manipulation and predicted problems from current behaviour across all health 
behaviours, and a negative correlation between mood after manipulation and chances of 
health related changes across all applicable ratings, opposite from the predictions of the 
AIM. Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, self-esteem correlated significantly 
with pre-induction and with post-experimental mood, but not with post-induction mood. 
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Table 7.2 	Correlations for Experiment 2 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
1. Pre Mood 1 
2. Post Mood .28* 1 
3. Final Mood .57* 49* 1 
4. Self Esteem .59* .03 .37* 1 
5. Problems (Alc to UV) .15 -.31* .04 .08 1 
6. Chances (Ex to U10 .17 -.21* -.03 .21* .39* 1 
7. Pred. Change (Ex to UV) -.19 .02 -.07 -.15 -.41* -.07 1 
8. RT (Ex to UV) .01 .09 .14 -.04 .06 -.10 -.21 1 
Note: 	a= 58; critical value of r = .21. 
* Significant at p= .05. 
Post-experimental questionnaires, administered to check for any anomalies to be taken 
into consideration in analyses or modifications required for future studies, yielded no 
significant information. For example, no participants expressed any suspicion about a 
connection between the allegedly unrelated 'first' and 'second' experiments. 
Summary 
First hypothesis 
Although mood was successfully induced, ANOVAs across all three optimism ratings 
showed few effects at all for mood even for earlier items. Therefore there was little 
evidence in support of the first hypothesis - that participants in whom a sad mood had 
been induced would make more pessimistic judgments about both the possibility, and 
the outcome, of modifying their behaviour, and those with a happy mood would make 
more optimistic judgments. 
Second hypothesis 
Nor was there support for the second hypothesis that participants in whom a sad mood 
was induced would have a longer processing time than those in a happy mood (with 
neutral mood between). 
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Correlations 
Correlational analyses showed that mood correlated negatively with some health ratings 
and provided no support for the AIM. 
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Experiment 3: Autobiographical Mood Induction and Computer-
administered Items 
This experiment was similar to Experiment 2 except that, because of the lack of mood 
effects, moods were induced using a traditional autobiographical method (Baker & 
Guttfreund, 1993; Martin, 1990; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Wright & Mischel, 1982). 
Method 
Participants 
Sixty first-year Psychology students, 30 males and 30 females, of mean age 21.13 years 
(SD = 6.93) were recruited to participate in an experiment described as a social 
judgment study. 
Design 
The design was identical to that of the Experiment 2. 
Mood induction and manipulation checks 
Mood was induced by the autobiographical method described in Chapter 6. Mood 
assessments were as for Experiment 2. As before, effectiveness of mood manipulation 
and maintenance was analysed using a 3 (Occasion) x 3 (Mood) x 2 (Sex) design, 
where occasions were: pre-induction (pre), post-induction (post) and end of experiment 
(end). 
Apparatus and materials 
Apparatus and materials were as for Experiment 2 except for the mood induction 
material. In this experiment, the autobiographical method (cf. Baker & Guttfreund, 
1993; Martin, 1990; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Wright 8z Mischel, 1982) found 
successful in Experiment 1 was used. The apparatus therefore consisted of a typed set 
of instructions for participants to write about some of their own life experience. The 
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group to be induced with a happy mood was asked to write about a happy incident, and 
the group to be induced with a sad mood was asked to write about a sad incident. 
Neutral group participants were instructed to describe the street in which they had lived 
at the age of about 10 years. (See Appendix B.) 
Participants responded using two pages of lined paper. A ten minute time period for the 
mood induction was measured by the experimenter with a stop-watch. 
Procedure 
The procedure was as for Experiment 2, except that the autobiographical induction 
method replaced the audiovisual. The autobiographical mood induction was carried out 
away from the computer. 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analyses 
Baseline data 
Analyses of variance, all of the form 3 (Mood induction) x 2 (Sex), confirmed that there 
were no significant differences between the groups to be induced with happy, neutral or 
sad moods, for age, self-esteem, need for cognition or facility with using the computer 
(ascertained by response times on need for cognition questionnaires). 
Mood checks 
Figure 7.8 shows mean mood ratings, on the sad - happy scale, for mood induction 
groups at pre-induction, post-induction and end of Experiment 3. Analysis of variance 
on the basis of a 3 (Occasion) x 3 (Mood induction) x 2 (Sex) design showed a 
significant Occasion x Mood type interaction, F(4,108)= 16.16, p = .001 (with Geisser-
Greenhouse correction). As can be clearly seen, moods were manipulated in the 
intended direction, but were not maintained until the end of the experiment, as was also 
the case in Experiment 2. 
100 
1:21 Happy 
ig Neutral 
Sad 
8 _ 
7-. 
6_ 
5 _ 
4 _ 
3 
2 _ 
1_ 
0 
Mood 
Rating 
Pre 	 Post 
	 End 
Rating occasion 
Figure 7.8 	Mean mood ratings for mood induction groups, happy, neutral and 
sad, at pre-induction, post-induction and end of Experiment 3. 
Vertical lines depict standard errors of the means. 
For pre-induction, post-induction and end of experiment, analyses of variance of the 
form 3 (Mood induction) x 2 (Sex) were performed on mood ratings on the sad - happy 
scale. 
(i) At pre-induction (pre) there was a significant main effect for mood, 
F(2,54) = 4.40, p = .017. SNK tests showed significant differences in mood 
between sad and neutral groups, with the group to be induced with a sad 
mood starting off happiest. Other differences were not significant. 
(ii) Immediately post-induction (post) there was a significant main effect for 
mood, F(2,54) = 10.32, p = .001. SNK tests showed significant differences 
in mood between sad and happy groups, and between neutral and happy 
groups. That is, the mood induction was as successful as for Experiment 2, 
despite the high pre-induction mood-ratings made by those allocated to the 
sad group. 
(iii) At the end of the experiment (end) no significant differences remained 
showing that induced mood did not persist until that stage. 
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It would seem therefore that any mood effects would be more likely to be found in 
responses to earlier rather than to later items. 
Testing the major hypotheses: impact of mood on health judgments 
Impact of mood on health ratings 
As for Experiment 2 participants rated 
1. 	The likelihood of specific problems given their current behaviour. 
2 	Perceived chances of modifying their current behaviour in a healthy 
direction. 
3. The improvement they expected might result from such a change. 
This yielded three optimism scores as dependent variables. Where necessary raw scores 
were reversed so that more optimistic scores would be expressed as higher ratings. 
Scores were: 
(i) Current prediction 
(ii) Chances of change 
(iii) Predicted change in health (expected improvement rating minus likelihood 
rating given current behaviour, i.e. score on 3 - score on 1). 
Current predictions 
Current prediction across all behaviours 
Mean ratings, summed across all behaviours, for perceived likelihood of encountering 
problems in the given area of behaviour given current practice for the three mood 
induction methods were: 
Happy 	M = 52.70 (SD = 9.45) 
Neutral 	M = 50.00 	(SD = 8.28) 
Sad 	M = 50.80 	(SD = 12.94) 
The means for happy and sad moods (but not for neutral) were in the predicted order 
but analysis of variance indicated no significant differences between these ratings. Nor 
were there other significant effects. 
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Figure 7.9 shows the mean perceived likelihood of encountering problems in the given 
area of behaviour, given current practice. 
Figure 7.9 
Alcohol 	Nicotine Cannabis Exercise 	Fat 	Fruit & Veg. Safer Sex Ultraviolet 
Intake/Use 
Perceived likelihood of encountering problems in the given area of 
behaviour, given current practice with happy, neutral or sad mood, for 
Experiment 3. (N = 60.) Vertical lines depict standard errors of the 
means. 
There were no significant effects involving mood or sex, for alcohol, nicotine, cannabis, 
exercise, fat consumption, safer sex or exposure to ultraviolet radiation. 
For fruit and vegetable consumption the only significant effect was for sex, 
F(1,54) = 10.27, p = .002, with females rating themselves as more likely to have 
problems resulting from their consumption level than males. Mean scores were: 
females, M = 7.37 (SD = 1.27); males, M= 6.00 (SD = 1.89). There were no significant 
mood effects. 
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Chances of change 
Chances of change across all behaviours 
Mean ratings, summed across all behaviours (other than alcohol, nicotine and cannabis 
use) for chances of change in behaviour given current practice for the three mood 
induction methods were: 
Happy M = 35.20 (SD = 6.39) 
Neutral M = 36.55 (SD = 4.31) 
Sad M = 36.35 (SD = 5.09) 
The mean ratings were not in the predicted order, and analysis of variance indicated no 
significant differences between them, F(2,54) = 0.37, p = .692. Nor were there any 
other significant effects. 
Chances of change for specific behaviours 
Figure 7.10 shows the mean perceived chances of successfully modifying behaviour in 
the given area given a decision to do so. 
There were no significant effects involving mood or sex for alcohol (for users) cannabis 
(for users), exercise, fat consumption, fruit and vegetable consumption, safer sex or 
exposure to ultraviolet radiation. 
For those who used nicotine, there was a significant effect for sex, F(1,16) = 5.29, 
p = .035, with females rating themselves as more likely to be able to reduce their use 
than males, mean ratings by females were M = 6.83 (SD = 1.75), and by males, 
M = 4.80 (SD = 2.04). There were no significant mood effects. 
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Figure 7.10 	Perceived chances of successfully modifying behaviour in the given 
area given a decision to do so with happy, neutral or sad mood, for 
Experiment 3. (Alcohol, N. 49, nicotine, N. 22; cannabis, N. 23; 
others, N = 60.) Vertical lines depict standard errors of the means. 
Predicted change 
Predicted change across all behaviours 
Mean ratings, summed across all behaviours (other than alcohol, nicotine and cannabis 
use) for predicted change in behaviour given current practice for the two mood 
induction methods were: 
Happy M = 3.40 (SD = 5.24) 
Neutral M = 4.20 (SD = 4.58) 
Sad M = 2.80 (SD = 5.98) 
The means for happy and sad (but not neutral) were in the order predicted by the AIM 
but analysis of variance indicated no significant effects, F(2,54) = 0.34, p = .712. 
Predicted change for specific behaviours 
Figure 7.11 shows means for predicted change in health resulting from a behaviour 
change in the given area. 
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Figure 7.11 	Predicted change with happy, neutral or sad mood, for Experiment 3. 
(Alcohol, N= 49; nicotine, N= 22; cannabis, N= 23; others, N= 60.) 
Vertical lines depict standard errors of the means. 
There were no significant effects involving mood or sex, for any of the investigated 
behaviours. 
Impact of mood on processing time 
Impact of mood on processing time across all behaviours 
When response time was summed across all ratings (other than for alcohol, nicotine and 
cannabis use), mean response times (in seconds) for each induction method were: 
Happy M = 182.75 (SD = 48.19) 
Neutral M = 172.80 (SD = 35.72) 
Sad M = 173.55 (SD = 36.59) 
These response times were not in the predicted order. A 3 (Mood induction) x 2 (Sex) 
ANOVA showed no significant main effects or interactions, F(2,54) = 0.37, p = .692. 
Impact of mood on processing time for specific behaviours 
Figure 7.12 shows the mean response times for the behaviours with the three moods. In 
the case of alcohol, nicotine and cannabis, response times are given only for users. 
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Figure 7.12 Response times with happy, neutral or sad mood, for Experiment 3. 
(Over 5 items relating to alcohol, 6 items to nicotine and 6 to 
cannabis; 3 items for each of the others. Alcohol, N=49; nicotine, 
N= 22; cannabis, N= 23; others, N= 60.) Vertical lines depict 
standard errors of the means. 
A 3 (Mood induction) x 2 (Sex) ANOVA for users only of alcohol, nicotine and for all 
participants in the areas of exercise, fat consumption, fruit and vegetable consumption, 
safer sexual behaviour or protection against ultraviolet radiation, showed no significant 
main effects or interactions. 
For cannabis, however, there was a significant difference in response time between 
males and females, F(1,17) = 6.59, p = .020, with females, M= 85.64 secs (SD = 23.28) 
taking longer than males, M = 65.00 secs (SD = 8.73). It can be seen that there was a 
much greater variability in response time for females than for males. There were no 
other significant effects. 
The hypothesis that people in whom a sad mood had been induced would take longer to 
process information than those in whom a happy mood had been induced was not 
upheld. 
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A summary of findings related to mood in terms of number of participants, N, and 
p-values, is given in Table 7.3. 
Table 7.3 	Summary of Mood Main Effects in Experiment 3. 
Preliminary analyses N P 
Age 
Mood before inductions 
Mood after induction 
Final mood (end of experiment) 
60 
60 
60 
60 
.998 
.017* 
.001* 
.158 
p-values 
Main analyses AT Opt 1 Opt 2 Opt 3 
Sum of analyses with 60 participants 60 .692 .696 .692 .712 
Alcohol 60 &a .402 nla n/a 
Alcohol 49 drinkers only .927 n/a .314 .382 
Nicotine 60 n/a .616 n/a n/a 
Nicotine 22 smokers only .685 n/a .733 .660 
Cannabis 60 n/a .422 n/a n/a 
Cannabis 23 cannabis users only .173 n/a .935 .751 
Exercise 60 .911 .223 .522 .240 
Fat items 60 .847 .325 .098 .510 
Fruit & veg. intake 60 .487 .537 .179 .592 
Safer sex 60 .639 .983 .929 .641 
UV 60 .390 .183 .596 .146 
Note. 	* significant at p = .05 (mood congruent) 
Variables: Mood type (Happy, Neutral, Sad), Sex (Male, Female) 
Key: 	RT: Response time 
Opt 1: Optimism score (first) i.e. Prediction, given current behaviour 
(negative optimism score) 
Opt 2: Optimism score (second) i.e. Chances of change 
Opt 3: 
n/a 
Optimism score (third) 
not available/applicable 
i.e. Predicted change in health, given behavioural change 
Correlations 
Because ambient mood might be more pervasive than induced mood, correlational 
analyses were run between final mood and optimism ratings (cf. Salovey & Birnbaum, 
1989) and between final mood and processing time. The results are included in the 
summary Table 7.4. These analyses showed positive correlations between all of pre-
induction, post-induction and final mood ratings and prediction of problems given 
current behaviour across the summed ratings, thus supporting mood congruence. There 
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was a positive correlation between initial mood and chances of change ratings across 
relevant behaviours, also supporting mood congruence. As in Experiment 2, self-esteem 
correlated significantly with pre-induction and with post-experimental mood, but not 
with post-induction mood. 
Table 7.4 	Correlations for Experiment 3 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
1. Initial Mood 1 
2. Mood check .39* 1 
3. Final Mood .69* .74* 1 
4. Self Esteem •33* .19 .36* 1 
5. Problems (Alc to UV) .36* .24* .41* .18 1 
6. Chances (Ex to UV) .27* .07 .19 .21* .48* 1 
7. Pred. Change (Ex to UV) .07 .18 .006 -.01 -.43* -.13 1 
8. RT (Ex to UV) -.07 -.10 -.013 .16 .01 -.28* -.21 1 
Note: 	df = 58; critical value of r= .21 
* Significant at p = .05. 
As for Experiment 2, post-experimental questionnaires yielded no significant 
information. 
Summary 
First hypothesis 
Across all three optimism ratings, ANOVAs showed no effects for mood, even for 
earlier items. That is there was no evidence in support of the first hypothesis - that 
people in whom a sad mood had been induced would make more pessimistic judgments 
than people in a happy mood. 
Second hypothesis 
Nor was there support for the second hypothesis that people in a sad mood would have 
a longer processing time than those in a happy mood (with neutral mood between). 
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Correlations 
Correlational analyses showed some evidence of mood congruence consistent with the 
predictions of the AIM for substantive processing. 
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Experiment 4: Audiovisual Mood Induction and Pencil-and-paper-
presented Items. 
This experiment was run to ascertain whether computer administration diminished the 
effects of the mood inductions, for example because of the concentration required for 
its use, thus possibly accounting for lack of mood effects in Experiments 2 and 3. Other 
differences were that participants were all females and only two mood groups — happy 
and sad — were used. Mood was induced using the audiovisual technique employed in 
Experiment 2. 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-four female first year Psychology students of mean age, M = 22.18 years 
(SD = 8.37) were recruited to participate in an experiment described as a social 
judgment study. 
Design 
A 2 x 2 between subjects factorial design was used, with mood (happy, sad) and 
response mode (pencil-and-paper, computer) as factors. As for Experiments 2 and 3, the 
dependent variables were ratings of perceived risk, perceived chance of modifying 
behaviour and estimated outcome of modification, and processing time. 
• Mood induction and manipulation checks 
These were as for the Experiment 2. 
Apparatus and materials 
These were as for Experiment 2, except that items were presented in booklet form 
rather than on screen. A digital wrist watch was used by the experimenter to time 
responses. 
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Procedure 
The procedure was as for Experiment 2 except that practice items and questionnaires 
were presented and responded to on paper and the experimenter noted times taken with 
a watch. The control group, however, used the computer as in Experiment 2 and 3. 
Results of ANOVAs are reported across both pencil-and-paper and computer groups 
combined. Figures show findings for both groups separately as well as combined. 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analyses 
Baseline data 
Analyses of variance, all of the form, 2 (Mood induction) x 2 (Response Mode), 
confirmed that there were no significant differences across groups induced with happy 
or sad moods for age, self-esteem or need for cognition. 
Mood checks 
Figure 7.13 shows mean mood ratings, on the sad - happy scale, for mood induction 
groups at pre-induction, post-induction and end of Experiment 4. Analysis of variance 
on the basis of a 3 (Occasion) x 2 (Mood induction) x 2 (Response Mode) design 
showed a significant Occasion x Mood induction interaction, F(2,80) = 19.44, p = .001 
(with Geisser-Greenhouse correction). As can be clearly seen, across the methods 
analysed together, moods were manipulated in the intended direction, but were not 
maintained until the end of the experiment. Inspection of the graphs shows better mood 
maintenance for the pencil-and-paper group than for the computer-administered group 
although the improvement did not reach statistical significance. 
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Figure 7.13 	Mean mood ratings for mood induction groups, happy and sad, at 
pre-induction, post-induction and end of Experiment 4, for computer 
administered tests, pencil & paper tests and both. Vertical lines 
depict standard errors of the means. 
Analysis of variance of the form 2 (Mood induction) x 2 (Response mode) on mood 
ratings on the sad - happy scale made at the following points during the experiment 
showed the following effects. 
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(i) A pre-induction (pre) ANOVA showed no significant effects, and in 
particular that there was no significant difference between the two mood 
groups prior to the mood induction procedures. 
(ii) Immediately post-induction (post) ANOVA showed a significant main effect 
for mood, F(1,40) = 52.00, p < .001. There were no other significant effects. 
(iii) At the end of the experiment (end) ANOVA showed that the difference in 
mood ratings due to the sad and happy mood inductions was no longer 
significant. 
Again it would seem that any mood effects would be more likely to be found in 
responses to earlier rather than to later items. 
Testing the major hypotheses: impact of mood on health judgments 
Impact of mood on health ratings 
As in Experiments 2 and 3 participants rated 
1. The likelihood of specific problems given their current behaviour. 
2. Perceived chances of modifying their current behaviour in a healthy 
direction. 
3. The improvement they expected might result from such a change. 
This yielded 3 optimism scores as dependent variables. Where necessary raw scores 
were reversed so that more optimistic scores would be expressed as higher ratings. 
Scores were: 
(i) Current prediction 
(ii) Chances of change 
(iii) Predicted change in health (expected improvement rating minus likelihood 
rating given current behaviour, i.e. score on 3 - score on I). 
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Current predictions 
Current prediction across all behaviours 
Mean ratings, summed across all behaviours, for perceived likelihood of encountering 
problems in the given area of behaviour given current practice for the two mood 
induction methods were: 
Happy 	M = 54.64 (SD= 8.31) 
Sad 	M = 51.68 	(SD = 11.73) 
The means were in the order predicted by the AIM but a 2 (Mood induction) x 
2 (Response mode) analysis of variance indicated no significant differences between 
them, F(1,40) = 0.98, p = .329. Nor were there any other significant effects. 
Current prediction for specific behaviours 
Figure 7.14 shows mean perceived likelihood of encountering problems in the given 
area of behaviour, given current practice for pencil-and-paper respondents and 
computer respondents both separately and combined. 
Analysis of variance over all participants showed that there were no significant effects 
on ratings for any of the eight health behaviours investigated. 
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Chances of change 
Chances of change across all behaviours 
Mean ratings, summed across all behaviours (other than alcohol, nicotine and cannabis 
use) for chances of change in behaviour given current practice for the two mood 
induction methods were: 
Happy 	M = 35.91 	(SD = 6.96) 
Sad 	M = 36.05 	(SD = 6.41) 
The means were not in the order predicted by the AIM and analysis of variance 
indicated no significant differences between them, F(1,40) = 0.02, p = .883. Nor were 
there any other significant effects. 
Chances of change for specific behaviours 
Figure 7.15 shows mean perceived chance of successfully modifying behaviour in the 
given area given a decision to do so. 
Analysis of variance showed that there were no significant effects involving mood or 
response mode for alcohol (for users), exercise, fat consumption, fruit and vegetable 
consumption, safer sex or exposure to ultraviolet radiation. 
For nicotine users, there were no significant effects involving mood. There was a main 
effect for response mode, F(1,10) = 6.56, p = .028, with the pencil-and-paper group 
predicting a greater likelihood of change, M = 7.78 (SD = 1.79), than the computer 
group, M = 5.20 (SD = 2.49). This effect seems more likely to be due to the operation of 
random factors than to demonstrate an effect of response mode. 
For cannabis users, there was a main effect for mood, F(1,7) = 9.28, p = .019, with 
mean scores: Happy, M = 8.83 (SD = 0.41), Sad, M = 6.40 (SD = 1.67), in the order 
predicted by the AIM. 
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Perceived chance of successfully modifying behaviour in the given 
area, given a decision to do so, with happy or sad mood for 
Experiment 4. Numbers in parentheses signify N. Vertical lines 
depict standard errors of the means. 
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Predicted change 
Predicted change across all behaviours 
Mean ratings, summed across all behaviours (other than alcohol, nicotine and cannabis 
use) for predicted change in behaviour given current practice for the two mood 
induction methods were: 
Happy 	M = 2.23 	(SD = 5.49) 
Sad 	M = 4.73 	(SD = 4.30) 
The means were not in the predicted order and analysis of variance indicated no 
significant differences between these ratings, F(1,40) = 1.61, p = .212. Nor were there 
any other significant effects. 
Predicted change for specific behaviours 
Figure 7.16 shows means for predicted change in health resulting from a behaviour 
change in the given area. 
There were no significant effects involving mood or response mode, for alcohol (for 
drinkers), nicotine (for smokers), exercise, fat consumption, fruit and vegetable 
consumption, or exposure to ultraviolet radiation. 
For cannabis, there was a significant effect for mood, F(1,7) = 6.45, p = .039, with the 
happy group, M = 1.83 (SD = 2.93) being more optimistic than the sad, M = -0.80, 
(SD = 2.17) in accordance with the AIM. 
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Figure 7.16 Predicted change in health resulting from a behaviour change in 
the given area with happy or sad mood for Experiment 4. Numbers 
in parentheses signify N. Vertical lines depict standard errors of the 
means. 
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For safer sex there was a significant interaction between mood and response mode 
(shown in Figure 7.17), with means comparisons indicating the difference between• 
pencil-and-paper and computer modes to be significant for sad mood participants. The 
reason for this is not obvious. 
1.5 
1.0 
0.5 
Rating 
difference 
(Expected 	0.0 
improvement) 
-0.5 
-1.0 
-1.5 
Computer 	Pencil & Paper 
Response mode 
Figure 7.17 	Expected improvement due to behaviour change safer sex. 
Vertical lines depict standard errors of the means. 
Impact of mood on processing time 
Impact of mood on processing time across all behaviours 
When response time was summed across all ratings (other than for alcohol, nicotine and 
cannabis use), mean response times (in seconds) for each induction method were: 
Happy 	M = 173.59 (SD = 46.98) 
Sad 	M= 165.05 (SD = 36.31) 
These response times were not in the predicted order and there were no significant 
effects. 
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Impact of mood on processing time for specific behaviours 
Figure 7.18 shows the mean response times for the individual behaviours with the two 
moods for pencil-and-paper respondents, computer respondents, and for both response 
modes. 
Analyses of variance, for users of nicotine or cannabis, and for all participants in the 
areas of exercise, fat consumption, safer sexual behaviour or protection against 
ultraviolet radiation, showed no significant effects involving mood. 
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Figure 7.18 	Response times for happy and sad mood, for Experiment 4. 
Numbers in parentheses signify N. Vertical lines depict standard 
errors of the means. 
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For alcohol, however, there was a significant interaction between mood and response 
mode, F(1,35) = 4.28, p= .046, with the computer group taking much longer if sad than 
if happy as shown in Figure 7.19. 
Computer 	Pencil & Paper 
Response mode 
Figure 7.19 	Response time for alcohol drinkers only. Vertical lines depict 
standard errors of the means. 
For fruit and vegetable consumption there was a significant main effect for response 
mode, F(1,40) = 6.97, p= .012, with the pencil-and-paper participants taking M= 35.53 
secs (SD = 10.95), which was longer than the computer group, M= 27.29 secs 
(SD = 5.70). 
Overall, there was little support for the hypothesis that people in whom a sad mood had 
been induced would take longer to process information than those in whom a happy 
mood had been induced. 
A summary of findings related to mood in terms of number of participants, N, and 
p-values, is given in Table 7.5. 
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Table 7.5 	Summary of Mood Main Effects in Experiment 4. 
Preliminary analyses N P 
Age 
Mood before inductions 
Mood after induction 
Final mood (end of experiment) 
44 
44 
44 
44 
.071 
.886 
.001 
.204 
* 
p-values 
Main analyses RT Opt 1 Opt 2 Opt 3 
Sum of analyses with 60 participants 44 .537 .329 .883 .212 
Alcohol 44 n/a .481 n/a n/a 
Alcohol 39 drinkers only .190 n/a .669 .159 
Nicotine 44 n/a .327 n/a n/a 
Nicotine 14 smokers only .559 n/a .211 .609 
Cannabis 44 n/a A47 n/a n/a 
Cannabis 11 cannabis users only .440 n/a . 019* . 039* 
Exercise 44 .629 .721 .524 .162 
Fat items 44 .884 .838 .508 .716 
Fruit & veg. intake 44 .503 .184 .501 .655 
Safer sex 44 .869 .916 .977 .968 
UV 44 .091 .808 .802 .114 
Note. 	* significant at p = .05 (mood congruent) 
Variables: 	Mood type (Happy, Neutral, Sad) 
Response mode (Computer, Pencil & Paper) 
Key: 	RT: 	Response time 
Opt 1: Optimism score (first) i.e. Prediction, given current behaviour 
(negative optimism score) 
Opt 2: Optimism score (second) i.e. Chances of change 
Opt 3: 
n/a 
Optimism score (third) 
not available/applicable 
i.e. Predicted change in health, given behavioural change 
Correlations 
As for the previous experiment, because ambient mood might be more pervasive than 
induced mood, correlational analyses were run between final mood and optimism 
ratings (cf. Salovey & Birnbaum, 1989) and between final mood and processing time. 
The results are included in the summary Table 7.6. There was no evidence of mood 
congruence. As in Experiments 2 and 3, self-esteem correlated significantly with pre-
induction and with post-experimental mood, but not with post-induction mood. 
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Table 7.6 	Correlations for Experiment 4 (Pencil & Paper Respondents Only) 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
1. Initial Mood 
2. Mood check 
3. Final Mood 
4. Seff Esteem 
5. Problems (Alc to UV) 
6. Chances (Ex to UV) 
7. Pred. Change (Ex to UV) 
8. RT (Ex to UV) 
1 
.24 
.65* 
.38* 
.05 
-.02 
.00 
.05 
1 
.65* 
.26 
.18 
-.16 
-.19 
-.04 
1 
.35* 
.13 
.05 
-.01 
.05 
1 
.41* 
.07 
-.55* 
.01 
1 
.03 
-.59* 
-.32* 
1 
-.15 
-.21 
1 
-.09 1 
Note: 	cif = 28; critical value of r= .31 
* Significant at p = .05 
As for Experiment 2 and 3, post-experimental questionnaires yielded no significant 
information. 
Summary 
First hypothesis 
Across all three optimism ratings investigated, ANOVAs showed little indication of 
mood congruence. Therefore the first hypothesis - that participants in whom a sad 
mood had been induced would make more pessimistic judgments about both the 
possibility, and the outcome, of modifying their behaviour, and those with a happy 
mood would make more optimistic judgments - was not well supported. 
Second hypothesis 
Nor was there support for the second hypothesis that participants in whom a sad mood 
was induced would have a longer processing time than those in a happy mood. 
Correlations 
Correlational analyses showed no evidence of mood congruence. 
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General Discussion of Findings of Experiments 2,3 and 4 
The hypotheses that if Forgas's model applies to health judgments then: 
1. participants in whom a sad mood is induced would make more pessimistic 
judgments about both the possibility and the outcome of modifying their 
behaviour; and those in whom a happy mood is induced will more make 
more optimistic judgments (with neutral mood in between) and 
2. participants in whom a sad mood is induced would have a longer processing 
time; and those in whom a happy mood is induced will have a shorter 
processing time (with neutral mood in between), 
received little support from Experiments 2, 3 and 4. 
Furthermore, although there was some correlational evidence of mood congruence, in 
that health ratings sometimes correlated with measures of mood at pre-induction, post-
induction or end-of-experimental stages, such findings were inconsistent across the 
three experiments reported in this chapter. 
This group of experiments had the following strengths: 
1. Happy and sad moods were effectively induced. 
2. Mood was thoroughly monitored. 
3. Two mood induction methods: audiovisual and autobiographical, and two 
response modes: computer and pencil-and-paper, were used. 
It was therefore appropriate to give detailed consideration to the lack of mood effects. 
Procedural issues 
Some possible procedural factors (and possible remedies) for lack of mood effects were 
seen to be as follows. 
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Although mood ratings were included with distractor scales to de-emphasise them it 
was considered possible that mood awareness and/or compliance effects might still 
have occurred. To remedy this the number of mood checks could be reduced. 
Ambient mood might have over-ridden effects of induced mood. Allocation to mood 
groups could be planned so that the happiest people would be assigned to the happy 
group and the saddest to the sad group. An argument against this would be that a hybrid 
experiment would result: a mixture of a true experiment (with actual manipulation) and 
a quasi-experiment (based on groups which differed at the beginning). 
A shorter health-judgment questionnaire could be used, however in the present 
experiments mood effects could have been expected in response to earlier items, and in 
any case, in the experiments reported in this chapter, mood was better maintained with 
the pencil-and-paper response mode (as illustrated in Figure 7.13) and mood effects 
were still not observed. 
The issue of personal relevance of health issues could be considered. A restricted age 
range with only older participants might yield a group more susceptible to mood effects 
on health. Alternatively, a group whose health was in some way threatened could be 
used. However, Salovey and Birnbaum (1989) found no mood effects for ill people, so 
this suggestion was considered to be of doubtful value. A third possibility considered 
was that a group experiencing a more serious and immediate health threat might show 
affect infusion. 
Theoretical issues 
Issues of a theoretical nature are discussed under three headings, relating to the 
adequacy of the AIM, health issues and the AIM, and substantive processing and health 
judgments. 
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The adequacy of the AIM 
Substantive processing is expected when an issue has high personal relevance (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1981, 1986) and is the type of processing in which mood influence is most 
likely (Forgas, 1994a). Curren and Harich (1994) however, found with product 
advertising, that mood biased judgments only when an evaluation lacked personal 
relevance — opposite to what the AIM would predict. Also, Storchheim (1995), found 
no evidence of mood-congruent bias in judgments of job applications. 
Another consideration is the effect of mood regulation. A movement from substantive 
or heuristic to motivational processing might be inferred from findings of Sedikides 
(1994) who found that, although sad mood at first influenced self-descriptions in a 
mood congruent way, self-descriptions became more positive as mood regulation 
strategies apparently came into effect. Also, Smith and Petty (1995) found that with 
negative induced mood, participants with low (but not high) self-esteem showed mood 
congruent recall, which again points to possible mood regulation by people high in self-
esteem. 
Processing for a given task might well include more than a single one of the four types 
of processing of the AIM. Instances where empirical findings are not consistent with 
the model could be accounted for by movement between processing types. Further, if it 
were not possible to predict that substantive processing would occur, but that it could 
only be inferred after the data had been collected, there would be a problem with 
circularity. 
A more general issue concerns the limits of the AIM and the range of phenomena to 
which it extends. A possible extension would be to postulate dynamic shifting between 
processing modes with search extent and search process depicted explicitly as 
continuous variables. Arrows included in the model might be required to indicate 
movement between processing types. Bearing in mind that the underlying processes 
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occur at neural level (Barnard & Teasdale, 1991; Izard, 1993) the reality is likely to be 
even more complex with several types of processing occurring concurrently. 
Health issues and the AIM 
An issue to be considered is whether the items presented in Experiments 2, 3 and 4, 
somehow rendered the AIM inapplicable. Given that Salovey and Birnbaum's (1989) 
results were consistent with the AIM, at least for negative health events, this was 
thought unlikely. 
Perhaps the lack . of affect infusion relates to issues concerning the self-concept in the 
matter of health judgments. Rhodewalt and Agustsdottir (1986) dealt with the effects of 
self-presentation on the phenomenal self. They saw people's awareness as arising out of 
(i) their interactions with the external environment, of (ii) their beliefs, values, attitudes 
and the implications of these for their behaviour. Such self-knowledge varies according 
to the social context. It might be that in younger people social influences might result in 
a view of self which negates mood effects. 
It is possible that health judgments inevitably lead to motivated processing and an 
optimistic bias. This notion would be supported by Croyle and Uretsky (1987) who 
found that an ill-health scenario, which could be assumed to increase the accessibility 
of illness-related memories, reduced the effects of negative mood on health judgments. 
As self-relevance increased, affective influence decreased (cf. Curren & Harich, 1994, 
who found self-relevance to be associated with lack of mood effects). Adler, Kegeles 
and Genevro (1992) integrated models for predicting health behaviours, recognising 
that such behaviours are not only influenced by emotional and cognitive factors, but 
also by optimistic bias, which they defined in terms of people underestimating their 
own susceptibility to health problems, causing systematic bias in the appraisal of threat. 
The implication of this bias for mood and health judgments needs further consideration. 
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An optimistic bias might interfere with affect infusion but the data reported in this 
chapter gives no evidence of an optimism ceiling effect. 
Substantive processing and health judgments 
Substantive processing involves the 'active generation of new information' (Fiedler, 
1991) and because of the reconstruction involved in such information processing it was 
predicted by the AIM to be likely to show affect infusion (Forgas, 1994a). The mood 
effects resulting from substantive processing were considered likely during observation 
and interpretation of social behaviours, as demonstrated by Forgas, Bower and Krantz 
(1984) and possibly to be even greater with more complex stimuli (Forgas, 1994a). The 
findings of Salovey and Birnbaum (1989) of affective influence on judgments about 
symptoms, health efficacy and future ill-health, made by healthy participants about 
negative health events, indicated that such health judgments were subject to affect 
infusion (Forgas, 1994a). However the mood-congruence findings of Salovey and 
Birnbaum (1989) applied neither to judgments made by sick participants, nor to 
judgments made about positive health events. In terms of the AIM this could be due to 
more direct processing occurring in such instances. 
In summary, an issue to be addressed is that of reconciling the results reported in this 
chapter with those of Salovey and Birnbaum (1989). A detailed examination of Salovey 
and Birnbaum's materials was undertaken to ascertain possible reasons for the 
difference in findings, and a replication of their third experiment was planned as part of 
this series of experiments. 
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Chapter 8 
Experiments 5 and 6: Two Procedural Issues 
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Chapter 8 
Experiments 5 and 6: Two Procedural Issues 
This chapter reports on two experiments undertaken to consider methodological issues 
to do with the experiments reported in Chapter 7. Experiment 5 dealt with the direction 
of the scales and Experiment 6 compared the depth of processing of the two item types. 
Experiment 5: The Direction of the Scales 
This experiment was undertaken to determine whether the direction of likelihood scales 
influenced the sort of ratings participants made. This was done to rule out the 
possibility that direction of the scales had somehow prevented findings in accordance 
with the AIM in Experiments 2, 3 and 4. Specifically, scales labelled very likely - very 
unlikely were compared with scales labelled very unlikely - very likely. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-three second and third year university students (11 males and 22 females) of 
mean age 23.58 years (SD = 7.48) participated in this study as part of a Psychology 
practical class exercise. 
Design 
Direction of scale (very likely first or very unlikely first) and sex were between subjects 
factors. 
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Apparatus and materials 
In this experiment there was no mood induction. Questionnaires for all participants 
were similar in that each contained ten items structured as in Experiments 2, 3 and 4, 
followed by ten items structured as in the experiments of Salovey and Birnbaum 
(1989). Copies of protocols for this experiment form Appendix C. A set of appropriate 
instructions preceded each set of items. Instructions and an example of items of the 
structure used in the experiments of this thesis follow. 
Instructions:  
On the following pages are some questions about how likely you are to suffer from 
the effects of various practices which could be hazardous to health and about 
how confident you are that you could make various health-related changes. 
Whether or not you are actually trying to change your habits at present, please rate 
how confident you are that your would be able to make yourself do regularly 
the things suggested, if you wanted to. 
(On next page:) 
Information: Exposure of uncovered skin to ultra-violet rays from the sun is 
associated with increased risk of skin cancer. 
Example of a group of three items: 
Given your current and likely future exposure to the sun, how likely do you think you 
are to have contracted skin cancer before the age of 70? 
What do you believe would be your chances of increasing your use of blockout (15+) 
and/or wearing sun-protective clothing over the next summer if you decided to? 
How likely do you think you are to have contracted skin cancer by the age of 70 if 
you have used blockout (15+) and/or worn protective clothing? 
Example of three Salovey & Birnbaum items, with stem: 
For each of the following items, please use the scale to indicate the likelihood that 
you will experience the situation at some stage in your life. 
• Contracting some form of cancer. 
• Achieving great cardiac fitness. 
• Developing high blood pressure. 
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Example of the 'Very likely" first' scale used by participants: 
11 11 1 111111i11111111111111111111111111111 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Example of the 'Very unlikely" first' scale used by participants: 
Very unlikely 	 Very likely 
The visual analogue scales, as shown above, on which participants were asked to make 
ratings, were of the form used in the preceding experiments. That is they had nine major 
steps, with each step subdivided into five. The only difference between the materials 
administered to the two groups of participants was that one had all their likelihood 
rating scales starting with very likely, and the other with very unlikely. After the 
likelihood ratings was a page headed Post-experimental questionnaire with the 
following questions: "Did you find the scales confusing?" (yes/no), "Would you have 
found it easier if the scales had been reversed?" (yes/no) and "Please rate the scales you 
have completed for ease of use (1 = easiest, 9 = hardest)". On the final page participants 
were asked to rate mood at that moment on a sad - happy scale embedded between an 
alert - drowsy scale and a dreamy - attentive scale. 
Participants made their own recordings of time taken for their responses from a video-
screened film of a digital clock a few metres in front of them. 
Procedure 
The experiment was run with participants in a group in a room from which daylight was 
excluded (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). They were told that they would be asked to answer 
some health related questions and were instructed to "put a line through the scale to 
indicate your rating". The researcher demonstrated this on an exemplar scale. 
Participants were also told "if you wish to alter any rating you can go back and do it" 
and that there was no need to rush their answers. They were asked to write their age in 
years and their sex. 
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The time taken to make each style of rating (very likely - very unlikely or very unlikely - 
very likely) was measured by participants: an instruction at the beginning and end of 
items of the Dobber type and likewise of the Salovey and Birnbaum type (referred to, 
for convenience, here and subsequently, as being of the Salovey type) asked 
participants to "note down the time from the display clock" in a specially marked space. 
After completing likelihood ratings, participants answered questions about ease of use 
of the scales. Finally, participants made a mood rating. The number of corrections to 
ratings made by participants was counted by the experimenter for each type of item 
(Dobber items, Salovey items). 
Results and Discussion 
Direction of scale 
Analysis of variance was performed on optimism score. This was derived for each 
participant by adding their ratings with score reversals as appropriate, so that the score 
was always an optimism, rather than a pessimism, score. The independent variables 
were direction of scale and sex. Mean scores were very likely first, optimism score 
M = 118.63 (SD = 17.32), very unlikely first, optimism score M = 120.07 (SD = 14.21), 
which were not significantly different, F(1,29) = 0.10, p = .757. Nor was the Direction 
of scale x Sex interaction significant. Furthermore, ANCOVA with age as a covariate 
showed no significant difference for age. Likewise with response time as the dependent 
variable there was no significant difference for direction of scale. Additional analyses 
for total optimism score and total time for Dobber items and Salovey items separately 
showed no significant difference for direction of scale. No significant differences were 
found for negative or Positive items of either the Dobber or the Salovey type. 
Responses to: Did you find the scales confusing? (yes/no) 
One of the 18 participants with very likely first found the scale confusing, compared 
with 2 of the 15 with very unlikely first. 
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Responses to: Would you have found it easier if the scales had been reversed? 
(yes/no) 
One of the 18 participants with very likely first would have liked the scale reversed, 
compared none of the 15 with very unlikely first. 
Responses to: Please rate the scales you have completed for ease of use. 
(1 = easiest, 9 = hardest) 
Mean ratings were very likely first M = 3.63 (SD = 2.28) and very unlikely first 
M= 3.13 (SD = 1.77). (where 1 = easiest, 9 = hardest) with ANOVA showing that 
scales were not rated as significantly different in ease of use. 
Corrections made by participants 
Very likely first resulted in mean number of corrections per person, M = 0.17 
(SD = 0.51) and very unlikely first M = 0.40 (SD = 0.63), with ANOVA showing that 
scale direction did not result in a significantly different number of corrections by 
participants. 
Summary 
It was concluded therefore that the direction of scale made no significant difference to 
outcomes and therefore that the scale used in the experiments of this thesis was an 
appropriate one. Hence lack of mood effects was not in any way due to any confusion 
caused by the direction of the scale. 
Correlations of mood with optimism score; of mood with response time 
This experiment provided an opportunity to investigate correlations between scores and 
(ambient) mood ratings unconfounded by mood induction. As the hypotheses (that 
mood rating would correlate positively with health ratings and negatively with response 
time) were directional, the tests of significance were one-tailed. (N = 33, df = 31). As is 
evident from Table 8.1 showing correlations between mood and optimism scores and 
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response times and optimism scores, there were no significant correlations between 
mood and health ratings or between mood and response time. 
Table 8.1 	Correlations between Mood and Optimism Scores; Mood and 
Response Times. 
Mood with optimism scores r 
total optimism score .21 
on Dobber items .17 
on Dobber negative items .16 
on Dobber positive items .16 
on Dobber neutral items .08 
on Salovey and Birnbaum items .21 
on Salovey and Birnbaum negative items .08 
on Salovey and Birnbaum positive items .19 
Mood with response times r 
total response time .11 
with response time for Dobber items .15 
with response time for Salovey and Birnbaum items .01 
Note: 	Critical value for r = .30. None of these correlations was significant at the .05 level. 
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Experiment 6: Comparing the Depth of Processing between the Two Item 
Types. 
Depth of processing involves a hierarchy of processing levels so that processing 
happens at different 'depths', where 'depth' implies a greater degree of semantic 
analysis (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Craik & Tulving, 1975). This experiment was 
designed to confirm that the depth of processing involved in making the judgments 
required by the items of the preceding studies (Dabber) was as least as great as that 
required by Salovey and Bimbaum's (1989) items (Salovey). Individuals from four 
participant groups made judgments of both the Dobber and the Salovey types, with 
order counterbalanced. Allowances were made for differences in item length, because 
the items used in the Dobber studies were longer than those used by Salovey and 
Birnbaum (1989). Because Salovey and Birnbaum asked for judgments for the average 
college student and then for the participant, a second, average university student 
judgment was incorporated for half of the participants responding to Dobber items and 
for half the participants responding to Salovey items. 
The hypothesis was that participants would, when item length was taken into account, 
take as long or longer to make judgments of the Dobber type than for those of the 
Salovey type. This hypothesis was tested for two situations: when participants were 
asked to make ratings only for themselves and when they were asked to make a rating 
for the average university student and for themselves. To avoid confusion, the term 
"average" in reference to students has been replaced by the term "typical" in reports of 
statistical analyses. 
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Method 
Participants 
Participants were 60 university students (16 males and 44 females) of mean age, 
M = 21.68 (SD = 6.98) recruited to participate in an experiment described as a social 
judgment study. 
Design 
Half of the participants were asked to make ratings only for themselves and the other 
half were asked to make a rating for the typical student and for themselves. Order of 
items (Dobber first or Salovey first) was counterbalanced. This resulted in four 
experimental groups. Analyses involved simple comparisons between times taken for 
processing of items of the Dobber, and of the Salovey type. This was done separately 
for those participants who answered only about themselves (self only) and those who 
also made a rating for the typical student (typical&self). To eliminate order effects 
analyses were run according to the principles of a mixed Latin Square design (Keppel, 
1982). 
Apparatus and materials 
Participants were given a set of questionnaires, each set consisting of a numbered 
consent form followed by a general set of instructions for making likelihood ratings 
which were specific to the item type (Dobber, Salovey) and for item target (self only, 
typical&self). Then followed some pages of health statements, each statement having a 
rating scale next to it. After two sets of ratings (with order of item type 
counterbalanced) there were two sets of health statements (identical to the previous but 
without corresponding rating scales) which participants were asked simply to read 
through. Copies of protocols for this experiment form Appendix D. 
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The experimenter used a digital wrist-watch to measure the time taken for each part of 
the experiment. 
Procedure 
Each participant was run separately. The experiment was conducted in a room from 
which the daylight was excluded to prevent (or reduce) effects of weather on mood 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Participants were told: 
I would like you to answer some questionnaires. Put a line through the scale to indicate 
your rating as on the demonstration scale (for both sets of likelihood ratings). 
They then made the ratings, while the experimenter noted times taken to complete 
Salovey and Dobber items separately. Participants were told: 
I would like you to read through these items to get an idea of how long it took you to read 
them when you were making the likelihood ratings. Please read them at the same rate, but 
there is no need to think about the ratings this time. There is no need to read aloud, but 
moving your biro down the page might help you to concentrate. 
At the end of the experiment participants were asked to make a mood rating on a sad - 
happy scale embedded between alert - drowsy and dreamy - attentive scales as in 
previous experiments. However, as in Experiment 5, there had been no mood induction. 
A post-experimental questionnaire was completed. Participants were informed of the 
purpose of experiment. They were also asked not to discuss the experiment with any 
one who might participate in the experiment later. 
Results and Discussion 
Two analyses of variance was performed, one for self only and one for typical&self. 
Processing time (that is response time minus reading time) was the dependent variable. 
Independent variables were sex (male, female) — a between subjects factor, item type 
(Dobber, Salovey) and item order (first, second) — both repeated measures factors. 
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For self, mean processing times were: 
Dobber items, M = 95.17 secs (SD = 33.72) 
Salovey items, M= 61.17 secs (SD= 19.92) 
with a significant main effect for item type, F(1,26) = 31.19, p < .001, and no other 
significant effects. 
For typical&self 
Mean processing times by item type were: 
Dobber items 	M= 161.00 secs (SD = 56.10) 
Salovey items 	M = 122.40 secs (SD = 34.62) 
which were significantly different, F(1,26) = 14.67, p < .001. 
Mean processing times by order were: 
Item presented first 	M = 154.4 secs (SD = 54.3) 
Item presented second M = 122.4 secs (SD = 42.8) 
which were significantly different, F(1, 26) = 5.98, p = .022. 
On the basis of the significantly longer time taken for processing Dobber items it can 
therefore be concluded that the Dobber items involved processing which was at least as 
elaborative and therefore at least as likely to incur substantive processing (cf. Forgas, 
1992a) as that required by the Salovey and Birnbaum (1989) items, and probably more 
so. It should be remembered that processing times are being compared — these were 
derived by subtracting reading times from response times, and hence allowed for the 
greater length of Dobber items. The significant main effect for item order for 
typical&self indicated that mean response time for items was influenced by the order of 
their presentation. 
Correlations of mood with optimism score; of mood with response time 
This experiment provided another opportunity to investigate correlations between 
scores and (ambient) mood ratings. As the hypotheses that mood rating would correlate 
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positively with health ratings and negatively with response time, were directional, the 
tests of significance were one-tailed. For scores of Dobber plus Salovey items, N = 60, 
df = 58. For scores of Dobber scores or Salovey scores separately, again, N = 60, 
df = 58, as each participant made ratings on both types of items. The results as shown in 
Tables 8.2 and 8.3 show significant correlations between mood and optimistic bias 
scores except for positive items, of either the Dobber or Salovey type, and also 
optimism scores for total Dobber items. 
Table 8.2 	Correlations of Mood with Optimistic Bias Scores (i.e. Self Score 
Minus Typical Score); Mood with Response Times. (Where Available.) 
Mood with 
total optimistic bias score (Dobber plus Salovey) 	 .27* 
optimistic bias score, Dobber items 
	 .24* 
optimistic bias score, Dobber negative items 	 .23* 
optimistic bias score, Dobber positive items .15 
optimistic bias score, Dobber neutral items 	 .23* 
optimistic bias score, Salovey items 	 •37* 
optimistic bias score, Salovey negative items 	 .26* 
optimistic bias score, Salovey positive items .08 
Mood with 
(processing only) (processing and reading) 
total time, (Dobber plus Salovey) .153 .29* 
time, Dobber items .163 .29* 
time, Salovey items .108 .16 
Note: 	Critical value for r= . 21. 
* Significant at the .05 level. 
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Table 8.3 	Correlations of Mood with Optimism Scores for Self; Mood with 
Response Times. (Where Available.) 
Mood with 
(for mood with resp. time) 
total optimism score (Dobber plus Salovey) 	.055 	-.14 
optimism score, Dobber items 	 .016 
optimism score, Dobber negative items 	.280* 
optimism score, Dobber positive items -.252* 
optimism score, Dobber neutral items 	.125 
optimism score, Salovey items 	 .088 	-.16 
optimism score, Salovey negative items 	.111 
optimism score, Salovey positive items -.004 
Note: 	Critical value for r= .21. 
* Significant at the .05 level. 
Summary of Findings of Experiments 5 and 6. 
Experiment 5 showed that the direction of the scale (very likely first or very unlikely 
first) made no significant difference to outcomes and therefore the lack of mood effects 
in Experiments 2, 3 and 4 was not in any way related to the direction of the scale. 
Experiment 6 showed that the Dobber items took proportionately longer to process than 
did the Salovey items. This supports the view that the type of processing required for 
the items developed for use in the present research required at least as much semantic 
processing as that required by those used by Salovey and Birnbaum (1989). It can be 
concluded, therefore, that the items developed for these studies were at least as likely to 
incur substantive processing as those of Salovey and Birnbaum (1989) (cf. Forgas, 
1992a). 
The correlations evaluated for ambient mood and optimism/optimistic bias scores and 
with response time indicated no significant correlations in Experiment 5, but a number 
of significant correlations between mood and optimism/optimistic bias scores in 
Experiment 6, indicating some mood congruence. 
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Chapter 9 
Experiment 7: Mood Influence on Judgments of the Salovey and Birnbaum 
Type and of the Type used in this Thesis 
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Chapter 9 
Experiment 7: Mood Influence on Items of the Salovey and Birnbaum Type 
and of the Type used in this Thesis. 
This experiment was designed to compare the effects of sad and happy induced mood 
on judgments used in the present series of experiments with those of the type used by 
Salovey and Birnbaum (1989). Because Salovey and Birnbaum asked for judgments to 
be made in relation to the average college student and then for the participant, this 
format was incorporated for half of the participants. The other half answered for self 
only. All participants, however, made judgments both of the Dobber and of the Salovey 
and Birnbaum (Salovey) types. Like those used by Salovey and Birnbaum (1989), 
health events were positive or negative. In the case of Dobber items, some were also 
neutral in valence. 
Examples of health events and their valences used by Salovey and Birnbaum were: 
"Contracting some form of cancer" — negative valence. 
"Regularly maintaining a well-balanced diet" — positive valence. 
Examples of items of the type and their valences used in the present experiments were: 
"Given your current and likely future exposure to the sun, how likely do you think 
you are to have contracted skin cancer by the age of 70" — negative valence. 
. "What do you believe would be your chances of increasing your use of blockout 
(15+) and/or wearing sun-protective clothing over the next summer if you decided 
to" — positive valence. 
"How likely do you think you are to have contracted skin cancer by the age of 70 if 
you have used blockout (15+) and/or worn protective clothing?" — neutral valence. 
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Hypotheses 
Preliminary hypothesis 
A preliminary hypothesis was based on Weinstein's (1980) work on 'optimistic bias'. 
This view would hypothesise that individuals consider themselves less vulnerable to 
illness than their peers and it was accordingly proposed that participants who made 
ratings for a typical student as well as themselves would make more optimistic health 
ratings for themselves than for a typical student. 
Major hypotheses 
The major hypotheses, based on Salovey and Birnbaum's (1989) Experiment 3 findings 
and Forgas' s (1994a) Affect Infusion Model, were that participants in whom a sad 
mood was induced would 
(i) make more pessimistic judgments 
and 
(ii) process information more slowly 
than those in a whom a happy mood was induced. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 70 second and third year Psychology students, 10 males and 60 
females, who participated as part of their course of mean age 23.43 (SD = 7.45). 
Design 
A 2 x 2 design was used with factors: mood induction (sad, happy) and item type 
(Dobber, Salovey). Item type order (Dobber first or Salovey first) was counterbalanced. 
Item type was a within subjects factor and mood induction a between subjects factor. 
Half of the participants were asked to answer only about themselves (as in Experiments 
2, 3 and 4) and half were asked, item by item, first about the average student and then 
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about themselves (cf. Salovey & Birnbaum, 1989). The rating given to the "average 
student" was subtracted from that given for "self' to obtain an optimistic bias rating (cf. 
Salovey & Birnbaum, 1989). As in Chapter 8, to avoid confusion, the term "average" in 
reference to students was replaced by the term "typical" in reports of statistical 
analyses. 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variables were 
(1) optimism scores on negative items 
(2) optimism scores on positive items 
(3) total optimism scores (negative, neutral and positive items) 
(4) corresponding response times (where appropriate). 
Mood induction and mood manipulation checks 
Mood was induced by the autobiographical method described in Chapter 6 and used in 
Experiment 3. In this experiment, to reduce further the possibility of mood awareness 
or compliance effects, participants' mood ratings were requested only after the health 
judgments had been made. As in previous experiments, mood ratings were made on a 
sad - happy scale, again embedded among distractor scales. 
Apparatus and materials 
Participants were given their own set of questionnaires each consisting of 
1. a numbered consent form 
2. an instructions page indicating 
(i) that the consent form was to be torn off after completion so that replies 
would be confidential, and, 
(ii) that the set of questionnaires included 
(a) Life event description 
(b) Health inventory 
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(c) Likelihood ratings sheets 
A request "Please follow all instructions" came next. This was followed by a 28 item 
'Health Inventory' (Salovey & Birnbaum, 1989) to ensure that participants were 
uniformly healthy across the groups and an 'Autobiographical Memory Inventory' for 
happy or sad mood induction with one and a half pages of lined paper. 
Then came an instruction page for 'A Health Ratings Experiment' explaining the use of 
the rating scale and asking for the participant's age and sex. Instructions for responding 
to likelihood ratings for Salovey items and for Dobber items followed. Specific 
instructions were given depending on two issues: 
(i) item type (Dobber or Salovey), and 
(ii) the number of items: whether participants were asked to make judgments for 
the average student as well as for themselves or just for themselves. 
Health events with associated scales for ratings came next. An instruction at the 
beginning and end of the block of items of the Dobber type, and likewise of the Salovey 
type, asked participants to "note down the time from display clock" in a specially 
marked space. 
On the penultimate page participants were asked "Please read the following word pairs 
and mark, with a line through the scale, the position on the scale that refers to you at 
this moment". The scales were alert - drowsy, sad - happy and dreamy - attentive, all 
with 9 major points. A post-experimental questionnaire followed. Copies of protocols 
for this experiment form Appendix E. 
The experimenter used a stop-watch to measure the ten minute mood induction period 
(that is the time participants were allowed to complete the Autobiographical Memory 
Inventory). Participants made their own recording of time taken for their responses 
from a video-screened film of a digital clock a few metres in front of them. 
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Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in a room from which daylight was excluded (Schwarz 
& Clore, 1983). Participants were told: 
I have some questionnaires for males and some for females as I want an even spread. I 
would like you all to keep in step for the first part of today's work. Please read and 
complete the consent form. I will discuss fully with you the purpose of the experiment at 
the end of today's session. Meanwhile, if you have any questions now I will do my best to 
answer them. 
Consent forms were then detached by participants and collected by the experimenter to 
ensure anonymity of responses. The video-clock was shown to participants and it was 
explained that they would later be asked to record time in minutes and seconds. 
Participants were asked to complete the health inventory. They were then asked to turn 
over the page and told: 
On this page is an Autobiographical Memory Inventory. Please read the instructions and 
respond to the questions on the dotted lines. One and a half pages have been allocated for 
your response and this is always enough space. Take your time as you will have ten minutes 
to write your answers. I will tell you when ten minutes is up. 
After ten minutes participants were told: 
Please finish up now. Just finish writing your sentence or idea. Then turn over the page and 
we will read the instructions for the Health Ratings experiment. Do you understand how to 
use the scale? This is where you will be asked to note the time on this clock (just minutes 
and seconds). Please write in your age and circle male or female. Fairly soon now you can 
work right through to the end for yourself, following any instructions as you go. Some 
people will take more time to finish than others as some people have more questions to 
answer. When you have finished please sit quietly. Do not forget to write in the times as 
asked. Please turn over the page, read the instructions, begin and continue at your own 
pace. 
Following these tasks a post-experimental questionnaire was completed. Participants 
were then debriefed on the use and purpose of the mood induction procedure and on the 
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purpose of the whole experimental program. Those who had been induced with a sad 
mood group were offered the opportunity of further debriefing. 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analyses 
Age distribution across cells 
Analysis of variance showed that mean ages of males, M = 23.00 (SD = 7.86) and 
females, M = 23.50 (SD = 7.45) were not significantly different from each other. 
However mean ages were significantly different for the mood groups, F(1,68) = 5.63, 
p = .021. For the group induced with a happy mood, M= 21.32 years, (SD = 4.68); for 
the group induced with a sad mood, M = 25.42, (SD = 8.97). A graph (Figure 9.1) was 
drawn to illustrate age spread. This clearly shows that the ages fell into two groups, 19 
to 28 and 39 to 45, with a large proportion of sad mood participants in the older group. 
The options were (i) to divide age into levels as another factor, (ii) to perform analyses 
of covariance with age as a covariate, or (iii) to find out what occurred when data from 
the older age group was omitted from analyses. The relatively low number of older 
Number 
25 - 
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 X 27 28 23 30 31 M 33 34 35 X 37 33 33 40 41 12 43 44 45 
Age 
Figure 9.1 	Ages and induced mood of participants in Experiment 7. 
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participants and its unbalanced distribution between the two mood groups made two 
age levels inappropriate. The irregular, extremely bimodal, age distribution made use of 
analysis of covariance inappropriate as it assumes a constant relationship between the 
covariate (age) and the independent variable. The large age gap in the bimodal 
distribution meant that the small number of mature age students with extreme scores 
could have a large effect on the ANCOVA. The option chosen therefore, was to analyse 
results with data from the whole group and to compare these results with those obtained 
when the data from the older participants was excluded. A younger subset, those aged 
under 25, was selected for the purpose. The terms set and subset here are applied as in 
mathematical set theory, to express clearly that the age inclusive group, the set, 
included the younger group, the subset. The issue of the cut off point for the younger 
aged subset was decided in the context of both this experiment and the next 
(Experiment 8) to eliminate age differences between the groups produced by random 
allocation. For both experiments there were no significant differences in age between 
the mood groups when 25 was chosen as the cut-off point. 
All findings are reported, but in the interests of clarity, findings are given in detail only 
for the whole group, that is, the age inclusive set. Findings for the younger subset are 
given in detail only if they are dissimilar to those of the age inclusive set, or if they 
involve mood. 
Health status of participants 
Over all participants (the age inclusive set), ANOVA showed that the mean number of 
ill-health symptoms for the day of the experiment was not significantly different 
between sad and happy groups. For the group to be induced with a happy mood, mean 
number of symptoms was M = 4.03, (SD = 4.71), and for those to be induced with a sad 
mood rating, mean number of symptoms was M = 3.72, (SD = 3.79) (cf. Salovey and 
Birnbaum's ill participants who reported, on average, 8 or 9 symptoms in their 
Experiments 2 and 1 respectively, from the same checklist.) The health ratings for the 
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week prior to the experiment were not significantly different between the two groups. 
For the group induced with a happy mood, the mean number of symptoms was 
M= 10.77, (SD = 5.63) and for the group induced with a sad mood, M= 8.97, 
(SD = 4.33). 
These results were mirrored by those for the younger subset, where the mean numbers 
of ill-health symptoms for the day of the experiment was not significantly different 
between the groups; for the group to be induced with a happy mood, the number of 
symptoms was M = 4.00, (SD = 4.45) and for the group to be induced with a sad mood 
number of symptoms, M . 3.08, (SD = 3.70). The health ratings for the week prior to 
the experiment were not significantly different between the mood groups. For the group 
induced with a happy mood, the number of symptoms was M = 10.40, (SD = 5.53); for 
the group induced with a sad mood, the number of symptoms was M = 8.40, 
(SD = 4.43). 
Mood manipulation/retention check 
Of the 70 participants (age inclusive set), there were 34 people in the happy mood 
group and 36 in the sad. Analysis of variance showed that mood was successfully 
manipulated and maintained until the end of the experiment, with scores at the end of 
the experiment for the group induced with a happy mood, M = 6.35, (SD = 1.50), for 
those induced with a sad mood, M = 5.12, (SD = 1.95), and the difference in means 
being significant, F(1,68) = 8.61, p = .005. 
These results were mirrored by those for the younger subset, where there were 30 
people in the happy mood group and 25 in the sad. Analysis of variance showed that 
mood was successfully manipulated and maintained until the end of the experiment 
with mean scores for the group induced with a happy mood, M = 6.55 (SD = 1.27), for 
the group induced with a sad mood, M = 5.50, (SD = 1.92), and the difference in means 
being significant, F(1,53) = 5.81, p = .020. 
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Testing Weinstein's (1980) optimistic bias hypothesis 
A new aspect factor with levels "self" and "typical" formed part of the analysis to test 
this hypothesis. A 2 (Item type) x 2 (Induced mood) x 2 (Aspect) ANOVA on optimism 
score from participants rating "self" and "typical" showed that over all items there was 
a significant main effect for aspect, F(1,32) = 23.29, p < .001, with mean scores 
M (typical) = 5.52, (SD = 0.61) and M (self) = 6.17, (SD = 0.88). Thus Weinstein's 
optimistic bias for "self" was confirmed, as illustrated in Figure 9.2. This finding for 
the age inclusive set, was also supported for the younger subset. It is therefore 
reasonable to examine mood congruence in relation to optimistic bias as did Salovey 
and Birnbaum (1989). 
Testing the major hypotheses: ANOVAs 
Analyses were performed on optimism scores for negative and positive health events 
separately, on optimism scores combined over items of negative, neutral and positive 
valence, and on the associated response times. Because there were different numbers of 
positive and negative items in Salovey and Dobber items, rating scores and times were 
adjusted accordingly for these analyses. Analyses were performed for the age inclusive 
El Self 7 — 
Typical & Self 
Negative items Positive items 	All items • Negative items Positive items 	All items 
Age inclusive set 
Figure 9.2 Illustration of optimistic bias: Comparison of ratings given to "Self" 
and to "Typical" by those rating for both. Vertical lines depict 
standard errors of the means. 
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set and repeated for the younger subset. 
Two kinds of analyses for optimism score for 'self' were made. The first used all 
available scores from ratings made by the participants about themselves: both by those 
who responded about themselves only (` self' ) and by those who responded about 
themselves as well as about the typical student. Both types of ratings for 'self were 
used. The data from participants who responded only about themselves was used as a 
measure uncontaminated by any anchoring effect of a response about the typical 
student. The data from participants who responded about themselves was used because 
it doubled the amount of data available to be examined for mood effects. The purpose 
of gathering the ratings for the typical student was solely to obtain the optimistic bias 
scores below, so these "typical student" data were not subjected to separate analysis. 
The second type of analysis used the data for participants who answered only about 
themselves. A corresponding response time analysis (response time over all items) was 
made. 
All analyses were ANOVAs of the form, 2 (Item type) x 2 (Induced mood), with item 
type as a within subjects factor and induced mood a between subjects factor. Optimism 
score or response time were dependent variables. Results are summarised in tables 
showing means ratings for mood for the happy and sad induction groups, and F-values, 
degrees of freedom and p-values from ANOVAs for both the age inclusive set and the 
younger subset. 
As well as these analyses for optimism score for self, further analyses were run on 
optimistic bias scores, obtained by subtracting the score given by a participant to the 
"average" student, from the score given to "self'. 
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Using ratings relating to 'self items (all participants) 
Optimism score on negative health event items 
Findings are summarised in Table 9.1. 
Table 9.1 	Mean Optimism Scores and ANOVA Results for Judgments of 
Negative Health Event Items for the Self Made by all Participants 
(Both 'Self only' and Typical&self). 
Age inclusive set 
Mood N Dobber Mean (SD) Salovey Mean (SD) Both Mean (SD) 
Happy 34 6.23 	(0.93) 6.31 	(0.82) 6.27 (0.87) 
Sad 36 6.19 	(1.35) 5.72 	(1.24) 5.96 (1.31) 
ANOVA factors N F P 
Induced mood 70 91,68) = 1.79 .185 
Item type 70 91,68) = 2.31 .133 
Item type x Induced mood 70 91,68) = 4.56 .036* 
Younger subset 
Mood N Dobber Mean (SD) Salovey Mean (SD) Both Mean (SD) 
Happy 30 6.25 	(0.95) 6.34 	(0.83) 6.29 (0.88) 
Sad 25 5.92 	(1.21) 5.47 	(1.18) 5.70 (1.20) 
ANOVA factors N F P 
Induced mood 55 91,53) = 6.40 .014* 
Item type 55 91,53) = 1.31 .258 
Item type x Induced mood 55 91,53) = 2.98 .090 
Note: 	' Significant at p = .05. 
For the age inclusive set, there was a significant interaction between item type and 
mood shown in Figure 9.3. This interaction can be seen to be due to the lower optimism 
ratings made by sad mood participants on Salovey items relative to those made on 
Dobber items. 
For the younger subset, however, there was a significant main effect for mood, with 
lower optimism scores for sad mood participants for which details are given in 
Table 9.1. That is the younger subset showed mood congruence consistent with 
Forgas's (1994a) model when items of the Dobber and Salovey types were analysed 
together. 
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Figure 9.3 	Interaction between item type and induced mood for negative items 
about 'self' (adjusted values) with mean optimism score as the 
dependent variable (age inclusive set). Vertical lines depict standard 
errors of the means. 
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Optimism score on positive health event items 
Findings are summarised in Table 9.2. 
Table 9.2 	Mean Optimism Scores and ANOVA Results for Judgments of 
Positive Health Event Items for the Self Made by all Participants (Both 
'Self only' and Typical&self). 
Age inclusive set 
Mood N Dobber Mean (SD) Salovey Mean (SD) Both Mean (SD) 
Happy 34 7.08 (1.16) 6.11 	(1.07) 6.59 (1.21) 
Sad 36 6.86 (1.50) 6.08 	(1.01) 6.47 (1.33) 
ANOVA factors 
Induced mood 70 F(1,68) = 0.25 .621 
Item type 70 F(1,68) = 34.54 .001* 
Item type x Induced mood 70 91,68) = 0.42 .518 
Younger subset 
Mood N Dobber Mean (SD) Salovey Mean (SD) Both Mean (SD) 
Happy 30 6.98 (1.20) 6.06 	(1.10) 6.52 (1.23) 
Sad 25 6.83 (1.37) 5.96 	(1.05) 6.40 (1.29) 
ANOVA factors 
Induced mood 55 F(1,53) = 0.19 .665 
Item type 55 91,53) = 40.51 .001* 
Item type x Induced mood 55 F(1,53) = 0.03 .865 
Note: 	Significant at p = .05. 
For the age inclusive set, ANOVA showed a significant main effect for item type, with 
more optimistic scores for Dobber items than for Salovey items. For the younger 
subset, ANOVA likewise showed a significant main effect for item type. 
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Total optimism score over all health event items (including those of 
'neutral' valence) 
Findings are summarised in Table 9.3. 
Table 9.3 	Mean Optimism Scores and ANOVA Results for Judgments of All 
Health Event Items for the Self Made by all Participants (Both 'Self 
only' and Typical&self). 
Age inclusive set 
Mood N Dobber Mean (SD) Salovey Mean (SD) Both Mean (SD) 
Happy 34 6.79 	(0.76) 6.21 	(0.67) 6.50 (0.77) 
Sad 36 6.65 	(1.10) 5.90 	(0.90) 6.27 (1.07) 
ANOVA factors N F P 
Induced mood 70 F(1,68) = 1.37 .247 
Item type 70 91,68) = 71.71 .001* 
Item type x Induced mood 70 F(1,68) = 1.00 .320 
Younger subset 
Mood N Dobber Mean (SD) Salovey Mean (SD) Both Mean (SD) 
Happy 30 6.75 	(0.77) 6.20 	(0.68) 6.47 (0.77) 
Sad 25 6.51 	(0.98) 5.71 	(0.82) 6.11 (0.98) 
ANOVA factors N F P 
Induced mood 55 91,53) = 3.21 .079 
Item type 55 91,53) = 59.58 .001* 
Item type x Induced mood 55 91,53) = 1.96 .168 
Note: 	* Significant at p = .05. 
For the age inclusive set, ANOVA showed a significant main effect for item type, with 
more optimistic scores for Dobber than for Salovey items. For the younger subset, 
ANOVA also showed a significant main effect for item type. 
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Using ratings relating to 'self items (those answering 'self' items only) 
Optimism score on negative health event items 
Findings are summarised in Table 9.4. 
Table 9.4 
	
Mean Optimism Scores and ANOVA Results for Judgments of 
Negative Health Event Items ('Self only'). 
Age inclusive set 
Mood N Dobber Mean (SD) Salovey Mean (SD) Both Mean (SD) 
Happy 18 6.41 	(0.99) 6.24 	(0.81) 6.32 (0.90) 
Sad 18 6.63 	(1.34) 6.07 	(1.17) 6.35 (1.27) 
ANOVA factors N F P 
Induced mood 36 F(1,34) = 0.01 .932 
Item type 36 F(1,34) = 3.92 .056 
Item type x Induced mood 36 F(1,34) = 1.07 .309 
Younger subset 
Mood N Dobber Mean (SD) Salovey Mean (SD) Both Mean (SD) 
Happy 17 6.47 	(0.99) 6.21 	(0.82) 6.34 (0.91) 
Sad 11 6.19 	(1.41) 5.66 	(1.10) 5.93 (1.27) 
ANOVA factors N F P 
Induced mood 28 F(1,26) = 1.43 .242 
Item type 28 91,26) = 3.15 .088 
Item type x Induced mood 28 F(1,26) = 0.36 .553 
For the age inclusive set, the main effect for item type fell just short of significance, 
with a more optimistic score for Dobber items than for Salovey items. Likewise, for the 
younger subset, item type fell short of significance. 
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Optimism score on positive health event items 
Findings are summarised in Table 9.5. 
Table 9.5 	Mean Optimism Scores and ANOVA Results for Judgments of 
Positive Health Event Items ('Self only'). 
Age inclusive set 
Mood N Dobber Mean (SD) Salovey Mean (SD) Both Mean (SD) 
Happy 18 7.45 	(0.99) 6.47 	(1.04) 6.96 (1.12) 
Sad 18 6.88 	(1.59) 6.21 	(1.14) 6.55 (1.39) 
ANOVA factors N F P 
Induced mood 36 F(1,34) = 1.32 .259 
Item type 36 91,34) = 22.71 .001* 
Item type x Induced mood 36 91,34) = 0.79 .380 
Younger subset 
Mood N Dobber Mean (SD) Salovey Mean (SD) Both Mean (SD) 
Happy 17 7.42 	(1.01) 6.46 	(1.07) 6.94 (1.14) 
Sad 11 6.29 	(1.63) 6.01 	(1.37) 6.15 (1.48) 
ANOVA factors N F P 
Induced mood 28 91,26) = 3.33 .079 
Item type 28 91,26) = 9.32 .005* 
Item type x Induced mood 28 F(1,26) = 2.72 .111 
Note: 	Significant at p = .05. 
For the age inclusive set, ANOVA showed a significant main effect for item type, with 
a more optimistic score for Dobber than for Salovey items. For the younger subset, 
ANOVA also showed a significant effect for item type. 
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Total optimism score over all health event items (including those of 
'neutral' valence) 
Findings are summarised in Table 9.6. 
Table 9.6 	Mean Optimism Scores and ANOVA Results for Judgments of All 
Health Event Items ('Self only'). 
Age inclusive set 
Mood N Dobber Mean (SD) Salovey Mean (SD) Both Mean (SD) 
Happy 18 6.96 (0.76) 6.35 	(0.74) 6.65 (0.80) 
Sad 18 6.91 (1.15) 6.14 	(0.90) 6.52 (1.09) 
ANOVA factors N F P 
Induced mood 36 F1,34)= 0.21 .652 
Item type 36 F(1,34) = 50.65 .001* 
Item type x Induced mood 36 F(1,34) = 0.73 .400 
Younger subset 
Mood N Dobber Mean (SD) Salovey Mean (SD) Both Mean (SD) 
Happy 17 6.98 	(0.78) 6.33 	(0.76) 6.66 (0.82) 
Sad 11 6.50 	(1.07) 5.83 	(0.91) 6.14 (1.02) 
ANOVA factors N F P 
Induced mood 28 F(1,26) = 2.73 .111 
Item type 28 F(1,26) = 30.43 .001* 
Item type x Induced mood 28 F(1,26) = 0.02 .898 
Note: 	Significant at p = .05. 
For the age inclusive set, ANOVA showed a significant main effect for item type, with 
more optimistic scores for Dobber than for Salovey items. For the younger subset, 
ANOVA also showed a significant effect for item type. 
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Analysis of response time 
An analysis corresponding to that for optimism score was made for response time over 
all items for participants who answered only about themselves. 
Findings are summarised in Table 9.7. 
Table 9.7 	Mean Response Times and ANOVA Results (Self only'). 
Age inclusive set 
Mood N Dobber Mean (SD) Salovey Mean (SD) Both Mean (SD) 
Happy 18 11.81 	(2.75) 5.60 	(1.51 8.71 (3.83) 
Sad 18 12.64 	(4.33) 5.63 	(1.22) 9.14 (4.74) 
ANOVA factors N F P 
Induced mood 36 91,34) = 0.41 .525 
Item type 36 91,34) = 112.91 .001* 
Item type x Induced mood 36 91,34) = 0.41 .527 
Younger subset 
Mood N Dobber Mean (SD) Salovey Mean (SD) Both Mean (SD) 
Happy 17 11.88 	(2.82) 5.56 	(1.54) 8.72 (3.91) 
Sad 11 13.31 	(5.211) 5.14 	(0.92) 9.22 (5.55) 
ANOVA factors N F P 
Induced mood 28 91,26) = 0.37 .550 
Item type 28 91,26) = 88.54 .001* 
Item type x Induced mood 28 91,26) = 1.44 .241 
Note: 	Significant at p = .05. 
For both the age inclusive set and the younger subset, ANOVAs showed a significant 
main effect for item type, with the longer Dobber items, as expected, taking longer than 
those of Salovey. 
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Using ratings made by participants about themselves and the typical student: 
Analysis of optimistic bias score 
The optimistic bias score was obtained by subtracting the score given by a participant to 
the 'average' student from the score given to 'self . 
Optimism score on negative health event items 
Findings are summarised in Table 9.8. 
Table 9.8 
	
Mean Optimistic Bias Scores and ANOVA Results for Judgments of 
Negative Health Event Items ('rypical&self). 
Age inclusive set 
Mood N Dobber Mean (SD) Salovey Mean (SD) Both Mean (SD) 
Happy 16 1.09 	(0.94 0.77 	(0.75) 0.93 (0.85) 
Sad 18 1.08 	(1.11) 0.13 	(0.94) 0.61 (1.12) 
ANOVA factors N F P 
Induced mood 34 F(1,32) = 1.16 .289 
Item type 34 F(1,32) = 25.87 .001* 
Item type x Induced mood 34 F(1,32) = 6.16 .019* 
Younger subset 
Mood N Dobber Mean (SD) Salovey Mean (SD) Both Mean (SD) 
Happy 13 0.77 	(0.61) 0.62 	(0.57) 0.70 (0.59) 
Sad 14 1.19 	(1.05) 0.17 	(0.90) 0.68 (1.09) 
ANOVA factors N F P 
Induced mood 27 F(1,25) < 0.01 .967 
Item type 27 F(1,25) = 19.91 .001' 
Item type x Induced mood 27 F(1,25) = 10.80 .003* 
Note: 	Significant at p = .05. 
For the age inclusive set, ANOVA showed a significant main effect for item type, and a 
significant interaction between item type and mood. Figure 9.4 shows that this 
interaction resulted particularly from a greater effect of mood on optimistic bias for 
Salovey items. For the younger subset a similar pattern was obtained (Figure 9.5). A 
comparison between the graphs shows that in this case scores on the Dobber items were 
relatively lower for the group induced with a happy mood than for the corresponding 
group in the age inclusive set. 
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Figure 9.4 	Interaction between item type and induced mood for negative health 
event items with optimistic bias score as the dependent variable (age 
inclusive set). Vertical lines depict standard errors of the means. 
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Figure 9.5 	Interaction between item type and induced mood for negative health 
event items with optimistic bias score as the dependent variable 
(younger subset). Vertical lines depict standard errors of the means. 
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Optimism score on positive health event items 
Findings are summarised in Table 9.9. 
Table 9.9 	Mean Optimistic Bias Scores and ANOVA Results for Judgments of 
Positive Health Event Items (Typical&self'). 
Age inclusive set 
Mood N Dobber Mean (SD) Salovey Mean (SD) Both Mean (SD) 
Happy 16 1.03 	(1.24) 0.72 	(1.07) 0.87 (1.15) 
Sad 18 0.72 	(1.25) 0.62 	(0.97) 0.67 (1.10) 
ANOVA factors N F P 
Induced mood 34 91,32) = 0.39 .536 
Item type 34 F(1,32) = 0.91 .347 
Item type x Induced mood 34 F(1,32) = 0.26 .614 
Younger subset 
Mood N Dobber Mean (SD) Salovey Mean (SD) Both Mean (SD) 
Happy 13 0.62 	(0.50) 0.60 	(0.82) 0.61 (0.66) 
Sad 14 1.01 	(1.08) 0.66 	(0.84) 0.84 (0.96) 
ANOVA factors N F P 
Induced mood 27 F(1,25) = 0.70 .410 
Item type 27 F(1,25) = 1.12 .300 
Item type x Induced mood 27 91,25) = 0.86 .362 
Analysis of variance showed no significant effects for either the whole (age inclusive) 
set or for the younger subset. 
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Total optimistic bias score over all health event items (including those of 
'neutral' valence) 
Findings are summarised in Table 9.10. 
Table 9.10 
	
Mean Optimistic Bias Scores and ANOVA Results for Judgments of 
All Health Event Items (rTypical&self'). 
Age inclusive set 
Mood N Dobber Mean (SD) Salovey Mean (SD) Both Mean (SD) 
Happy 16 0.83 	(0.88) 0.74 	(0.76) 0.79 (0.81) 
Sad 18 0.69 	(0.95) 0.38 	(0.89) 0.53 (0.92) 
ANOVA factors N F P 
Induced mood 34 91,32) = 0.88 .354 
Item type 34 91,32) = 2.56 .120 
Item type x Induced mood 34 91,32) = 0.77 .386 
Younger subset 
Mood N Dobber Mean (SD) Salovey Mean (SD) Both Mean (SD) 
Happy 13 0.53 	(0.37) 0.61 	(0.45) 0.57 (0.41) 
Sad 14 0.88 	(0.84) 0.41 	(0.78) 0.65 (0.83) 
ANOVA factors N F P 
Induced mood 27 F(1,25) = 0.13 .724 
Item type 27 F(1,25) = 2.92 .100 
Item type x Induced mood 27 91,25) = 5.79 .024* 
Note: 	Significant at p = .05. 
For the whole (age inclusive) set ANOVA showed no significant effects. However for 
the younger subset there was a significant interaction between item type and induced 
mood. Figure 9.6 shows that responses on Dobber items for participants induced with a 
sad mood showed greater optimistic bias than those from any of the other groups. 
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Figure 9.6 	Interaction between item type and induced mood for all health event 
items with optimistic bias score as the dependent variable (younger 
subset). Vertical lines depict standard errors of the means. 
Analysis of response time 
Findings are summarised in Table 9.11. 
Table 9.11 
	
Mean Response Times per Item and ANOVA Results (`Typical&self). 
Age inclusive set 
Mood N Dobber Mean (SD) Salovey Mean (SD) Both Mean (SD) 
Happy 16 9.67 (2.46) 4.89 	(1.01) 7.27 (3.05) 
Sad 18 8.92 (2.46) 4.79 	(1.30) 6.86 (2.85) 
ANOVA factors 
Induced mood 34 91,32) = 0.68 .417 
Item type 34 F(1,32) = 107.11 .001* 
Item type x Induced mood 34 91,32) = 0.56 .461 
Younger subset 
Mood N Dobber Mean (SD) Salovey Mean (SD) Both Mean (SD) 
Happy 13 9.78 (2.68) 4.75 	(1.04) 7.26 (3.25) 
Sad 14 8.77 (2.69) 4.49 	(0.99) 6.63 (2.95) 
ANOVA factors 
Induced mood 27 91,25) = 1.09 .307 
Item type 27 91,25) = 89.24 .001* 
Item type x Induced mood 27 F(1,25) = 0.57 .457 
Note: 	Significant at p = .05. 
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For both the age inclusive and the younger subset ANOVAs there was a significant 
main effect for item type, with greater time taken by the longer Dobber compared with 
Salovey items. 
Post-experimental questionnaires yielded no information suggesting any issues 
warranting further consideration. 
Summary and discussion of results of ANOVAs 
First hypothesis 
The first hypothesis was that people in a sad mood would make more pessimistic 
judgments than those in whom a happy mood was induced. This hypothesis was 
supported in only one instance. There was a main effect for mood when analysing 
negative ratings about the self on 'self only' items for the younger subset when both 
'self' and 'typical and self' items were analysed together (cf. Tables 9.1, 9.13). There 
was no other statistically significant support for this hypothesis. 
However there were four instances of statistically significant interactions between 
mood and item type out of the eighteen investigated. The optimism score on negative 
health events on all 'self ratings by the age inclusive set of participants in a sad mood 
was significantly lower on Salovey than on Dobber items (cf. Table 9.1). The optimistic 
bias score on negative health events on negative health events by participants (for both 
the age inclusive set and the younger subset) showed significantly more optimism on 
Dobber than on Salovey items (cf. Table 9.8). The optimistic bias score over all health 
events for the younger subset showed a significantly greater optimistic bias of sad 
mood participants on Dobber items than of: sad mood participants on Salovey items, 
happy mood participants on Salovey items, or happy mood participants on Dobber 
items (cf. Table 9.10). 
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Second hypothesis 
The second hypothesis was that people in an induced sad mood would process 
information more slowly than those in a happy induced mood. No significant effects of 
mood on response time were found and therefore the second hypothesis was 
unsupported. 
Correlations 
Because ambient mood might be more pervasive than induced mood, correlational 
analyses were run (cf. Salovey & Birnbaum, 1989) between final mood and: 
(i) optimism scores: 'self' over all participants, 'self over participants with 
'self' items only and optimistic bias scores (self - typical) derived from 
participants with 'self and 'average' items, were run for judgments and also 
for 
(ii) response times (total). 
All correlations were run for both the age inclusive set and the younger subset. As the 
hypotheses that mood rating would correlate positively with optimism scores and 
negatively with response time were directional, the tests of significance were one-tailed. 
Results are shown in Table 9.12. 
These correlations of individual mood ratings with corresponding (i) optimism and 
optimistic bias scores, and with (ii) response time show the following. Firstly, for both 
the age inclusive set and younger subset, there was a significant correlation between 
actual mood and optimism score over all ratings participants made for themselves 
('self') on negative items which resulted also in significant correlations over all items 
(positive and negative combined). Secondly, Salovey and Birnbaum's (1989, 
Experiment 3) findings were supported for both the age inclusive set and the younger 
subset. Mood congruence was thus demonstrated for optimistic bias about negative 
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health events. This resulted also in a significant correlation over all items, that is, over 
negative, neutral and positive combined. 
Table 9.12 
	
Correlations of Final Mood with Optimism Scores and Response 
Times. 
Age inclusive set 
Scores for 
Participants 
answering: 
Final mood 
'Self 
any 'Self 
items 
Salovey items 
'Self 
'Self only' 
items 
Optimistic bias 
Typical&self 
items 
'Self 
any 'Self 
items 
Dobber items 
'Self 
'Self only' 
items 
Optimistic bias 
Typical&self 
items 
df 68 34 32 68 34 32 
Negative items .31* .19 .34* .16 .05 .10 
Positive items .10 .19 .26 .12 .33* -.02 
All items .28* .25 •33* .17 .16 .08 
r (critical value) .19 .27 .29 .19 .27 .29 
Response times 
df rila 34 32 n/a 34 32 
Time ri/a .21 -.25 n/a -.37* -.09 
r (critical value) rila .27 .29 Na .27 .29 
Younger subset 
Salovey items Dobber items 
Scores for: 'Self 'Self' Optimistic bias 'Self' 'Self Optimistic bias 
Participants any 'Self 'Self only' Typical&self any 'Self 'Self only' Typical&self 
answering: items items items items items items 
Final mood 
df 53 26 25 53 26 25 
Negative items .35* .32* .53* .22* .19 .11 
Positive items .16 .31 .24 .18 .45* -.13 
All items .35* .40* .47* .22* .32* -.01 
r (critical value) .22 .312 .32 .22 .32 .32 
Response times 
dl rila 26 26 Na 26 25 
Time nia .19 .04 n/a -.59* -.23 
r (critical value) rila .32 .32 n/a .32 .32 
Note: 	' Significant at p = .05. 
For the younger subset only, there were also significant correlations between mood for 
each of (a) 'self', (b) all participants for 'self' on 'self only' items, and (c) optimistic 
bias score, (which resulted in significant correlations in each case when negative and 
positive items were combined). 
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For the predictions of the AIM for substantive processing to be supported in any way, 
optimism scores should be negatively correlated with the time taken to make 
judgments. There was a non-significant trend in this direction only for "typical&self" 
items, demonstrated for the age inclusive set (but not for the younger subset). 
Separating response timing of negative and positive items would help elucidate the 
matter further, but these data were not collected separately. 
The results on the items used in the present study for the age inclusive analysis differ 
from those obtained by Salovey and Birnbaum (1989, Experiment 3). There was a 
significant correlation for both the age inclusive set and the younger subset between 
'self' (when participants were asked only about themselves) and mood, on positive 
items. The results for the younger subset showed an even stronger correlation between 
optimism score and mood for 'self' on positive items (resulting also in a significant 
correlation for 'self on all items). For the younger subset there were also significant 
correlations between optimism score and mood for 'self' on negative items and over all 
items. 
The correlations for time are also interesting. The negative correlations between mood 
and time taken on 'self only' items (by both the age inclusive set and younger subset) 
and on both 'self only' and `typical&self for the younger subset would accord with the 
AIM (although the only corresponding optimism score reaching significance was for 
'self' on 'Self only' items). 
Summarising these findings in relation to Forgas's AIM: for both the age inclusive set 
and the younger subset, there was a significant correlation between mood and optimism 
score (positive items) parallelled by a significant correlation between mood and time 
(over all item valences) for 'self only' items. 
Again separate response timing of negative and positive items would help elucidate the 
matter further. 
172 
Summary and Conclusions 
Results of Experiment 7 correlations have already been summarised in Table 9.12. For 
ease of reference previously presented results of mood main effects in Experiment 7 
ANOVAs are summarised in Table 9.13. 
Table 9.13 	Summary of Mood Main Effects in Experiment 7 ANOVAs 
N (age inclusive) p N(younger subset) p 
Analyses of all participants 
Optimism score - neg items about self 	70 .185 55 .014 * 
Optimism score - pos items about self 70 .621 55 .665 
Optimism score - all items about self 	70 .247 55 .079 
Analyses of participants answering "self' items only 
Optimism score - neg items about self 	36 .932 28 .242 
Optimism score - pos items about self 36 .259 28 .079 
Optimism score - all items about self 	36 .652 28 .111 
Response time 	 36 .525 28 .550 
Analyses of participants answering 'self and 'typical items. 
Optimistic bias - negative items 	 34 .289 27 .967 
Optimistic bias - positive items 34 .536 27 .410 
Optimistic bias - all items 	 34 .354 27 .724 
Response time 	 34 .417 27 .307 
Note: 	* Significant at p = .05. 
Variables: Induced mood (Happy, Sad) 
Item type (Dobber, Salovey) 
Induced mood, optimism scores and response time 
There was some confirmation of Salovey and Birnbaum's (1989) findings that healthy 
participants in a sad mood would make more pessimistic judgments than those in a 
happy mood. There were also indications that scores on the items of this study were 
responded to differently from those of Salovey and Birnbaum's study, with participants 
in a sad mood responding more optimistically on the former than on the latter. There 
were no significant effects for mood on response time. It was decided that separate 
times for responses to positive and negative items would be measured in the next 
experiment. 
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Ambient mood, optimism score and response time 
Ambient mood and optimism score 
For Salovey items there was more indication of mood/optimism score congruence. 
Firstly Salovey and Birnbaum's findings of optimistic bias for negative health events 
was confirmed. Furthermore there was a significant correlation between mood and 
optimism score for ratings for the self (that is, an effect on the score, rather than on a 
relative score as with optimistic bias). Also, there was some evidence of mood 
congruence for positive items in the younger subset for 'self . However no causality can 
be inferred without mood manipulation. 
For Dobber items there was also evidence of some mood/optimism score congruence, 
but not for optimistic bias on negative items, as would have been expected on the basis 
of Salovey and Birnbaum (1989, Experiment 3). Similarly to the above findings on 
Salovey items, there was a correlation between mood and optimism score on negative 
items for 'self . As opposed to Salovey type items, there was a correlation between 
mood and score for 'self from those who responded for 'self only', on positive items. 
Ambient mood and response time. 
For both Salovey and Dobber items there was some indication that response time might 
correlate negatively with optimism score, as proposed by Forgas's AWL This could be 
clarified by separate measures of response time for negative and positive items. 
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Chapter 10 
Experiment 8: Mood Influence on Positive and Negative Health Events, 
varying Item Type and Item Target 
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Chapter 10 
Experiment 8: Mood Influence on Positive and Negative Health Events, 
varying Item Type and Item Target 
Experiment 7 provided some degree of confirmation of Salovey and Birnbaum's 
finding of mood congruence in health judgments made by healthy people. Not only was 
clarification of this required, but there was also a need for separate timing of responses 
for negative and positive items for confirmation of Forgas's AIM. An experiment was 
therefore run to allow a comparison of items of the Salovey and Birnbaum (1989) type 
with those of this study. A shortened version of the Dobber items was also 
incorporated, in case, for whatever reason, mood effects might occur only with shorter 
items — the original Dobber items were longer than those used by Salovey and 
Birnbaum (1989). 'Neutral' valenced Dobber items were not incorporated as they were 
considered unnecessary to settle the present issues. 
This experiment can best be conceptualised as involving the running of 4 sub-
experiments under similar conditions: participants were recruited together, the same 
mood inductions were used and conditions were as similar as possible. Participants 
were allocated to one of the 4 sub-experiments. These sub-experiments or quadrants, as 
shown in Table 10.1, were determined by 
(i) item type: whether of the type used by Salovey and Birnbaum (1989) 
(referred to below as Salovey) or of the type developed for this study 
(Dobber) and 
(ii) item target: whether participants were asked only about themselves ('self ) 
or first about the typical student and then about themselves ('typical&self ). 
In all four sub-experiments the items were presented to each participant in two 
categories: one category related to positive health events and the other related to 
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negative health events. All questionnaires contained an equal number of positive and 
negative items with item order (positive or negative first) counterbalanced across the 
design. Total times were recorded, (i) for responses to items relating to negative health 
events and (ii) for responses to items relating to positive health events. 
Table 10.1 The Four Quadrants of Experiment 8. 
Item type: Dotter 
First Quadrant — Item target: Self 
Induced Group 	First 	Age 	Cue mood 
Second Quadrant — Item target Typical & self 
Group 	Induced 	First 	Age 	Cue mood 
A 	H + in in 4 A 	H in in 4 
B 	H + in out 4 B 	H in out 4 
C 	H + out in 4 C 	H out in 4 
D 	H + out out 4 D 	H out out 4 
E 	H in in 4 E 	H in in 4 
F 	H in out 4 F 	H in out 4 
G 	H out in 4 G 	H out in 4 
H 	H out out 4 H 	H out out 4 
+ in in 4 in in 4 
+ in out 4 in out 4 
K 	S + out in 4 K 	S out in 4 
+ out out 4 out out 4 
M 	S • in in 4 M 	S in in 4 
N 	S in out 4 N 	S in out 4 
0 	S - out in 4 0 	S out in 4 
P 	S • out out 4 P 	S out out 4 
Total (16M, 48F): 64 Total (16M, 48F): 64 
Item type: Salovey 
Group 
Third Quadrant — Item target: Self 	 Fourth Quadrant — Item target Typical & self 
Ind ouocedd 	First 	Age 	Cue 	N 	 Indue Group 	cd 	First 	Age 	Cue 	N mood 
A H n/a Na 	12 	A 	H 	n/a 	n/a 	12 
B H • Na Na 	12 B 	H n/a 	n/a 	12 
C S Na rila 	12 	 n/a 	n/a 	12 
D S Na Na 	12 n/a 	n/a 	12 
Total (9M, 39F): 48 	Total (13M, 36F): 	 48 
Note. 	Key: Ind. mood (H, S) = Induced mood (Happy, Sad) 
First (+, -) = Items presentation order (Positive first, Negative first) 
Age (in, out) = Age reference included or excluded 
Cue (in, out) = prefatory statement ("Given your current and likely future behaviour...") 
included or excluded 
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All Salovey items were of a similar type, asking for likelihood ratings on situations 
such as "contracting some form of cancer" — an example of a negative item, or 
"regularly maintaining an exercise program" — an example of a positive item. 
Dobber positive items were of the type, "What do you believe would be your chances 
of (initiating or maintaining some specific beneficial health behaviour) over the next six 
months if you decided to?" 
Dobber negative items were of four types, based on two between subjects factors, 
depending on whether or not a cue or an age was included. That is, the structure of a 
Dobber negative item was: 
Cue (sometimes present): Given your current and likely future behaviour... 
Stem (always present): ...how likely do you think is the (specified) outcome... 
Age (sometimes present): ...before the age of 70? 
Hence, examples of Dobber negative item variants (this one relating to exposure to the 
sun) were: 
(i) "Given your current and likely future exposure to the sun, how likely do you 
think you are to contract skin cancer before the age of 70?" (Cue included, 
age included). 
(ii) "How likely do you think you are to contract skin cancer before the age of 
70?" (Cue excluded, age included). 
(iii) "Given your current and likely future exposure to the sun, how likely do you 
think you are to contract skin cancer?" (Cue included, age excluded). 
(iv) "How likely do you think you are to contract skin cancer?" (Cue excluded, 
age excluded). 
For Dobber items related to negative health events, the presence of cue and age was 
thus varied to make the items progressively more similar in nature and word length to 
the Salovey items. Salovey & Birnbaum (1989) had asked participants to make 
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likelihood ratings of experiencing particular situations over the lifespan, for issues such 
as "Contracting some form of cancer". Salovey items (positive and negative), and 
Dobber positive items, were not varied in any way in this experiment. 
This overall experiment, then, was designed to clarify a number of issues: 
(i) Where, across the overall design, were mood effects to be found, if at all? 
(ii) Did mood effects, if established, relate to the time taken to process 
information as predicted by Forgas's Affect Infusion Model? 
Hypotheses 
Preliminary hypothesis 
As for Experiment 7, a preliminary hypothesis was that participants who made ratings 
for a typical student as well as themselves would exhibit an optimistic bias for 
themselves in their health ratings (Weinstein, 1980) . 
Major hypotheses 
The major hypotheses, based on Forgas's Affect Infusion Model, were that participants 
in whom a sad mood was induced would 
(i) make more pessimistic judgments 
and 
(ii) process information more slowly 
than those in a whom a happy mood was induced. 
Based on Salovey and Birnbaum's (1989) findings, this was expected to apply at least 
when both of the following conditions were satisfied: 
(i) judgments were made in relation to negative health events 
(ii) participants were asked to rate their prospects compared with those of the 
average university student. 
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Method 
Participants 
Participants were 224 university students, 54 males and 170 females, of mean age 23.12 
(SD = 8.32) recruited to participate in a 'health judgments study'. 
Design 
The whole experiment was conceived in terms of a 2 x 2 x 2 design with overarching 
factors of mood induction (happy, sad), item type (Dobber, Salovey) and presence or 
absence of typical student items (typical&self, self only). However, as already indicated 
in the introduction to this chapter, and further explained below, there were some 
differences between the Dobber and Salovey item types. Sex (male, female) was also 
analysed across the whole design. The order of presentation of items (positive health 
event first, negative health event first) was counterbalanced. All other factors were 
between subjects factors. Within the half of the experiment involving the `Dobber 
items' there were two additional between subjects factors (as described above): 
cue given your current behaviour (cue included, cue excluded) and 
age by the age of 70 (age included, age excluded). 
The dependent variables 
The dependent variables were: 
(i) optimism scores on negative items 
(ii) response times for negative items 
(iii) optimism scores on positive items and 
(iv) response times for positive items. 
In this experiment optimism scores were summed for analyses, whereas in the previous 
experiment average optimism scores were necessarily used because adjustments needed 
to be made to allow for differences in the number of items. 
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Mood induction and manipulation checks 
Moods were induced using the autobiographical method as in Experiments 2 and 7. 
Mood ratings were made on a 9-point scale embedded among other distractor scales, as 
in previous experiments. To rule out the possibility of mood awareness and compliance 
effects, participants' mood ratings were requested only after the health ratings had been 
made, as for Experiment 7. 
Apparatus and materials 
Participants were given their own sets of questionnaires, each consisting of a numbered 
consent form, and an 'Autobiographical Memory Inventory' (for happy or sad mood 
induction) with one and a half pages of lined paper. This was followed by a general set 
of instructions for what was presented as another study entitled 'A Health Ratings 
Experiment' followed by experiment-specific instructions for responding to likelihood 
scales. Differences in instructions related (i) to differences in item type (Dobber or 
Salovey) with instructions written to fit the items asked, and (ii) to fit the varieties of 
item target (depending on whether participants were asked to respond for the average 
student and then for themselves or just for themselves). Then followed some pages of 
health statements, each statement having a rating scale next to it. An instruction at the 
beginning and end of items relating to positive health events and similarly to negative 
health events asked participants to "note down the time from the display clock" in a 
specially marked space. On the penultimate page participants were asked "Please read 
the following word pairs and mark, with a line through the scale, the position on the 
scale that refers to you at this moment". The scales were alert - drowsy, sad - happy 
and dreamy - attentive, all with 9 major points. Then followed a post-experimental 
questionnaire. Copies of protocols for this experiment form Appendix F. 
The experimenter used a stop-watch to measure the ten minute mood induction period, 
that is the time participants were allowed to complete the Autobiographical Memory 
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Inventory. Participants made their recordings of time from a video-screened film of a 
digital clock situated a few metres in front of them. 
Procedure 
The procedure for this Experiment 8 was exactly as for Experiment 7, except that this 
time no Health Inventory was administered. 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analyses 
Age distribution across cells 
A 2 (Sex) x 2 (Item type) x 2 (Item target) x 2 (Mood induction) ANOVA was run on 
data from the whole experiment to examine age distribution across the cells of the 
design, with age as the dependent variable. Although random allocation to groups was 
expected to ensure an even spread of ages between them, there was a significant 
interaction (shown in Figure 10.1) between mood and sex, F(1,208) = 4.82, p = .029, 
with mean ages and standard deviations: 
sad males 	M = 24.54 years (SD = 7.74) 
happy females 	M = 24.13 years (SD = 9.00) 
sad females 	M = 22.30 years (SD = 8.57) 
happy males 	M = 20.92 years (SD = 4.51) 
However means comparisons (contrast analysis) showed that no mean for any 
mood/sex group was significantly different from any other. 
As there was the same problem of significant differences between ages for the groups 
as there had been for Experiment 7, the same way of dealing with the data was chosen. 
That is, a decision was made to present results both for all participants (age inclusive 
set), and for participants aged less than 25 (younger subset), where there was no 
significant difference in age between the mood/sex groups, to provide a check on age 
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effects. All significant findings are reported but in the interests of clarity, findings are 
given in detail only for the age inclusive set, with only results relating to the hypotheses 
(that is those relating to mood) or otherwise considered important, being given in detail 
for the subset of younger participants. 
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Figure 10.1 
	
Interaction of sex and induced mood with age (all participants). 
Vertical lines depict standard errors of the means. 
Mood manipulation/retention check 
Analyses for effectiveness of the mood manipulation/retention were carried out over all 
four quadrants combined and for each quadrant separately. 
Analyses of variance were performed on mood ratings across all four quadrants to test 
the hypothesis that the mood induction was effective. Similar mood analyses were run 
for each of the quadrants. Results of analyses are shown in Table 10.2 (age inclusive set 
and younger subset.) 
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Table 10.2 Results of Mood Inductions Checks. 
Analyses 
Mean mood rating 
Happy 	Sad 
Mean (SD) 	Mean (SD) 
F value p-value 
Age inclusive All 4 quadrants 6.09 (1.52) 4.95 (1.65) F(1,222) = 28.77 <.001 * 
Dobber (seff only) 6.01 (1.62) 4.92 (1.71) F(1,62) = 6.76 012* 
Dobber (typical&self) 5.87 (1.57) 4.88 (1.38) F(1,62) = 7.24 .009 * 
Salovey (self only) 6.48 (1.19) 4.81 (1.48) F(1,46) = 18.49 <.001 * 
Salovey (typical&self) 6.08 (1.60) 5.23 (2.07) F(1,46) = 2.56 .116 
Younger subset All 4 quadrants 6.09 (1.42) 4.89 (1.61) F(1,171). 27.03 <.001 ' 
Dobber (self only) 5.86 (1.70) 4.74 (1.66) F(1,50) =5.77 .020* 
Dobber (typical&self) 6.30 (1.00) 4.73 (1.38) F1,43)= 18.50 <.001 * 
Salovey (self only) 6.41 (1.14) 4.87 (1.54) F(1,38) = 12.98 .001 * 
Salovey (typical&self) 5.81 (1.66) 5.37 (1.93) F(1,34) = 0.54 .467 
Note: 	saddest = 1 and happiest = 9 
* Significant at p = .05. 
Mood induction/maintenance across all the quadrants 
For both the age inclusive set and the younger subset, it can be seen that across all 
quadrants combined there was a highly significant difference between happy and sad 
induction participants on post-questionnaire mood ratings. That is, not only were happy 
and sad moods effectively induced, but they were also maintained for the health 
judgments period. 
Mood induction/maintenance across individual quadrants 
Likewise for the quadrants Dobber: self only, Dobber: typical&self, Salovey: self only, 
happy and sad moods were apparently successfully induced and maintained. However 
for the Salovey: typical&self quadrant, although the mean rating for the happy mood 
group was similar to that for the other quadrants and this mood was maintained, the 
mean rating for the sad mood group indicated that either the sad mood induction was 
ineffective for these participants, or more probably that the mood induced was not 
maintained as well as in the other three groups. 
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In summary, for both the age inclusive set and the younger subset, induced mood was 
successfully induced and maintained in all but the Salovey typical&self quadrant where 
differences, although in the direction of the manipulation, were not significant. 
Testing Weinstein's (1980) optimistic bias hypothesis 
A 2 (Item type) x 2 (Induced mood) x 2 (Aspect) ANOVA, with ratings for typical 
student/self being the levels of the repeated measures aspect factor on optimism score 
as the dependent variable showed that over all items there was a significant main effect 
for aspect, F(1,104) = 71.26, p < .001, with mean scores M (typical) = 84.33 
(SD = 11.32) and M (self) = 95.28 (SD = 12.31). There was also an interaction for 
Aspect x Sex x Item type, F(1,104) = 5.98, p = .016, a consequence of a large 
optimistic bias displayed by males on Salovey items. That is Weinstein's optimistic 
bias for the self was confirmed. An optimistic bias was also found for the younger 
subset, this time without any interaction. Figure 10.2 depicts the optimistic bias 
exhibited in Experiment 8. 
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Figure 10.2 	Mean scores for negative, positive and all items, comparing 
responses of participants answering the 'self' as well as the 'typical' 
items. Vertical lines depict standard errors of the means. 
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In summary the optimistic bias effect was confirmed. It was therefore reasonable to 
examine mood congruence in relation to optimistic bias as did Salovey and Birnbaum 
(1989). 
Testing the major hypotheses: ANOVAs 
To test the major hypotheses, appropriately grouped data were analysed across the 
quadrants of the experiment. A summary of results is given in Table 10.3, followed by 
more detail of the analyses. Results for the age inclusive set were mirrored by those for 
Table 10.3 
	
Significant Effects (at .05 level) in Experiment 8 ANOVAs. 
'Self data from all quadrants 
Participants: 	 All* 
	
Short items" 
DV: Optimism score 	 Optimism score 
Negative (Age inclusive) Sex x Item target p = .048 Item target p = .009 
Sex x Item type p = .035 
Negative (Younger subset) No significant effects Item target p =048 
Sex x Item type p = .031 
Positive (Age inclusive) Sex x Item type p = .009 Item target p = .036 
Sex x Item target p = .028 
Positive (Younger subset) Sex x item type p = .033 Item target p = .005 
Sex x Item target p = .034 Sex x Item target p = .026 
'Self & typical' data from the two relevant quadrants 
Participants: 	 All* 
	
Short items** 
DV: Optimistic bias score 	 Optimistic bias score 
Negative (Age inclusive) 
Negative (Younger subset) 
Positive (Age inclusive) 
Positive (Younger subset) 
No significant effects 
No significant effects 
Item type 
Sex x item type 
No significant effects 
p = .029 
p = .020 
No significant effects 
No significant effects 
No significant effects 
No significant effects 
Participants: 	 All* 
	
Short items" 
DV: Response time 	 Response time 
Negative (Age inclusive) 
Negative (Younger subset) 
Positive (Age inclusive) 
Positive (Younger subset) 
Item type 
No significant effects 
Item type 
Sex 
p = .015 No significant effects 
No significant effects 
p = .010 Item type 	p = .015 
p = .038 Sex p = .002 
Item type 	p = .001 
Sex x item type 	p = .024 
Note. 	No effects involving mood as a main effect or interaction were obtained by any of the above analyses. 
* All: i.e. all subjects in the relevant quadrant. 
** Short items: i.e. all subjects answering Salovey items or the shortest Dobber items (cue excluded, age 
excluded type). 
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the younger subset. As indicated in Table 10.3 there were no significant main effects or 
interactions involving mood, for any of: optimism score, optimistic bias score or 
response time as dependent variables. Hence, there was no support for the hypothesis 
that participants in whom a sad mood was induced would make more pessimistic health 
judgments than those in whom a happy mood was induced. Nor was there any support 
for the hypothesis that those in whom a sad mood was induced would process 
information more slowly than those in whom a happy mood was induced. These 
findings applied for both negative and positive health judgments. Hence Forgas's 
Affect Infusion Model was not upheld for these health judgments with induced sad and 
happy moods. 
Analyses of self data only across all quadrants 
Analyses across all items of all four quadrants 
In accordance with the principle of analysing whenever possible over the whole 
experiment, the self data were analysed across the whole design in a 2 (Sex) x 2 (Item 
type) x 2 (Mood induction) x 2 (Item target) ANOVA. Optimism scores derived from 
items relating to negative events and optimism scores derived from items relating to 
positive health events and the corresponding response times were dependent variables 
in separate analyses. Results are presented for the age inclusive set followed by the 
younger subset. 
Optimism on negative health event items 
For the age inclusive set, there were no significant main effects, but there was a 
significant interaction between sex and item target, F(1,208) = 3.96, p = .048. As can be 
seen in Figure 10.3, males who made a rating for the typical student as well as for 
themselves were more optimistic about their own health than were any of the other 
groups. Comparison of means showed statistically significant differences between 
optimism scores for male self compared with male typical&self (p = .029), male 
typical&self compared with female typical&self (p = .032) and male typical&self 
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compared with female self (p = .038). For the younger subset there were no significant 
effects. The interaction between sex and item target just failed to reach significance 
here. 
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Figure 10.3 
	
Interaction between sex and item target. Vertical lines depict standard 
errors of the means. 
Optimism score on positive health event items 
For the age inclusive set, ANOVA showed no significant main effects, but there was a 
significant interaction between sex and item type, F(1,208) = 6.98, p = .009. This 
interaction is shown in Figure 10.4 where it can be seen that most optimism was shown 
by females on Dobber items and by males on Salovey items. Means comparisons 
showed significant differences between females on the Dobber and Salovey items 
(p = .028) and between males and females on Dobber items (p = .040). 
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Item target 
Interaction between sex and item type (negative items, self items, all 
quadrants, age inclusive set). Vertical lines depict standard errors of 
the means. 
For the younger subset, there were no significant main effects, but there were two 
significant interactions. The first was between sex and item type, F(1,157) = 4.6, 
p = .033. Figure 10.5 shows that unlike in the age inclusive set, females were more 
optimistic on the Dobber items. The only significant difference between pairs of means 
was between males and females on Dobber items (p = .017), with females being more 
optimistic. The second interaction was between sex and item target, F(1,157) = 4.56 
p = .034, as shown in Figure 10.6, where it can be seen that responding for both the self 
and the typical student had a substantial effect on males who gave much more 
pessimistic ratings. Means comparisons showed that significant differences between 
scores for female self and male typical&self, (p = .049), between female typical&self 
and male typical&self, (p = .028) and between male self and male typical&self 
(p = .030). 
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Item target 
Interaction between sex and item type (positive items, self items, all 
quadrants, younger subset). Vertical lines depict standard errors of 
the means. 
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Figure 10.6 
	
Interaction between sex and item target, (positive items, self items, all 
quadrants, younger subset). Vertical lines depict standard errors of 
the means. 
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For Salovey items and shorter Dobber items only 
There were two major differences between the Dobber and the Salovey items: 
1. Dobber items were much longer than Salovey items 
2. Dobber positive and negative items were yoked in their content, whereas 
Salovey positive and negative items were not yoked. 
Total numbers of words in items are shown in Table 10.4. 
Table 10.4 	Total Numbers of Words in Items. 
Dobber items negative positive 
Cue included, Age included 217 208 
Cue excluded, Age included 133 208 
Cue included, Age excluded 177 208 
Cue excluded, Age excluded 93 208 
Salovey items 	 negative 	 positive 
All 
	
30 38 
Further analysis of self data across all quadrants of the design, was undertaken of all 
Salovey items as well as those Dobber items where both age and cue were excluded 
(providing Dobber items as similar as possible in length to Salovey items). A 2 (Sex) x 
2 (Item type) x 2 (Item target) x 2 (Mood induction) ANOVA was performed. 
Optimism scores derived from negative items and from positive items as well as the 
corresponding response times were dependent variables in separate analyses. 
Optimism score on negative health event items 
For the age inclusive set, there was a significant main effect for item target, 
F(1,112) = 7.06, p = .009, with more optimism for self, M = 47.54, (SD = 7.56), being 
shown when participants also made a rating for a typical student than when they made a 
rating just for themselves M = 44.20, (SD = 8.07). There was also a significant 
interaction between sex and item type, F(1,112) = 4.55, p = .035. As can be seen in 
Figure 10.7, the most optimistic scores were by males on Salovey items and the most 
pessimistic by males on Dobber items. For the younger subset, there were similar 
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Figure 10.7 	Interaction between sex and item type (negative items, self items, all 
quadrants, shorter items, age inclusive set). Vertical lines depict 
standard errors of the means. 
Optimism score on positive health event items 
ANOVA indicated a significant main effect for item target, F(1,112) = 4.53, p = .036, 
with greater optimism being shown in scores for self when the participant also made a 
typical rating, M = 48.06, (SD = 8.96) than for the self alone, M = 49.07, (SD = 8.35). 
There was a significant interaction between sex and item target, F(1,112) = 4.95, 
p = .028. As can be seen in Figure 10.8, the males who responded to items for self alone 
were the most optimistic. All other scores were similar. Means comparisons showed 
that the only significant differences between pairs of means was between male self 
compared with male typical&self, p = .014. (Variability of the scores probably accounts 
for the lack of significance between means which appear significant on the graph.) The 
younger subset analysis also revealed a main effect only for item target, and an 
interaction between sex and item target. 
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Interaction between sex and item target (positive items, self items, all 
quadrants, short items, age inclusive set). Vertical lines depict 
standard errors of the means. 
Analysis of `typical&self' data across the two `typical&self quadrants. 
Data from the Salovey and Dobber quadrants of the design in which participants were 
asked to make a typical rating, was analysed with 2 (Sex) x 2 (Item type) x 2 (Mood 
induction) ANOVAs. Optimistic bias scores (rating for self minus rating for the typical 
student) for negative items and optimistic bias scores for positive items, and the 
corresponding response times were dependent variables in separate analyses. 
Analyses across all items of the two quadrants 
Optimistic bias score on negative health event items 
ANOVA indicated no significant effects in either the age inclusive set or the younger 
subset. 
Response time for negative health event items 
For the age inclusive set, ANOVA indicated a significant main effect for item type, 
F(1,104) = 6.1 1, p = .015 with the longer Dobber items taking longer, M= 113.89, 
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(SD = 37.30), than the Salovey items, M= 94.71, (SD = 34.48). For the younger subset, 
ANOVA indicated no significant effects. 
Optimistic bias scores on positive health event items 
ANOVA indicated a significant main effect for item type F(1,104) = 4.88, p = .029 
with Dobber M = 6.39, (SD = 7.00, and Salovey M = 8.38, (SD = 10.12. There was a 
significant interaction between sex and item type F(1,104) = 5.57, p = .020. As shown 
in Figure 10.9, the most optimistic scores were obtained for males on Salovey items and 
the most pessimistic scores by males on Dobber items, with female scores similar for 
both item types. Means comparisons showed that there were significant differences 
between males on Dobber items, M = 3.31, (SD = 6.72), and on Salovey items, 
M— 11.82, (SD = 12.95), p = .009. For the younger subset there were no significant 
effects. 
Dobber 	 Salovey 
Item target 
Figure 10.9 
	
Interaction between sex and item type (positive items, two typical&self 
quadrants, age inclusive set). Vertical lines depict standard errors of 
the means. 
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Response time for positive health event items 
For the age inclusive set, ANOVA indicated a significant main effect for item type, 
F(1,104) = 6.91, p = .001, with the longer Dobber items M= 122.44 secs, (SD = 43.12 
taking longer than Salovey M = 103.52 secs, (SD = 36.15. For the younger subset, there 
was a significant effect for sex, with males, M = 120.73 secs, (SD = 36.10) taking 
longer than females, M = 104.07 secs, (SD = 32.49). 
Analysis of 'optimistic bias' data (Salovey items and shorter Dobber items) 
Further analysis of typical&self data across both Dobber and Salovey item types, where 
participants were asked to make a response for the typical student as well as for 
themselves, was undertaken with the exclusion of the three longest Dobber conditions 
according to the number of words in the item (as for the self only data above). 
Optimistic bias score on negative health event items 
ANOVA indicated no significant effects, for either the age inclusive set or the younger 
subset. 
Response time for negative health event items 
ANOVA indicated no significant effects for either the age inclusive set or the younger 
subset. 
Optimistic bias scores on positive health event items 
For the age inclusive set, ANOVA indicated no significant effects. Neither were there 
any significant effects for the younger subset. 
Response time for positive health event items 
For the age inclusive set, ANOVA indicated a significant main effect for item type, 
F(1,56) = 6.26, p = .015, with the longer Dobber items, M= 126.25 secs, (SD = 41.06) 
taking longer than those of Salovey, M= 103.52 secs, (SD = 36.15). 
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For the younger subset, ANOVA indicated that, as well as a significant main effect for 
item type, there was also a main effect for sex, F(1,42) = 10.73, p = .002 with males, 
M = 123.08 secs (SD = 40.60) taking longer than females, M = 103.46, (SD = 31.44), 
and an interaction between sex and item type, F(1,42) = 5.51, p = .024. The graph of 
the interaction shown in Figure 10.10 shows that males, M= 172.33 secs, (SD = 38.68) 
took longer to answer Dobber items than did females M = 114.73 secs, (SD = 37.04) 
with a significant difference between the two (p = .003). Males and females had similar 
response times on Salovey items. 
Dobber 	 Salovey 
Item target 
Figure 10.10 Interaction between sex and item type, (positive events, two 
typical&self quadrants, younger subset). Vertical lines depict standard 
errors of the means. 
As in the previous experiments, post-experimental questionnaires yielded no significant 
information. 
Correlations 
Because ambient mood might be more pervasive than induced mood, correlational 
analyses were run between final mood and optimism ratings (cf. Salovey & Birnbaum, 
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1989) and between final mood and response time (for both the age inclusive set and the 
younger subset) as outlined in Table 10.5. 
Table 10.5 	Schema for Correlations of Final Mood with Optimism Scores and with 
Response Times. 
{all quadrants 
Salovey; and Dobber (cue excluded, age excluded) 
Optimism ratings for Salovey only* 
all Dobber* 
Dobber (cue excluded, age excluded)* 
Optimistic bias scores, (self - typical) for 
two relevant quadrants* 
Salovey; and Dobber (cue excl., age excl.)* 
Salovey only* 
all Dobber* 
Dobber (cue excl., age excl.)* 
 
Note. * Response times were also correlated with mood where appropriate, as asterisked. 
As the hypotheses (that mood rating will correlate positively with optimism scores or 
optimistic bias scores and negatively with response time) were directional, the tests of 
significance were one-tailed. The results are shown in Table 10.6. 
Optimistic bias scores — negative health events 
For the age inclusive set (and also the younger subset) the significant correlation 
between mood rating and optimistic bias score (i.e. self minus typical score) for 
negative health events on the Salovey items replicated the findings of Salovey and 
Birnbaum (1989, Experiment 3) with healthy participants. This occurred despite the 
lack of mood maintenance until the end of the experiment for this quadrant. However, 
as there was no corresponding significant correlation of mood with response time, 
Forgas's model was not supported. The only other correlations between mood and 
optimistic bias score on negative health events were likely to be due to the strong 
correlation for the Salovey items discussed above. 
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Table 10.6 	Correlations of Final Mood with Optimism Scores/Response Times. 
Seff data from all four quadrants - Age Inclusive Set 
df 
correlation of final mood with ... 
Optimism Score 	Response Time 
neg 	pos 	both 	neg 	pos 	both (crit.) 
All (Salovey and Dobber) 222 .16* .18* 23* rVa Na n/a .11 
Salovey & Dobber (Cue, Age excl.) 126 21* .09 .19* n/a Na .14 
Salovey only 94 .21* .18* 27* -.01 .09 .04 .18 
Dobber only 126 .13 .19* .22* .01 .06 .04 .14 
Dobber (Cue, Age excl.) 30 .20 -.19 -.02 .21 .01 .12 .30 
Self minus typical data for two relevant quadrants - Age Inclusive Set 
correlation of final mood with ... 
df 
Optimism Score 
neg 	pos 	both 
Response Time 
neg 	pos 	both (crit) 
All (Salovey and Dobber) 110 .27* .15 .25* .01 .01 .07 .16 
Salovey & Dobber (Cue, Age excl.) 62 .38* .06 .23* .06 .08 .09 .21 
Salovey only 46 .46* .17 •35* .05 .20 .15 .24 
Dobber only 62 .08 .11 .12 .02 .06 .05 .21 
Dobber (Cue, Age excl.) 14 -.14 -.53* -.46* .12 -.37 -.18 .43 
Seff data from all four quadrants - Younger Subset 
dl 
correlation of final mood with ... 
Optimism Score 	Response Time 
neg 	pos 	both 	neg 	pos 	both (crit) 
All (Salovey and Dobber) 171 .16* .21* .26* n/a n/a n/a .12 
Salovey& Dobber (Cue, Age excl.) 99 .20* .07 .18* n/a n/a n/a .16 
Salovey only 74 .18 .16 .24* -.02 .06 .02 .19 
Dobber only 95 .15 .25* .27 .06 .06 .07 .17 
Dobber (Cue, Age excl.) 23 .33 -.25 .09 .28 .04 .17 .34 
Self minus typical data for two relevant quadrants - Younger Subset 
correlation of final mood with ... 
dl 
Optimism Score 
neg 	pos 	both 
Response Time 
neg 	pos 	both (crit.) 
All (Salovey and Dobber) 79 .30* .07 .23* .03 .01 .08 .18 
Salovey& Dobber (Cue, Age excl.) 48 36* -.03 .18 .08 .05 .08 .23 
Salovey only 34 .46* .07 35* .06 .21 .14 .28 
Dobber only 43 .12 .05 .10 .02 .04 .04 .25 
Dobber (Cue, Age excl.) 12 -.06 -.38 -.31 .13 -.37 -.17 .26 
Note. * Significant at p= .05. 
Optimistic bias scores - positive health events 
The only significant correlation of mood with optimistic bias score for positive 
health events was an inverse correlation for short Dobber items for the age inclusive set 
(but not for the younger subset). There were no significant correlations between mood 
and response time. 
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Optimism scores — negative health events 
Dealing now with optimism scores (i.e. scores from all data relating to the participants 
themselves) on negative health events in relation to mood, it can be seen that for the age 
inclusive set there were significant correlations for all but the Dobber (longer and 
shorter) items. For the younger subset significant correlations were found only for the 
Salovey and Dobber total groups (with Dobber longer or shorter forms). 
Optimism scores — positive health events 
There were also some significant correlations for optimism scores on positive health 
events in relation to mood. These were for all Dobber and Salovey, for Salovey only 
(age inclusive set only) and for Dobber only (age inclusive set and younger subset). 
Again there were no significant correlations of mood with response time. 
Conclusions —from correlational data 
There was some support for Salovey and Bimbaum' s (1989, Experiment 3) finding of 
mood congruence with optimistic bias for negative health events, but this did not 
generalise to the types of items used in this series of studies. The significant finding for 
positive items on shorter Dobber items (inverse correlation) is difficult to interpret. 
There have also been some significant correlations for raw optimism scores. The lack of 
any significant correlations between mood and response time (even when there were 
significant correlations with optimistic bias or optimism scores) suggests that mood 
congruence, when it occurs, is not related to response time and therefore this aspect of 
the experiment provides no support for Forgas's ADA. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Overall, mood ratings at the end of the experiment were consistent with highly effective 
mood inductions. However, mood ratings for happy induction compared with sad 
induction groups for the Salovey (typical&self) quadrant at the end of the experiment 
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were not significantly different from each other, perhaps indicating an incompletely 
effective mood induction, but more likely some decay of induced mood. 
Mean age across mood/sex groupings was from M= 20.92 to M = 24.54 years. Age has 
seldom been taken into account in studies of mood effects on judgments. In any case 
the differences between the groups was allowed for by the analyses of data from both 
the age inclusive set and the younger subset. 
The preliminary hypothesis that participants who made ratings for a typical student as 
well as themselves would make more optimistic health ratings for themselves than for 
typical students was strongly supported for both negative and positive health events 
thus confirming Weinstein's (1980) optimistic bias effect. 
The results of tests of the major hypotheses (ANOVAs) are summarised in Table 10.7. 
Correlations have already been summarised in Table 10.6. 
Analyses of variance indicated no significant mood effects when judgments were made 
in relation to negative health events and participants were asked to rate their prospects 
compared with those of the typical university student. This applied even for items like 
those of Salovey and Birnbaum (1989) who found a significant effect for mood on 
optimistic bias score. However, some caution needs to be expressed as this was the 
quadrant for which mood induction and/or retention was not as successful as for the 
other quadrants of the experiment. For the (short form) Dobber items (those most 
comparable to Salovey and Birnbaum items) even though mood was successfully 
induced/maintained there was still no mood effect on optimistic bias. 
Correlations between final mood rating and optimism scores (summarised in Table 
10.6), evaluated as by Salovey and Birnbaum (1989), replicated their findings of 
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Table 10.7 	Summary of ANOVA Results Involving Mood from Experiment 8. 
Age inclusive set Younger subset 
Dependent variable Variables 
Analyses of Aspect 
Negative score 
Positive score 
Total score 
Induced mood, 
Sex, Item type, 
Aspect 
as above 
as above 
224 
224 
224 
.838 
.510 
.536 
Preliminary analyses 
Age (all participants) Induced mood, 
Sex, Item type, 
Item target 
224 .395 173 
Final Mood (all participants) Induced mood 224 .001* 173 
Final Mood (Dobber, self only, quadrant) Induced mood 64 .012* 52 
Final Mood (Dobber, self & typ. quadrant) Induced mood 64 .009* 45 
Final Mood (Salovey, self only, quadrant) Induced mood 48 .001* 40 
Final Mood (Salovey, self & typ. quadrant) Induced mood 48 .116 36 
Analyses of all four quadrants 
Ratings on negative events for 'Self' Induced mood, 
Sex, Item type, 
Item target 
224 .891 173 
Ratings on positive events for 'Self as above 224 .386 173 
Analyses of all Salovey and shortest Dobber items 
Ratings on negative events for 'Self as above 128 .633 101 
Ratings on positive events for 'Self as above 128 .925 101 
Analyses of two lypical&self quadrants 
Optimistic bias scores - negative items Induced mood, 
Sex, Item type 
112 .857 81 
Optimistic bias scores - positive items as above 112 .485 81 
Time (negative items) as above 112 .657 81 
Time (positive items) as above 112 .768 81 
Analyses of Salovey and shortest Dobber items in the two lypical&self quadrants 
Optimistic bias scores - negative items 	as above 
	
64 	.926 
	
50 	.832 
Optimistic bias scores - positive items as above 64 	.136 50 .136 
Time (negative items) 
	
as above 
	
64 	.856 
	
50 	.995 
Time (positive items) as above 64 	.897 50 .077 
Note. 	* Significant at p = .05. 
Key: 	Variables: 	Induced mood (Happy, Sad) 
Sex (Male, Female) 
Item type (Dobber, Salovey) 
Item target (Self, Typical&self) 
Aspect (`Self alone, 'Self with typical) 
.484 
.001* 
.020* 
.001* 
.001* 
.467 
.863 
.083 
.311 
.504 
.780 
.840 
.755 
.148 
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significant effects for negative health events, but this did not generalise to items of the 
type developed for this study. The significant correlations between mood and optimism 
scores for some negative and positive items suggests that mood congruence was not 
confined only to relative judgments (that is those resulting in optimistic bias scores). 
The lack of any significant correlations of mood with response time, even where 
optimism/optimistic bias scores were significant, suggests no support for Forgas's 
(1994a) AIM. 
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Chapter 11 
Summary, Discussion, Implications and Conclusions 
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Chapter 11 
Between the idea 
And the reality 
Falls the Shadow. 
The Hollow Men - T.S. Eliot (1925) 
Chapter 11: Summary, Discussion, Implications and Conclusions 
This thesis began with a survey of the literature concerning affective influences on 
cognition, leading to an examination of Forgas's AIM and of mood effects on health 
judgments. This was followed by reports of experiments investigating the applicability 
of Forgas's (1992a, 1992c, 1994a, 1995b) AIM to health judgments. Complex stimuli 
requiring elaborate processing were expected to show mood effects (Forgas, 1994a). 
According to the AIM, sad moods would influence social judgments more than happy 
moods, as a result of the extended processing time associated with sad moods. On these 
bases, the fundamental hypotheses of this thesis were that people in whom a sad mood 
had been induced would: 
(i) be more pessimistic about both the possibility and outcome of modifying 
their behaviour and 
(ii) take longer to process health-relevant information, than those in whom a 
happy mood had been induced. 
Chapter 6 reported Experiment 1, which established an effective non-verbal audiovisual 
method of inducing happy and sad moods, and compared it with a traditional 
autobiographical method. The non-verbal method was developed for subsequent use in 
experiments on persuasive messages where a mood induction would ideally be free of 
any cognitive content relating to test items. (As noted previously, this study was 
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initially planned to examine mood effects on persuasive messages, but a different 
direction was taken when mood effects were not established for health judgments.) The 
autobiographical method, used as a basis for comparison, was also confirmed as 
effective, and was later used for group administration of experiments. 
Chapter 7 reported Experiments 2, 3 and 4. In these experiments participants estimated 
the likelihood that they would encounter specific problems given their current 
behaviour, their perceived chances of modifying their current behaviour and the 
improvement they expected might result from such a change. This yielded three 
measures of optimism: 
(i) a prediction of future health given the current behaviour, 
(ii) perceived chances of changing the behaviour in a healthy direction — 
reversed to provide an 'optimism' score, and 
(iii) predicted change in health given the behavioural modification (derived from 
the expected improvement minus the likelihood rating given current 
behaviour). 
Experiment 2 used the audiovisual mood induction technique found effective in 
Experiment 1, to induce happy, sad and neutral moods in male and female participants. 
Items were presented on computer. Moods were effectively induced, although not 
maintained until the end of the experiment. Across all three measures of optimism 
mood showed few significant effects on scores: the only significant effects for mood 
were for alcohol and ultraviolet exposure — for perceived chance of changing the 
behaviour (both mood incongruent), and for exercise — for predicted change in health 
given the behavioural modification (which was mood congruent). There were no 
significant effects for response time. This applied to earlier ratings, where mood effects 
could have been most likely, as well as to later ones, and also to the overall rating. 
205 
Experiment 3 differed from Experiment 2 in using a more traditional autobiographical 
mood induction technique which, like the audiovisual technique, had been found to be 
effective in Experiment 1. Moods were effectively induced, although again not 
maintained until the end of the experiment. This time there were no significant effects 
of mood on pessimism/optimism scores or on response time. 
Experiment 4 differed from Experiment 2 in using pencil-and-paper to present items 
(with a control group using computer), in case the computer administration used in 
Experiments 2 and 3 had diminished the effects of mood inductions. Other differences 
were that all participants were females and there were only two mood induction groups: 
happy and sad. The audiovisual mood induction technique was used. Again moods 
were successfully induced, but overall there were few significant mood effects on 
pessimism/optimism scores: the only significant effects for mood were for cannabis, 
(N = 11), for perceived chance of changing the behaviour, (but in a mood incongruent 
direction) and also for predicted change in health given the behavioural modification 
(in a mood congruent direction). There were no significant effects for response time. 
In summary, there was very little evidence that mood influenced pessimism/optimism 
scores or response times in Experiments 2, 3 or 4, even though moods were monitored 
and effectively induced and two mood induction methods and two response modes 
were used. Correlational analyses occasionally showed congruity of moods with 
judgments but this was inconsistent between the three experiments. 
A decision was therefore made that, in subsequent experiments, mood checks would 
only be made at the conclusion of the experiment to prevent the possibility that 
awareness of mood might render judgments immune to mood effects (Schwarz & 
Clore, 1983). A decision was also made to examine and follow the methodology of 
Salovey and Birnbaum's (1989) Experiment 3 more closely. Before this was attempted, 
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two other methodological issues were considered and reported in Chapter 8 as 
Experiments 5 and 6. 
Experiment 5 determined that the direction of the ratings scales (very likely - very 
unlikely, or very unlikely - very likely) made no significant difference to optimism 
scores. It was concluded, therefore, that lack of mood effects was not in any way due to 
the direction of the scales. Experiment 6 compared depth of processing between the two 
item types, that is, those developed for this thesis, and those of the type used by 
Salovey and Birnbaum (1989). A comparison of processing times for these item types, 
with adjustments for length of items, indicated that the type of item used in this thesis 
involved as much processing as, and probably more than, that of Salovey and Birnbaum 
(1989) and therefore was at least as like to incur substantive processing. These 
experiments also provided an opportunity to calculate correlations between ambient 
mood and optimism score and between ambient mood and response time. There were 
no significant correlations of mood with optimism scores or with response time found 
using data from Experiment 5. Data from Experiment 6, however (N = 60), showed 
significant correlations between ambient mood and optimistic bias scores for negative 
items, for both Salovey and Dobber items, in accordance with Salovey and Birnbaum's 
(1989) findings. In addition there were significant correlations between ambient mood 
and optimistic bias scores for Dobber 'neutral' items. There were also some significant 
correlations for Dobber items of positive and negative valence for analyses with "Self" 
ratings. 
Chapter 9 reported Experiment 7, which combined administration of suitably adapted 
items from Salovey and Birnbaum's (1989) Experiment 3, with items of the type 
developed for this thesis. Experiment 7 was run using groups of people in whom sad or 
happy moods were effectively induced using the autobiographical method. Firstly, 
Weinstein's (1980) optimistic bias hypothesis was confirmed by this experiment: 
participants making judgments for the "average student" and for themselves made more 
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optimistic judgments concerning themselves. Secondly, the results provided support for 
Salovey and Birnbaum's (1989) findings of mood congruence for people in a sad mood 
making judgments about negative health events. However, this was demonstrated only 
in the case of responses for "Self only", for the subset of participants aged under 25 
years, when Dobber and Salovey items were analysed together. There were also 
indications that the items typical of this series of studies were responded to differently 
from those of Salovey and Birnbaum (1989, Experiment 3): participants in whom a sad 
mood had been induced responded more optimistically to the Dobber items than to 
those of the Salovey and Birnbaum type. There were no significant effects for response 
time. Correlational analyses of ambient mood with optimistic bias scores, and with 
response time, confirmed corresponding correlational findings of Salovey and 
Birnbaum (1989) of mood congruence for negative health events. Mood congruence 
was also demonstrated with "Self only" optimism scores. There was evidence for mood 
congruence with positive events for "Self', but only for the subset of participants aged 
under 25 years. There was a trend for response times to correlate negatively with mood 
(as required by Forgas's AIM) when participants responded to items for both the 
typical student and for themselves, for the age inclusive set of participants. However, as 
Ellis and Ashbrook (1988) indicated, if mood is not manipulated then no causal 
inferences can be made. 
Chapter 10 reported the results of Experiment 8 which, like Experiment 7, was run in 
groups. Experiment 8 involved the breaking down of the items designed for use in this 
series of studies. The items used were originally of the form: Given your current 
exposure to sunlight, what do you think would be your chances of contracting skin 
cancer, by the age of 70? For Experiment 8 such an item was broken down into four 
sub-types to establish under what circumstances mood infused judgments. In this 
experiment, items were grouped so that judgment times could be assessed separately 
for negative and positive items. This enabled the testing of a fundamental tenet of the 
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AM, that judgments take longer when a person is in a sad mood thus allowing greater 
affect infusion, for negative and positive health items separately. 
Moods at the end of the experiment were rated in the direction of sad and happy poles 
for sad and happy mood induction groups respectively, although they were not retained 
as well in the Salovey: typical&self quadrant as in the other three. Analyses of variance 
indicated no significant effects of induced mood on optimism/optimistic bias scores or 
response times for negative or positive health events. Nevertheless, correlational 
analyses again replicated Salovey and Birnbaum' s findings of mood congruent 
judgments for negative health events. Additionally, there were some significant 
correlations for optimism scores for the "Self" for negative and positive items 
suggesting that mood congruence might not be confined to relative judgments (those 
resulting in optimistic bias scores). There was no support for Forgas's model, even 
when ambient mood, rather than induced mood, was examined in relation to optimism 
scores and response times. Where mood correlated significantly with optimism or 
optimistic bias scores, there was no association with significant correlations of mood 
with response time. It seems unlikely, therefore, that Forgas's AIM extends to health 
judgments made by healthy people. 
Discussion 
In summary, the results of the experiments reported in this thesis: 
(i) uphold Weinstein's (1980) optimistic bias principle: when the student 
participants made judgments for themselves and for the "average student" 
they made more optimistic judgments concerning themselves, 
(ii) provide some support for Salovey and Birnbaum's (1989) finding of mood 
effects for judgments about negative health events, 
(iii) suggest that mood effects do not generalise to include the particular kind of 
health items developed for this study, 
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(iv) suggest that mood effects do not generalise to include items from the present 
study which were modified to be more similar to those of Salovey and 
Birnbaum (1989), and 
(v) indicate that Forgas's AIM does not apply generally to health judgments. 
Experimental issues 
That consistent mood effects were not found gives rise to the following questions and 
responses regarding the experiments. 
(i) Were moods effectively induced and maintained? Mood inductions were 
invariably found to be effective in Experiments 2, 3 and 4 in which post-
induction mood ratings were obtained. Although mood was not maintained 
even analysis of earlier items failed to show affect infusion. 
(ii) Did participants know mood had been manipulated with the possible 
consequence of mood awareness or compliance effects? In Experiments 2, 3, 
4, 7, and 8, the mood induction was introduced as one experiment and the 
judgments as another. No participant in any of the experiments expressed 
any suspicion about a connection between the supposedly separate studies in 
the post-experimental questionnaires. In any case, in later experiments (7 
and 8), mood ratings were made subsequent to health judgments, yet there 
was still no evidence of affect infusion. 
(iii) Were Forgas's (1994a) principles governing processing choices met as 
appropriately in the present experiments as in Salovey and Birnbaum's 
(1989) Experiment 3? One of Forgas's principles for substantive processing 
was target atypicality. This condition could be considered to be as well met 
for Dobber as for Salovey and Birnbaum (1989) items: both involved health 
judgments involving potentially serious health outcomes. Forgas's second 
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principle for substantive processing was that the person making the 
judgments has no specific motivational goal and has adequate cognitive 
capacity. Again this condition could be expected to apply equally to the 
present experiment and to Salovey and Birnbaum's (1989) Experiment 3: 
university students participated as part of a course requirement in similarly 
conducted studies. Forgas's third principle was that of the situation: 
accuracy could reasonably be expected in a group of university students, in 
the Dobber as in the Salovey and Birnbaum (1989) studies. 
(iv) Was the processing required by the items sufficient to result in affect 
infusion? Experiment 6 indicated that the items used in the present 
experiments involved processing at least as detailed as that required by 
Salovey and Birnbaum's (1989) items. In any case the AIM was not upheld 
in the present studies even for items of the type used by Salovey and 
Birnbaum (1989). 
(v) What of the sex ratio in Salovey and Birnbaum's Experiment 3 compared 
with those in the experiments of this thesis? Salovey and Birnbaum's 
Experiment 3 involved 33 healthy undergraduates, 21 males and 12 females. 
In the present experiments there were usually three times as many females 
as males. Although Salovey and Birnbaum (1989, Experiment 3) found no 
significant effects for sex, Fujita, Diener and Sandvik (1991) found gender 
differences for negative affect, with females experiencing greater emotional 
intensity, positive and negative, and showing more negative affect. Females 
and males, however, reported equal happiness. Although the present study 
employed a higher proportion of females than Salovey and Birnbaum 
(1989), the greater emotional intensity of female participants reported by 
Fujita, Diener and Sandvik (1991) would have been expected to enhance 
affect infusion rather than diminish it. 
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The bases for the experimental work reported in this thesis were (i) that Salovey and 
Birnbaum (1989, Experiment 3) found that affect influenced perceptions of symptoms, 
health efficacy and expectations of future disease, and (ii) this provided evidence that 
'more complex stimuli that require more elaborate processing may show even greater 
mood effects' than those found in interpersonal issues (Forgas, 1994a, p. 14). Given 
these and the adequacy of experimental work as outlined above, the present 
experiments could have been expected to show affect infusion, but there was little 
evidence of mood congruence. In any case the lack of an association between mood and 
response time even when mood congruence was found for Salovey and Birnbaum 
(1989) items makes interpretation of their findings in terms of the AIM problematic. 
Theoretical issues will now be considered. 
Theoretical issues 
Several theoretical issues are raised by the lack of consistent mood effects. These 
involve mood and optimism as constructs, emotional arousal and emotional valence, 
self relevance and self concept, mood maintenance and repair, and unrealistic optimism 
in relation to sad mood. 
Mood as a construct 
Do happy and sad moods lie along the same axis? 
A basic supposition of these and similar studies has been that happy and sad moods are 
points on a single linear continuum. Teasdale and Barnard (1993, p. 151) indicated that 
the ICS model regards happy and unhappy induced moods 'not simply as crude sources 
of bipolar information (good versus bad), but as markers of the processing of mood-
related schematic models'. Without entering into this level of complexity, Fiedler 
(1990) proposed that happiness and sadness might be independent rather than lying at 
opposite ends of a bipolar axis. This possibility was not taken into account in the mood 
induction ratings in the present studies, but in any case Forgas has often reported mood 
effects when mood ratings were assessed on the basis of a bipolar axis, so lack of mood 
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effects in these studies is not, per se, accounted for by a lack of correspondence 
between the sad-happy scale used and the cognitive construct it was intended to 
represent. 
How distinct are the moods? 
It is possible for music at least, to elicit more than one emotion simultaneously, and 
these emotions can be contradictory (Salmon, 1993). It would seem, therefore, that 
several moods might be maintained concurrently, resulting in confounding of mood. 
Hence, although sad and happy moods were induced in the present experiments, there 
is no guarantee that they were the only moods induced. Nevertheless, the 
autobiographical mood inductions used in three of the five relevant experiments in the 
present series were similar to those used by Salovey and Birnbaum (1989) so a 
confounding effect of concurrent moods is unlikely to explain the lack of predicted 
mood effects in the present experiments. 
What is neutral mood? 
A neutral mood could be expected to be qualitatively different from a happy or sad 
mood, rather than merely a midpoint between them. This is supported by the work of 
Salovey (1992) who studied mood-induced self-focused attention and found, that 
pleasant or unpleasant, but not neutral, mood states induced self-focused attention 
following the Yerkes-Dodson principle (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). Because of these 
considerations, although neutral mood was induced to provide control groups in earlier 
experiments of this series, this was not continued in later experiments. 
Ambient mood compared with induced mood 
The term 'ambient' has been used in this series of studies to describe a person's mood 
at any one time. Sometimes this has been the result of their own initial ('natural') mood 
combined with the residual effects of an induced mood. The term 'ambient' was chosen 
to distinguish it from 'natural' mood. In Experiments 5 and 6 however, there were no 
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mood inductions and 'ambient' mood might equally well have been described as 
'natural' mood. Other researchers have investigated natural/ambient moods. Hasher, 
Rose, Zacks, Sanft and Doren (1985) found that ambient mood in university students 
was not usually associated with cognitive effects. Kwiatkowski and Parkinson (1994) 
concluded that naturally depressed mood seemed to be different from induced 
depressed mood, after demonstrating differences in recall patterns of naturally 
depressed and induced depressed participants. Mayer, McCormick and Strong (1995), 
however, found evidence for mood congruent memory with natural, as distinct from 
induced, mood. They found correlations between pleasant-unpleasant memory retrieval 
and mood across two independent tasks in all three of their studies. Such findings raise 
doubts about a unitary interpretation of words like sad and happy in terms of ambient 
and induced moods. 
Do optimism and pessimism lie along the same axis? 
In parallel to the question of the bipolarity of happy and sad mood is that of the 
bipolarity of optimism and pessimism. Chang and Bridewell (1998) investigated the 
effects of irrational beliefs on symptoms of anxiety and depression in a university 
student sample. They found that irrational beliefs had a significant impact on 
pessimism but not on optimism. This provided supported for the view of Chang, 
D'Zurilla, and Maydeu-Olivares (1994) that optimism and pessimism might be 
appropriately viewed as partially independent constructs. This might in some way 
account for the lack of consistent mood effects. 
Emotional arousal and emotional valence 
A different issue to be considered is the role of emotional arousal in affect infusion. 
Revelle and Loftus (1990) indicated that individual differences in arousal had 
implications for the study of mood and memory. They discussed inconsistency in 
findings of mood-related effects on cognitive processes in terms of effects of arousal, 
pointing out that mood manipulations influence arousal as well as affective valence. 
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Motivation and performance literature shows that variations in arousal interact with 
retention interval to affect immediate and delayed recall. Arousal might hinder aspects 
of short term memory, but facilitate processing and storage for long term retrieval As 
they indicated, arousal is nearly always uncontrolled in mood/memory experiments. 
Evidence from a cognitive psychological perspective came from Stormark and Hugdahl 
(1993), who proposed that when information activated in associative memory involves 
strong emotional associations, the ability to shift attention away from an emotional cue 
is impaired. That is, motivational information influences attentional processes. Using 
behavioural and event related potential data, they demonstrated the selective processing 
of emotional stimuli indicating that such stimuli elicited sustained attention. 
Paulhus and Lim (1994), whose work dealt with interpersonal issues, emphasised 
emotional arousal rather than emotional valence (sad/happy) and used a 'cognitive 
complexity' model to explain effects of emotional arousal on retrieval of social 
information. They found, in both real life and laboratory situations, that emotional 
arousal reduced the cognitive complexity of social perception. This resulted in 
polarised evaluations of social targets. Whereas Forgas (1991c) argued that retrieval 
effects are minimal and that emotion has its effects primarily at encoding (Forgas & 
Moylan, 1991) the dynamic complexity model endorsed by Paulhus and Lim (1994) 
addressed the effects of emotion on retrieval of already consolidated memories. They 
discussed an alternative model whereby high arousal invokes substantive processing, 
and low arousal, heuristic processing. 
In Experiment 1, where mood induction techniques were developed and validated, 
participants were encouraged to relax before the induction. Likewise, in studies of 
effects of induced mood on judgments, consideration could also be given to 
encouraging relaxation before mood inductions and again before the making of 
judgments. However, the mood induction itself, particularly sad autobiographical 
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inductions, might well trigger arousal. Unfortunately, relaxation after mood induction 
might well provide not only an opportunity, but even a motivation, for mood repair, 
thus weakening induced mood. This points to significant difficulties in designing 
experiments to control for arousal. 
Self relevance and concept of self 
Closely related to the issue of arousal is that of relevance of an issue to the self and the 
person's self concept. It is possible that health issues, because they lie close to the 
concept of self, might incur a strong motivation towards mood maintenance and repair. 
Mayer and Salovey (1988) indicated that although network models describe automatic 
processes occurring without conscious awareness, people also actively intervene in 
their moods. They found that self relevance of mood and of information can lead to 
powerful changes in cognition: as mood or the object of thought becomes more self 
relevant, effects become more powerful. Other workers such as Rogers, Kuiper and 
Kirker (1977) have proposed that the self might have a superordinate schema of 
personal information. Higgins and Bargh (1987), while claiming nothing 'special' 
about the self, indicated that people might not be motivated merely to be accurate or 
correct, but were likely to have multiple and conflicting motivations when processing 
self-relevant information. Although self-reference can result in mood congruence, 
relatedness to the self is not sufficient in itself for mood-congruence. Within their ICS 
framework, Teasdale and Barnard (1993) proposed that self related material which 
bypasses the Implicational subsystem (associated with 'hot' cognitions, Zajonc, 1980) 
does not result in mood congruence. 
The degree of self-complexity has affective consequences (Linville, 1987) with 
complexity buffering the self-concept against adverse events, stress and depression. 
Smith and Petty (1995) saw self-esteem as an element of the self-concept and found it 
to be a factor in mood effects. They found that with a negative emotional state, 
participants low in self esteem exhibited mood congruent recall, whereas participants 
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high in self esteem did not, presumably because of mood regulation. Mood congruent 
recall was exhibited for participants of both low and high self esteem when a neutral 
mood was induced. It seems then that there is a strong link between self esteem and the 
regulation of negative emotional states. However, the situation is likely to be even more 
complex: Experiments 2, 3 and 4 of the present studies, found statistically significant 
correlations between self-esteem and various mood measures. 
Laird's (1991) theoretical perspective tied the self closely to emotional experience. He 
concluded that research on mood-memory and on processes generating emotional 
experience indicated that mood affects memory because feelings are cognitions about 
the self. According to Laird (1991) knowledge of the outside world could be described 
as cognition, and knowledge of self (self perception) as affect. The same processes 
which generate emotional feelings also generate other feeling states: hunger, fatigue, 
boredom, self-esteem, like/dislike, all of which form a substratum for attitudes. He 
drew support for his view point from studies which show that people recall self-
relevant material consistent with their self-concept better than inconsistent material 
(Markus & Wurf, 1987; Ross & Conway, 1986). 
As noted above, one possibility for the lack of consistent fit of Forgas's model to health 
judgments is that health judgments may lie too close to the self-concept. Ellis and 
Ashbrook (1988) proposed that personal memories might be so well integrated that 
they are relatively impervious to mood effects. However, Riskind (1989) suggested that 
Ellis and Ashbrook neglected the studies showing that personal memories are usually 
influenced by mood inductions and therefore were not inert to mood effects. Riskind 
nevertheless proposed that specific categories of personal memories might be 
impervious to mood and thought that cognitive priming, rather than mood, might 
account for mood congruent memory results. Sedikides (1995) advanced a differential 
sensitivity hypothesis as a result of his findings that central self-conceptions (at least in 
terms of traits like friendly, modest) were unaffected by mood whereas peripheral self- 
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conceptions were mood congruent. He drew on the work of Forgas (1995a) as an 
explanation: peripheral self-conceptions were less elaborated and held with lower 
certainty, thereby increasing the likelihood of constructive, affect-infusing processes. 
Hence central self relevant information would recruit direct access or motivated 
processing, whereas peripheral self relevant information would recruit substantive or 
heuristic processing. Health issues might reasonably be expected to belong to a 
category of central relevant information, and, on the basis of Sedilcides (1995) would 
not show affect infusion. However, given that the participants in these experiments 
were mostly young people this issue is not clear-cut. 
Mood maintenance and repair 
The issue of mood maintenance and repair deserves further consideration. Like 
cognitive processes generally, mood regulation processes in particular could perhaps be 
categorised as automatic or controlled. Mayer and Volanth (1985) noted cognitive 
involvement in the mood response system, reporting a divergence between self-
reported mood and affect-linked cognition. As noted in Chapter 2, a definition of mood 
is far from being settled. Nevertheless, in daily life, mood feelings are accompanied by 
cognitions about these moods. Mayer and Gaschke (1988) proposed that mood 
comprises both the direct experience of mood and also thoughts and feelings about the 
mood. Mayer, Salovey, Gomberg-Kaufman and Blainey (1991) argued for a broader 
conception of mood experience indicating that mood comprises both emotional states 
and mood management. Mayer and Salovey (1993), Mayer, Salovey, Gomberg-
Kaufman and Blainey (1991), and Salovey and Mayer (1990) conceptualised such a 
mood management process as an emotional intelligence which enables people to 
monitor their own and other's emotions. Such concerns are addressed by Barnard and 
Teasdale's (1991) ICS model with its Implicational as well as Propositional levels of 
integration of emotional and cognitive information. This model provides a possible 
mechanism for such awareness and management of emotion described by emotional 
intelligence and a plausible account of mood maintenance and repair. 
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It is possible that such a motivation towards mood maintenance and repair sometimes 
influences the processing of health issues, resulting in a switch from substantive to 
motivated processing. This is consistent with Sedikides (1994) who found congruence 
followed by incongruence in self descriptions of participants induced with sad moods. 
He interpreted this as a mood 'shock' effect followed by mood regulation. He 
concluded that such resorting to mood regulation might result in mood effects being 
less general than previously assumed. 
Does unrealistic optimism over-ride sad mood? 
A theoretical construct overlapping that of mood regulation is that of optimistic bias. It 
is possible that unrealistic optimism over-rides sad mood. Gilbert and Wilson (1998, 
p. 12) proposed that "when circumstances threaten our well-being, we execute an 
assortment of cognitive strategies .... designed to prevent, limit, or repair the damage" 
with our happiness possibly "defended by an invisible shield". Perhaps an optimistic 
approach to life is so important for some experimental participants that it over-rides 
experimental mood manipulation. 
Abele and Hermer (1993) found self-appraisal, both of health, and of future health risk, 
more negative with negative mood but not more positive with positive mood. They also 
found that positive mood led to higher noxiousness ratings of unhealthy behaviours 
than did negative mood. Abele and Hermer found unrealistic optimism raised to an 
even higher level by positive than by negative mood, where they found unrealistic 
pessimism. In this case, unrealistic optimism was seen as being based on probability 
judgments on possible future events, whereas self-appraisal of health and health risk 
was based on perception and memory of symptoms underpinned by a stronger personal 
data base. They proposed that the hypothetical nature of the task might have prevented 
a stronger influence of negative mood and simultaneously facilitated an optimistic bias. 
They argued for mood maintenance with positive mood but not with negative mood. 
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Rodin and Salovey (1989) indicated that, perhaps as a result of attributional processes, 
people underestimate their own risk (relative to other people's) for illnesses and other 
negative life events (Kirscht, Haefner, Kegeles, Rosenstock, 1966; Weinstein, 1980). 
Such unrealistic optimism can have important health consequences because perceived 
susceptibility is associated with preventive behaviours (Weinstein, 1983). People who 
have not experienced major negative life events see themselves as particularly 
invulnerable (Rodin and Salovey, 1989). This is likely to include young people and 
thus provides another possible explanation for lack of mood effects in the present 
studies. Rather than involving the self too strongly, perhaps the items of the present 
studies did not involve the, mostly young, participants enough. Weinstein (1980) had 
reported unrealistic optimism about future life events — both positive and negative — 
which he thought might be due to cognitive errors and also to motivational factors and 
had suggested that such errors might be less prevalent among older people. 
Schwarzer (1994) reviewed optimism, vulnerability, and self-belief as health related 
cognitions and distinguished between defensive optimism (based on situation-outcome 
expectancies) and functional optimism (based on action-outcome expectancies and self-
efficacy expectancies). In terms of health behaviour change, optimistic self-beliefs were 
thought to be most beneficial because of their operative power in helping a person to 
set goals, initiate actions and maintain motivation. Unrealistic optimism could 
undermine preventive action, but optimism about coping might facilitate preventive 
behaviour. Optimistic bias was seen as only one factor among others. For example, 
people take preventive measures against disease (e.g. heart disease) even without 
having seen someone suffering from it. Personality was also seen to influence 
optimistic bias. Although people usually strive for accuracy unless under some stress, 
hypothetical events with self-relevance and high ambiguity are commonly regarded as 
stressful. The possibility of illness or impairment in the future is threatening and 
therefore provokes self-protective distortions in cognition. 
220 
However, as an example of personality/mood influences, Schwarzer (1994) indicated 
that depressives often make more realistic judgments than do non-depressives (Alloy & 
Abramson, 1988) and that therefore with ambiguous health threats, it could be assumed 
that depressives would be less likely to show defensive optimism than non-depressives. 
Taylor and Brown (1994) found that positive illusions promote psychological well-
being. Their reading of the clinical literature indicated that criteria for mental health were 
contentment, a positive attitude towards the self, ability to care for and about others, 
openness to new people and ideas, ability to perform creative and productive work, and 
the ability to grow, develop and self-actualise, especially in response to stressful events. 
Most people are positively biased in their self perception. Optimism, even if unrealistic, 
makes people feel better, is associated with positive social relationships and with an 
ability to cope more successfully and to recover more quickly from health related 
stressors. 
Forgas's AIM as a theory extending to health judgments 
Three general criteria outlined by Smith (1978) for assessing a theory were those of 
generality, extendability, and sufficiency. (In Smith's (1978) case the criteria were used 
in the context of assessing theories of semantic memory. These criteria were adopted by 
Wyer and Srull (1989) to assess their model of social information processing.) 
Generality was considered important with regard to specific findings and to the 
representations and processes accounting for such findings. Extendability was taken to 
mean the degree to which the formulations were capable of being extended to more 
complex situations. Sufficiency was taken to mean the extent to which the theory 
accounted for all available data. To assess Forgas's AIM, overall, according to these 
criteria, is beyond the scope of this thesis, however, in the light of this study of mood 
effects on health judgments some comments can be made. 
The findings of the present refinement of Salovey and Birnbaum's (1989) Experiment 3 
are not accounted for by substantive processing under the AIM because mood effects 
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were only occasionally correlated with optimism scores, and not associated with 
response time, as required by the model. That is the processes described in the AIM, 
whereby longer processing time allows for more influence of sad mood, were not 
confirmed and therefore the generality condition is not supported for health judgments. 
Nor does the AIM necessarily extend to health judgments. It is arguable that health 
judgments, rather than being more complex, are different in some relevant way from 
those to which the AIM applies. Although the AIM may be extendable to more 
complex interpersonal judgments, it does not necessarily apply to intrapersonal 
judgments. The predictions of the AIM for substantive processing do not apply to the 
data from the present experiments on health judgments unless the findings can be 
interpreted in some other way, for example in terms of motivated processing. The 
theory therefore might or might not meet the sufficiency criterion in relation to health 
judgments. 
In summary, the AIM satisfies neither of the criteria of generality or extendability in 
relation to health judgments. Hence, it is likely that, although there is considerable 
evidence for the AIM's applicability to interpersonal judgments, it does not apply, 
universally at least, to the intrapersonal. 
Possible explanations of lack of applicability of the AIM to some judgments 
Given that two decades of research on affective influence on cognition has yielded 
findings whose consistency lies mainly in their inconsistency the area must be 
considered problematic (cf. Eich & Macaulay, 1998). Forgas's AIM, while providing a 
neat conceptual framework for mood effects on social judgments, still lacks predictive 
strength. It could be argued that the present findings are consistent with motivational 
processing quadrant of the AIM, but such a post hoc explanation challenges the 
predictiveness of the AIM. Health judgments could be just one type of intrapersonal 
judgment where mood repair leads to varying degrees of motivated processing in 
different people and hence to lack of mood congruence. Even for interpersonal 
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judgments, the MM sometimes fails to be predictive. Berkowitz, Jaffee, Jo and 
Troccoli (1998) reported their failure to confirm Forgas's (1995a) mood congruent 
findings in evaluation of atypical couples, which they attributed to an overcorrection 
(of a feeling-induced bias) effect in their judgments. Berkowitz et al. (1998, p. 1) even 
proposed 'a contrast-like effect in which the judgment shifts away from the mood's 
hedonic nature'. Martin (1998) suggested that human beings operate as gestaltists with 
motivation apparently playing a more important role than the AIM would suggest. 
Further, Showers (1998) proposed the compartmentalisation of positive and negative 
beliefs as an easy and efficient strategy to minimise negative knowledge. When 
compartmentalisation breaks down, an evaluative integration is required, to 
accommodate negative knowledge. Compartmentalised and integrative styles of 
thinking might, she suggested, be important in self regulation. Motivated processing as 
a quadrant of Forgas's model could be well expanded to include not only mood 
maintenance and repair, but also the over-correction effect, and compartmentalisation. 
Such 'quarantining' of mood is very likely to be subject to inter-individual differences, 
which is likely to make predictions of mood effects on some judgments a difficult task. 
Implications 
The results of the experiments reported here indicate that information processing in 
relation to health is not necessarily subject to affect infusion. Also, health judgments 
might sometimes be more likely to be influenced by a person's ambient mood, 
particularly if sad, than by any induced mood. It appears likely that depressed people 
might find it more difficult to undertake health related behavioural change and this 
might apply also to other behaviours (cf. research findings of Seligman, 1990). Further 
research on the role of mood in relation to health judgments is required to confirm this. 
More broadly based research examining mood effects on intrapersonal judgments is 
also indicated. 
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Conclusions 
The present findings indicate that mood congruity effects in relation to health 
judgments are unlikely to be accounted for by affect infusion under substantive 
processing as described by the MM. This suggests limitations in the predictive capacity 
of the AIM. Issues to be further understood in relation to mood effects on health 
judgments include: arousal, self relevance, mood and optimism as constructs, the 
relationship between ambient and induced moods, and particularly the effects of 
unrealistic optimism and of motivation (cf. optimistic bias). The provision of an 
adequate explanatory model, particularly one including intrapersonal judgments, lies 
ahead. The ICS model (Barnard & Teasdale, 1991; Teasdale, 1993; Teasdale & 
Barnard, 1993) was developed to overcome inadequacies of Bower's (1981, 1991) 
network model. An examination of Forgas's AIM in relation to the ICS model is 
suggested as an area for further research. 
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Appendix Al: 	Experimental Design for Experiment 1 
Induction Method 	 Order of Induction 
	
First 	Second 	Third  
Audio only 	 Happy Sad Neutral 
Happy 	Neutral 	 Sad 
Sad Happy Neutral 
Neutral 	Happy 	 Sad 
Sad Neutral Happy 
Neutral 	 Sad 	 Happy 
Audio visual 	Happy Sad Neutral 
Happy 	Neutral 	 Sad 
Sad Happy Neutral 
Neutral 	Happy 	 Sad 
Sad Neutral Happy 
Neutral 	 Sad 	 Happy 
Visual only 	Happy Sad Neutral 
Happy 	Neutral 	 Sad 
Sad Happy Neutral 
Neutral 	Happy 	 Sad 
Sad Neutral Happy 
Neutral 	 Sad 	 Happy 
Autobiographical 	Happy Sad Neutral 
Happy 	Neutral 	 Sad 
Sad Happy Neutral 
Neutral 	Happy 	 Sad 
Sad Neutral Happy 
Neutral 	 Sad 	 Happy 
(Two subjects were randomly allocated to each of the 24 conditions.) 
257 
Appendix A2: 	Participant Consent Form for Experiment 1 
Social Cognition Laboratory 
Participant Consent Form 
Information for participants in social judgment studies 
The research in which you are participating is concerned with factors affecting social 
judgments, that is judgments which involve people or social issues. 
If you agree to participate, please sign and date this form after carefully reading the 
following section: 
I consent to taking part in a psychological experiment on social judgment. I understand 
that this will involve answering a short questionnaire on my thinking patterns. I will 
then be asked to relax before attending to some audio/visual presentations and 
answering some brief questions. I also understand that I may withdraw from the 
experiment at any time without prejudice. 
I have read the information above and any questions I have asked have been answered 
to my satisfaction. 
I agree that research data gathered for the study may be published provided that I 
cannot be identified as a subject. 
Signature of subject 	  Date 	  
Telephone number 	  
Name: 	  
I have explained this project and the implications of participation in it to this volunteer 
and I believe that the consent is informed and that s/he understands the implications of 
participation. 
Signature of investigator 	  Date 	  
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Appendix A3: 	Participant Instructions for Experiment 1 
Participant instructions 
Explain to participant before induction the appropriate variant of: 
'I am doing research for PhD in Clinical Psychology. The experiment you are involved 
in is a pilot study for an experiment on attitude change. One of the factors which has 
been found to influence attitude change is the amount of attention which people are able 
to pay to a task. This is in turn affected by the things like how relaxed the person is and 
so on. So during the experiment I am doing with you now, we will be doing a bit of 
introductory relaxation and at various times you will be asked you various questions 
which relate to your attention level and so on. The study will involve: 
'Audio only: presentation of various pieces of music to which I would like you to listen 
carefully. 
OR 
'Audiovisual: presentation of some video tracks, to which I would like you to attend 
carefully. 
OR 
'Visual only: presentation of some video pictures, to which I would like you to attend 
carefully. 
OR 
'Autobiographical: writing about some incidents, to which I would like you give 
careful attention. 
'Now we will do some relaxation. 
'One of the ways people can relax is by breathing a little more deeply: 
Place one hand on your abdomen and breathe in deeply through your nose into your 
abdomen to push up your hand as much as feels comfortable. Your chest should move 
just a little. Just keep breathing slowly and gently for a few minutes. 
'OK 
'Another way to relax is to create tension in a group of muscles and then to relax that 
muscle group. I would like you to clench both fists for seven seconds. Now let go and 
as you do this notice the sensation of letting go. Now clench your fists again and then 
let go. Feel the relaxation. 
'Now breathe slowly and allow your whole body to let go. Just relax.' 
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Appendix A4.1: 	Need for Cognition (Social Cognition) Questionnaire 
 
Subject No: 
Social Cognition Questionnaire 
Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement with the following statements by 
placing a cross at the appropriate number on the number line. 
1. I would prefer complex to simple 	111111111  
problems. 	 Disagree 	 Agree 
	
strongly strongly 
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling 	I 	I 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 
a situation that requires a lot of thinking. 	Disagree Agree 
strongly 	 strongly 
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun. 1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 
Disagree Agree 
strongly 	 strongly 
4. I would rather do something that requires 	111111111  
little thought than something that is sure to Disagree 	 Agree 
challenge my thinking abilities, 	 strongly strongly 
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations 	111111111  
where there is a likely chance I will have Disagree 	 Agree 
to think in depth about something. 	strongly strongly 
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and 
for long hours. 	 Disagree 	 Agree 
strongly strongly 
7. I think only as hard as I have to. I 	I 	I 	I 	I 	I 	I 	I 	I 
Disagree Agree 
strongly 	 strongly • 
8. I prefer to think about small, daily projects 	111111111 
to long-term ones. 	 Disagree 	 Agree 
strongly strongly 
9. I like tasks that require little thought once 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 
I've learned them. 	 Disagree Agree 
strongly 	 strongly 
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 
way to the top appeals to me. 	 Disagree Agree 
strongly 	 strongly 
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11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming 
up with new solutions to problems. 
1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 
Agee 
strongly 
I 	I 
Disagree 
strongly 
12. Learning new ways to think doesn't excite 
me very much. 
1 	I 
Disagree 
strongly 
 
I 	I 	I 	I 	I 	I 	I 
Agree 
strongly 
 
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles 
that I must solve. 
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is 
appealing to me. 
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, 
difficult and important to one that is 
somewhat important but does not require 
much thought. 
16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after 
completing a task that required a lot of 
mental effort. 
17. It's enough for me that something gets the 
job done; I don't care how or why it 
works. 
18. I usually end up deliberating about issues 
even when they do not affect me 
personally. 
I 	I 1 1 1 1 1 1 	1 
Disagree 
strongly 
1 	I 1 I I 1 I 
Agree 
strongly 
I 	1 
Disagree 
strongly 
1 	I I I I I I 
Agree 
strongly 
I 	1 
Disagree 
strongly 
1 	1 1 1 1 1 1 
Agree 
strongly 
1 	1 
Disagree 
strongly 
I 	I I 1 I 1 I 
Agree 
strongly 
I 	I 
Disagree 
strongly 
1 	I I I I 1 I 
Agree 
strongly 
I 	1 
Disagree 
strongly 
Agree 
strongly 
ghankyou for taking the time to fill" out this questionnaire. 
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Appendix A4.2: Need for Cognition Scale - Showing Reversed Items (for 
scoring) 
1. I would prefer complex to simple problems. 
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of 
thinking. 
3*. Thinking is not my idea of fun. 
4*• I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure 
to challenge my thinking abilities. 
5*• I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will have to 
think in depth about something. 
6. 	I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours. 
7*• I think only as hard as I have to. 
8*. I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones. 
9*• I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them. 
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. 
11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. 
12*. Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me very much. 
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve. 
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. 
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult and important to one that is 
somewhat important but does not require much thought. 
16*. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of 
mental effort. 
17*. It's enough for me that something gets the job done; I don't care how or why it 
works. 
18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me 
personally. 
Scoring of nine asterisked questions was reversed. 
(The ratings were recorded from I (lowest) to 9 (highest) per item.) 
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Appendix A5: 	Typical Visual Analogue Scale for Experiment 1 
This scale was presented before and after each mood induction to 
assess current mood; i.e. the scale was presented four times as there 
were three mood inductions. 
 
Subject No: 
Visual Analogue Scale 
Please rate how you feel right now on the following scales. Decide the position along 
the line which applies to you right now. For example if you are feeling more relaxed 
than tense then you would mark the line toward the relaxed end of the scale, say: 
Relaxed 
	
Tense 
  
Now please complete the following scales: 
 
Alert 
  
Drowsy 
     
Sad 
	
Happy 
Calm 
	 Excited 
Lethargic 
	 Energetic 
Attentive 
	 Dreamy 
Interested 
 
Bored 
Depressed 
 
Elated 
Muzzy 
  
Focussed 
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Appendix A6: 	Scripts for Autobiographical Mood Inductions. 
(These were printed one to a page and presented, one at a time, together with blank 
writing paper.) 
For Happy Mood Induction 
Autobiographical Memory Inventory 
Please think about a happy event in your life and write about it. As you do this, try to 
relive the feelings you had at the time. 
1. See all the details of the situation. Picture the surroundings and then write a description 
of them. 
2. See the people or objects and write a description of them. 
3. Hear the sounds and experience the event happening to you. Describe what you are 
experiencing. 
4. Think the thoughts you actually thought in this situation. What are they? 
5. Feel the same happy feelings you felt. Let yourself react as if you were actually there. 
Describe what is happening to you. 
Take your time as you will have ten minutes to write down your memories. 
For Neutral Mood induction 
Autobiographical Memory Inventory 
Please describe the details of the street in which you lived when you were about ten 
years old. 
1. You may find it helps to draw a sketch-map or picture first. 
2. Label the landmarks and objects. 
3. See all the details of the situation. 
4. Picture the surroundings and objects and then write a description of them. 
5. You go for a walk down the street. Describe what you can see. 
Take your time as you will have ten minutes to write down your memories. 
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For Sad Mood induction 
Autobiographical Memory Inventory 
Please think about a sad event in your life and write about it. As you do this, try to 
relive the feelings you had at the time. 
1. See all the details of the situation. Picture the surroundings and then write a description 
of them. 
2. See the people or objects and write a description of them. 
3. Hear the sounds and experience the event happening to you. Describe what you are 
experiencing. 
4. Think the thoughts you actually thought in this situation. What are they? 
5. Feel the same sad feelings you felt. Let yourself react as if you were actually there. 
Describe what is happening to you. 
Take your time as you will have ten minutes to write down your memories. 
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Appendix B 
Protocols for Experiments 2,3 and 4 
Appendix Bl: Participant Consent Form 
for Mood Induction - Autobiographical Method —See Appendix A6 
Appendix B2: Questionnaire - Pencil & Paper Format 
Appendix B3: Scoring Schema for Self Esteem Questionnaire 
for Scoring Schema for Need for Cognition Scale — See Appendix A4.2 
Appendix B4: Post Experimental Awareness Questionnaire. 
The various protocols for this group of experiments were presented either via computer 
screen, or questionnaire booklet. 
The actual text was identical in both, each "screen" in the computer version 
(Experiments 2 and 3) corresponding to a page of the questionnaire booklet 
(Experiment 4). 
The protocols are presented here in the questionnaire booklet version. 
The pages of the questionnaire booklets have been reduced in size to 80% of original. 
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Appendix B!: 	Participant Consent Form for Experiments 2,3 and 4 
Social Cognition Laboratory 
Participant Consent Form 
Information for participants in social judgment studies 
The research in which you are participating is concerned with factors affecting social 
judgments, that is judgments which involve people or social issues. 
If you agree to participate, please sign and date this form after carefully reading the 
following section: 
I consent to taking part in a psychological experiment on social judgment. I understand 
that this will involve (an audiovisual presentation andl) answering some questions and 
making judgments about statements on social issues. I also understand that I may 
withdraw from the experiment at any time without prejudice. 
I have read the information above and any questions I have asked have been answered 
to my satisfaction. 
I agree that research data gathered for the study may be published provided that I 
cannot be identified as a subject. 
Signature of subject 	  Date 	  
Telephone number 	  
Name: 	  
I have explained this project and the implications of participation in it to this volunteer 
and I believe that the consent is informed and that s/he understands the implications of 
participation. 
Signature of investigator 	  Date 	  
1 Included for Experiments 2 and 4 and omitted for Experiment 3 
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2. A question requiring a Yes/No response - e.g. Are you studying Psychology? m 
(Write "Y" or "N" in the box.) 
3. A statement with a range of options - 
e.g. I am doing well in my studies. 	 
Definitely 
false 
False Mostly 
false 
More false 
than true 
More true 
than false 
Mostly 
true 
True Definitely 
true 
(Tick the box under statement that you feel is the most accurate.) 
Social Cognition Experiment 	Experiment One 
1 
	
I 
1 
	
I 
:z
u  
m
pu
ad
dv
  
Q
uesti onnaire - Pencil  &
 Pa per F orm
at 
Enter Subject's Name: 
Enter Subject's Number: 
Instructions 
This experiment will involve your answering a number of questions presented in different ways. 
1. A question requiring a written answer - e.g. What is your name? 
(Write the answer in the box.) 
4. 	A statement with a sliding scale ranging between two extremes. 
e.g. Indicate your statistics ability. 	 11111111111111111111111111iiiiIiiiiliiiii 
Hopeless 	 Exceptional 
(Make an "X" at the appropriate position on the line.) 
Do not turn over the page until told to do so 
Please tell the experimenter when you are ready to continue. 
raise I rue more raise 
than true 
More true 
than false 
mostly 
false - 
Uettrutely 
true 
Uennttely 
false 
mostly 
true 
S.E. Please tick the appropriate box to indicate how true (or false) each item is as a description of you. There are no right or wrong answers. 
Uebnitely 
false 
False Mostly 
false 
More false 
than true 
More true 
than false 
Mostly 
true 
I rue Uetinitely 
true 
_ - I have a lot of respect for myself. 	  
I lack self-confidence. 	
 
1 
I am pretty accepting of myself. 	
 1 
I don't have much respect for myself. 	
 1 
I have a lot of self-confidence. 	  
I have a very good self-concept. 	
 1 
Nothing that I do is very important. 	
 1 
I have pretty positive feelings about myself. 	
 
1 
I have a pretty poor self-concept.     1 
I have pretty negative feelings about myself. 	
 1 
I do lots of things that are important. 	
 1 
I am not very accepting of myself. 	  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
I I 1 I 1 I I 
I 1 I I I I I 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
I 1 1 1 1 1 1 
I 1 1 I I I I 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 I 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
(Second page of first booklet - Self esteem
 inventory) 
	 1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
I 
1 
1 
1 
1. I would prefer complex to simple problems. 
 
iiiitliiii11111111111111iliiiiliiiilitili 
Disagree strongly 	 Agree strongly 
 
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of 	 IiiiiiiiiiIiiiilitilliiiilliiiImilliiii 
thinking. 
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun. 	 Iiiiihill1111111iiiiiiiiIiiiiIiiiihnil  
Disagree strongly 	 Agree strongly 
4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is 	 Iiiiiiiiiiiimilliilmilliiiiiiiiiiiiii 
sure to challenge my thinking abilities. 	 Disagree strongly 	 Agree strongly 
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will have to 	 liitilliiilliiiliiilliiilliiiiiiiiiliiill 
think in depth about something. 	 Disagree strongly 	 Agree strongly 
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours. 	 iliffiliiiliiiiIiiiiIiiiillitiliiiilitill 
Disagree strongly 	 Agree strongly 
7. I think only as hard as I have to. 	 IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIiiiiiiilmillitilliiii 
Disagree strongly 	 Agree strongly 
8. I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones. 	 Iiiiiimallitimilimilmiiiiiiiiill 
Disagree strongly 	 Agree strongly 
Please turn the page when ready, and continue the questions. 
(Third  page of first bookl et - N eed  for cognition questi onnaire) 
Disagree strongly 	 Agree strongly 
Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement with the following statements by placing a cross at 
the appropriate position on the number line. NC 
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them.  	 Iiiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliitiliiiiliiiil 
Disagree strongly 	 Agree strongly 
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. 	 
Disagree strongly 	 Agree strongly 
11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. 
Disagree strongly 	 Agree strongly 
12. Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me very much. 	 Imilm11111111111111H1111111111111111  
Disagree strongly 	 Agree strongly 
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve. 	  
Disagree strongly 	 Agree strongly 
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. 	  
Disagree strongly 	 Agree strongly 
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult and important to one that is 
somewhat important but does not require much thought. 	 Disagree strongly 	 Agree strongly 
16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of 	 11111111 iii ii uli II iii Ii 11111 hut iii iuu  
mental effort. 	 Disagree strongly 	 Agree strongly 
17. It's enough for me that something gets the job done; I don't care how or why it 	 till liuuiluuuuluiuuIuuiuluiiuluuuuluuuuI 
works. 	 Disagree strongly 	 Agree strongly 
18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me 	 111111111 thu 1111111 iii 1111111 thu iii u  
personally. 	 Disagree strongly 	 Agree strongly 
(Fourth page of first booklet - N eed for cognition
 questionnaire
 - cont.) 
Are you male (M) or female (F)? 
Please indicate your age in years: 
Please read the following word pairs and mark with an "X" the position on the scale 
that refers to you at this moment 
I iiiilmiliiillimitullintliiiiliiiii 
	
Competent 	 Incompetent 
Ii 11 1 1 1 11 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 11 1 11 1 1 1 li 1 I I iiiIiiiii 
Sad 	 Happy 
IIIIIIIIIII[HiltHillitillitiliIIIIIIIII 
Tense 	 Relaxed 
IIHIIIIIIII11111111111111tHillittillitii  
Elated 	 Depressed 
Please stop here, until the experimenter asks you to turn the page. 
m 
(Fifth
 pa ge of first booklet - mood  assess m
ent scal e for m
ood  maintenance check) 
POST EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
What is your (term time) post-code? 
Please read the following word pairs and mark with an "X" the 
position on the scale that refers to you at this moment 
111111111111111111111111111titliiiiliiiii 
	
Sad 	 Happy 
IiiiiiiiiilififliiiiiiiiiliiiiIiiiiltiiii 
Satisfied 	 Dissatisfied 
C3 
IiiiiliiiiIiiiiIiiiiiiiiiiliiiiiiiiiIiiiii 
Discontented 	 Contented 
Iiiiilliiiliiiiltitilmiliiiilifilliiiii  
Relaxed 	 Tense 
This is the end of the first experiment. 
P&P Pail One- 14.10.95 - 1 
(Sixth  pa ge of first booklet - M
ood ind ucti on effectiveness assessm
ent ) 
Li 
Li 
Li 
U 
CI 
classical 
folk 
rock 
metal 
techno 
jazz/blues 
other (please specify): 
My tastes in music are (please indicate more than one if desired): 
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Social Cognition Experiment 	Experiment Two 
Enter Subject's Number: 
	 I 
Instructions 
This experiment will involve your answering a number of questions presented in different ways. 
1. A question requiring a written answer - e.g. What is your name? 
(Write the answer in the box.) 
2. A question requiring a Yes/No response - e.g. Are you studying Psychology? 
(Write "Y" or "N" in the box.) 
3. A statement with a range of options - 
Definitely 
false 
False Mostly 
false 
More false 
than true 
More true 
than false 
Mostly 
true 
True Definitely 
true 
(Tick the box under statement that you feel is the most accurate.) 
4. 	A statement with a sliding scale ranging between two extremes. 
e.g. Indicate your statistics ability.  
	
I1 1111111 11 mil tit iii itillitt111111  
Hopeless 	 Exceptional 
(Make an "X" at the appropriate position on the line.) 
Please turn over when you are ready to continue. 
e.g. I am doing well in my studies. 	  
Confidence and Expectancy Ratings 
On the following pages are some questions 
about how likely you believe you are 
to suffer from the effects of various practices 
which could be hazardous to health 
and about how confident you are 
that you could make various health-related changes. 
Whether or not you are actually trying to change your habits at present, 
please rate how confident you are 
that you would be able to make yourself do regularly the things suggested, 
if you wanted to. 
Please tell the experimenter when you are ready to continue. 
Do not turn over the page until told to do so. 
(Second  page of second b ooklet - participan
t instructions) 
Use of Alcohol Information: Excessive consumption of alcohol is associated with memory problems. 
This group of questions relates to alcoholic drinks. Please tick ONE of the following options. 
Do you consider yourself currently: 
• a non drinker 
1:11 	an occasional drinker 
LJ 	a moderate drinker 
• a very regular drinker 
• a heavy drinker? 
How many standard drinks would you drink in an ordinary week (Monday - Monday)? 
Given your current and likely future use or non-use of alcohol, how likely do you think you 	Iiillititiliiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii111111111111 
are to have memory problems by the age of 70? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
If you do not currently drink alcohol, please continue by answering the questions on the next page. 
What do you believe would be your chances of reducing your alcohol intake over the next six 
months if you decided to? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
How likely do you think you are to have . merpory problems by the age of 70 if you 
maintained your alcohol reduction in this way? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Please turn the page when ready, and continue the questionnaire. 
(Third  page of second booklet) 
I use or Nicotine Information: Tobacco smoking is associated with an increased risk of lung cancer. 
This group of questions relates to cigarette smoking. Please tick ONE of the following options. 
Do you consider yourself currently: 
1:1 a non-smoker 
[=I 	an occasional smoker 
ij a moderate smoker 
LI a very regular smoker 
Li a heavy smoker? 
How many cigarettes would you smoke in a normal day? 
   
   
Given your current and likely future use or non-use of tobacco, how likely do you think you 
are to have contracted lung cancer by the age of 70? 
111111111i1111111111111111111tIrrillimi  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
If you are a non-smoker, please continue by answering the questions on the next page. 
What do you believe would be your chances of reducing your use of nicotine over the next 
six months if you decided to? 
Irtirlirillirtilirriltrirlirriliiirlirril  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
How likely do you think you are to have lung cancer by the age of 70 if you maintained your  
nicotine reduction in this way? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Please turn the page when ready, and continue the questionnaire. 
(Fourth  page of second booklet) 
This group of questions relates to cannabis use. Please tick ONE of the following options. 
 
Do you consider yourself currently: 
   
1:1 	a non-user 
1:1 	an occasional user 
Ull 	a moderate user 
CI 	a very regular user 
1:11 	a heavy user? 
   
    
How many times each week would you use cannabis? I 	I 	Estimate of hours per week: 
Please mark the scale with a cross at the appropriate place. 
Given your current and likely future use or non-use of cannabis, how likely do you think you 	liolholimilliolliolliolholliiiii  
are to have attention and memory problems by the age of 70? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
If you do not currently use cannabis, continue by answering the questions on the next page. 
What do you believe would be your chances of reducing your cannabis use over the next six 	lioilloillitilloiliollioilloilittil 
months if you decided to? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
How likely do you think you are to have attention and memory problems by the age of 70 if 	lioilliiiIIIIIIIiiilio11111111oilliiii 
you maintained your reduced cannabis use in this way? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Please turn the page when ready, and continue the questionnaire. (a
pi
oo
q  
pu
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as
  f o
  a8
vd
  1.1.
0
g
)  
Information: Cannabis use is associated with attention and memory problems. I use erCannabis 
Exercise Information: Regular exercise is associated with reduced risk of cardiovascular disease (heart attack or stroke). 
Given your current and likely future exercise level, how likely do you think you are to have 
cardiovascular disease before the age of 70? 
What do you believe would be your chances of sticking to a regular exercise program over 
the next six months if you decided to? 
111111111r111111111111i111111111111111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Itirilirrilliirliirriririliiiilittilirtil 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
How likely do you think you are to have a heart attack by the age of 70 if you maintained a 	IiiiiIiiiiliiiiliiiiiiiiilliiiiiiiiIiiill 
regular exercise program? 	 very likely 	 Very unlikely 
(
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)  
Please turn the page when ready, and continue the questionnaire. 
Given your current and likely future fat intake, how likely do you think you are to suffer 	 11111111111milliiiiiiiiIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII 
cardiovascular disease by the age of 70? 	 very likely 	 Very unlikely 
What do you believe would be your chances of reducing your fat intake over the next six 
months if you decided to? 
How likely do you think you are to have cardiovascular disease by the age of 70 if you 
maintained your fat reduction in this way? 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
1111111111111111111111111111111111111iiii 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
(Seventh  page of second  booklet) 
Fat intake Information: Excessive fat intake is associated with increased risk of cardiovascular disease (heart attack or stroke). 
Please turn the page when ready, and continue the questionnaire. 
Information: Daily intake of fresh fruit and vegetables provides 
protection against heart attack, stroke, cancer and 
other illnesses. 
Fruit & Vegetable intake 
 
Given your current and likely future fruit and vegetable intake, how likely do you think you 	iiiilliiii1111111111111111IIIIIIIIIIIIIil  
are to have a heart attack, stroke or cancer before the age of 70? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
What do you think are your chances of increasing your fruit and vegetable intake over the 	IIIIIIIIIIimilliiilludillihiffinill 
next six months if you decided to? 
	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
How likely do you think you are to have a heart attack, stroke or cancer by the age of 70 if 
you maintained your increased fruit and vegetable intake? 
Iiit1111111111111111111111111111111111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
(a
pp
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)  
Please turn the page when ready, and continue the questionnaire. 
Information: Sexually transmitted diseases include hepatitis B, AIDS, herpes, 
gonorrhoea, syphilis. 
Safer sex is taken to mean using a condom if you are involved in 
sexual activity. 
Safer 
Sex 
 
Given your current and likely future sexual practices, how likely do you think you are to have 
contracted a sexually transmitted disease before the age of 70? 
iiiiiltirrImiltriiitirilittarrirlirill  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
What do you believe would be your chances of practicing only safer sex over the next six 	 Inii11111111111111111110111111111111111 
months if you decided to? 
	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
How likely do you think you are to have contracted a sexually transmitted disease by the age 
of 70 if you maintained using safer sex practices? 
Iiirillirilli1111111111111111111111111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
(
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Please turn the page when ready, and continue the questionnaire. 
Given your current and likely future exposure to the sun, how likely do you think you are to 	Iitiiliitiltiiiltitiliiitliiiiliiitliiiil 
have contracted skin cancer before the age of 70? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
What do you believe would be your chances of increasing your use of blockout (15+) and/or 	Iiiiiiiiittiiiiiiiiiliiiiiiitiitiiiiiiiil 
wearing sun-protective clothing over the next summer if you decided to? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
How likely do you think you are to have contracted skin cancer by the age of 70 if you have 
used blockout (15+) and/or worn protective clothing? 
Iiii1111111111i11111111111,111111111mil 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
(J
ap
io
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Information: Exposure of uncovered skin to ultra-violet rays from the sun is 
associated with increased risk of skin cancer. I UV Protection 
Please turn the page when ready, and continue. 
Please read the following word pairs and mark with an "X" the position on the scale 
that refers to you at this moment. 
1111111111Iittillitilitt111111111111111111 
Alert 	 Drowsy 
ItiilliiiiliiiiliiitimilliiilliiiIiiiii 
Sad 	 Happy 
111111111111m11111111111111111iiilliiiti 
Dreamy 	 Attentive 
End of Experiment 
Thank you for your participation. 
(Last page of second  b ooklet - M
ood  m
ainte nance check) 
Appendix B3: 	Scoring Schema for Self Esteem Questionnaire 
1. 	I have a lot of respect for myself. 
2*. 	I lack self-confidence. 
3. 	I am pretty accepting of myself. 
4*• 	I don't have much respect for myself. 
5. I have a lot of self-confidence. 
6. I have a very good self-concept. 
7*. 	Nothing that I do is very important. 
8. 	I have pretty positive feelings about myself. 
9*• 	I have a pretty poor self-concept. 
10*. I have pretty negative feelings about myself. 
11. 	I do lots of things that are important. 
12*. I am not very accepting of myself. 
* Scoring of the six asterisked questions was reversed. 
The ratings were recorded from I (lowest) to 8 (highest) per item. 
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Appendix B4: 	Post Experimental Awareness Questionnaire 
Post-experimental Questionnaire 
Subject No 	  
As the first part of your debriefmg could you please answer these questions. 
1. Had you heard anything about this experiment from any other source? Yes/No 
What had you heard? 	  
2. What did you think the purpose of the experiment was? 	  
3. Is there anything about which you were thinking which it might be relevant for 
me to know, while you were carrying out the tasks, watching the video etc? 	 
4. Do you have any comments about the procedure? 	  
5. Do you have any other comments? 
	
	  
Thank you for your cooperation. 
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Appendix C 
Protocols for Experiment 5 
Appendix Cl: Participant Consent form 
Appendix C2: Questionnaire Booklet "Very likely" First Version 
Appendix C3: Questionnaire Booklet "Very unlikely" First Version 
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Appendix C I: 	Participant Consent Form for Experiment 5 
Health and Social Cognition Experiment 
Participant Consent Form 
Information for participants in health judgment studies 
The research in which you are participating is broadly concerned with factors affecting 
social judgments, that is judgments which involve people or social issues. This 
particular experiment is concerned with health-related judgments. 
If you agree to participate, please sign and date this form after carefully reading the 
following section: 
I consent to taking part in a psychological experiment on health-related judgment. I 
understand that this will involve answering some questions and making judgments 
about statements on health-related issues. I also understand that I may withdraw from 
the experiment at any time without prejudice. 
I have read the information above and any questions I have asked have been answered 
to my satisfaction. 
I agree that research data gathered for the study may be published provided that I 
cannot be identified as a subject. 
Signature of participant 	  Date 	  
Name: 	  
I have explained this project and the implications of participation in it to this volunteer 
and I believe that the consent is informed and that s/he understands the implications of 
participation. 
Signature of investigator 	  Date 	  
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Health Ratings Experiment 
I LU 
Instructions 
You will be asked to answer a number of questions. 
You are asked to do this by putting a line through a scale to indicate your rating. 
For example, if you were asked to indicate your statistics ability, you would put a line through the scale at the appropriate place. 
If you were quite good at statistics you might put your line as shown. 
e.g. Indicate your statistics ability 	  IiiillitiiiiiiilitithiiIII iiiiiiiiiiiil 
Hopeless 	 Exceptional 
You will also be asked to note down the time on the display clock at various stages during the experiment. It is important to note the time 
accurately. 
There is no need to rush your answers. 
Please give your age: 
Are you: 
(years) 
Male Female (Please circle) 
:z
3  
m
pu
ad
dv
  
Likelihood ratings (D& B) 
Please note down the time from the display clock then turn over immediately and begin. 
On the following pages are some questions about how likely you are to suffer from 
the effects of various practices which could be hazardous to health and about how 
confident you are that you could make various health-related changes. 
Whether or not you are actually trying to change your habits at present, please rate 
how confident you are that your would be able to make yourself do regularly the 
things suggested, if you wanted to. 
I n- liF q Pf! I 
(S econd  Page - Questionnaire B ooklet - "
Very likely"  First'  Version) 
likelihood ratings (D& B) 
• Information: Regular exercise is associated with reduced risk of cardiovascular disease (heart attack or stroke). 
Given your current and likely future exercise level, how likely do you think you are to have 	IIIIIIIIHIIIIIIiitilliffilitillitilliill  
cardiovascular disease before the age of 70? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
What do you believe would be your chances of sticking to a regular exercise program over 	litlitimi111111111111111111111111111111  
the next six months if you decided to? 
	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
How likely do you think you are to have a heart attack by the age of 70 if you maintained a 	Iiii1111111111111iiiiiiiiimiti1111111d1 
regular exercise program? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Information: Excessive fat intake is associated with increased risk of cardiovascular disease (heart attack or stroke). 
Given your current and likely future fat intake, how likely do you think you are to suffer 
cardiovascular disease by the age of 70? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
limiliiiiiiirthrillirrililitliiiilliiil 
What do you believe would be your chances of reducing your fat intake over the next six 	 111111111,1111111111111111111111111111111  
months if you decided to? 
	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
How likely do you think you are to have cardiovascular disease by the age of 70 if you 	 IiiriliiiiIiiiillitil11111111111111111111 
maintained your fat reduction in this way? 
	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
(Third  Pag
e - Q
uestionnaire Booklet - "
Very likely"  First'  Version) 
I • mm gen I then turn over. 
• Information: Daily intake of fresh fruit and vegetables provides protection against heart attack, stroke, cancer and other illnesses. 
Given your current and likely future fruit and vegetable intake, how likely do you think you 	Iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiimil 
are to have a heart attack, stroke or cancer before the age of 70? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
What do you think are your chances of increasing your fruit and vegetable intake over the 	IiiilliiiiliiiiIiiiiIiiiiliiiiIiiii111111 
next six months if you decided to? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
How likely do you think you are to have a heart attack, stroke or cancer by the age of 70 if 	iiiiilliiiIIIIIImiliiiillitilliilliiiil  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Information: Exposure of uncovered skin to ultra-violet rays from the sun is associated with increased risk of skin cancer. 
Given your current and likely future exposure to the sun, how likely do you think you are to 	IniiIIII11111111111111ifiluilmiltild 
have contracted skin cancer before the age of 70? 
What do you believe would be your chances of increasing your use of blockout (15+) and/or 
wearing sun-protective clothing over the next summer if you decided to? 
How likely do you think you are to have contracted skin cancer by the age of 70 if you have 	Iiii11111111mliiiiiiiii1111111111111111 
used blockout (15+) and/or worn protective clothing? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Please note down the time from the display clock 
(F ourth P age - Q
uestionnaire B ookl et - ' Very likely"  F
irst'  V ersion) 
you maintained your increased fruit and vegetable intake? 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
I ii l I 1 I II I I I II 1 1 1 11 1 1 I 11 1 hit I I [whin' 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
I. 
1—T111-1 	cell I then turn over immediately and continue. 
Likelihood ratings (S& B) 
For each of the following items, please use the scale to indicate the likelihood that 
you will experience the situation at some stage in your life. 
Please note down the time from the display clock 
(Fifth
  Pa ge - Q
uestionnaire Bookl et - ' Very likely"  F
irst'  Version) 
Likelihood ratings (s&B) 
hirilliiiiiiirliiiiiiiiillitilliriliml 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Iii rillirillri tilirrilirrilittrIiritlirril  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Iiiirlirrillirrlirrilliirliirilirrilmil  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
hiriltrirlitillitriliniliritlitrilirirl  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Irti1111111111111111111111m111111111111 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Developing diabetes. 	 hilinmilitittillinuillitilinitilli 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Regularly maintaining an exercise program. 	Inilliiiiiiiiilimiliiiliiiiiiiiillitil  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
(Sixth  Pag
e - Q
uesti onnaire
 B
ookl e
t - "
Very
 likely"  F
irst'  Version) 
• Contracting some form of cancer. 
• Achieving great cardiac fitness. 
• Developing high blood pressure. 
• Becoming an alcoholic. 
• Regularly maintaining a well balanced diet. 
• Lowering cholesterol levels. 
• Developing arthritis. 
• Having a stroke. 
111111111111111111111111111111111,1111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Irrirliritlitrilimirrillririlirrillirti 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Priitlirriltrirlirtrirrirliii1111111111 II 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Learning relaxation skills and reducing tension. 	irrirlirriltittlirrilirrilirriliiirlitril 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Reducing exposure to toxic substances. 	 Iriiilirrilitrilirrilirrilirriltrirlirtil 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Please note down the time from the display clock 
. • 
I mm 	e"c"-'1 then turn over. 
(S eventh  Pa ge - Q
uestionnaire Bookl et - ' Very likely"  First'  Ver sion) 
Did you find the scales confusing? Yes/No. 
Would you have found it easier if the scales had been reversed? Yes/No. 
Please rate the scales you have completed for ease of use ( I = easiest, 9= hardest) 
linillitilmilintill11111111IIIIIIIIII  
1 	2 	3 	4 	5 	6 	7 	8 	9 
(Eighth  Page - Q
uestionnaire B ookl et - 'Very
 likely"  First'  Version) 
Please read the following word pairs and mark with an "X" the position on the scale 
that refers to you at this moment. 
IiiiillitiliiiiIiitilittilitithililititi 
Alert 	 Drowsy 
Iiiiillisilmilititliiitlititliiiilititi 
Sad 	 Happy 
Iitilltitiliiiiliiiiiiiiilimilimilitill  
Dreamy 	 Attentive 
End of Experiment 
Thank you for your participation. 
Q
uestionnaire Booklet - "
Very likely"  First'  Versi on) 
Health Ratings Experiment 
I UL 
Instructions :E
D  
np
ua
dd
v  
Q
uesti onnaire B
ooklet "V
ery
 unlikely"  First'  V
ersion 
You will be asked to answer a number of questions. 
You are asked to do this by putting a line through a scale to indicate your rating. 
For example, if you were asked to indicate your statistics ability, you would put a line through the scale at the appropriate place. 
If you were quite good at statistics you might put your line as shown. 
e.g. Indicate your statistics ability  	I . ti iii ii iii titlittilititli 	iii liii III ii 
Hopeless 	 Exceptional 
You will also be asked to note down the time on the display clock at various stages during the experiment. It is important to note the time 
accurately. 
There is no need to rush your answers. 
Please give your age: 	 (years) 
Are you: 	 Male Female (please circle) 
(Subsequent Pages - Questionnaire Booklet - "Very unlikely" First' Version) 
NOTE: The subsequent pages of this questionnaire booklet are identical to those of 
"Very likely" first' booklet from this point on (i.e. for pages two to nine), except for 
the reversal of the wording on the scales. 
"Very likely" first' questionnaire booklet scales (printed in full earlier) 
111111iiiiliiiiIiiiiiiiiiliiiiIiiiiIiiii1 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
'Very unlikely" first' questionnaire booklet scales 
Iiiiiiiiii 11111111111iiiilliiiliiiiliiiii 
Very unlikely 	 Very likely 
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Appendix D 
Protocols for Experiment 6 
Appendix Dl: Participant Consent Form 
Appendix D2: Questionnaire Booklet 
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Appendix Dl: 	Participant Consent Form for Experiment 6 
Social Cognition Laboratory 
Participant Consent Form 
Information for participants in social judgment studies 
The research in which you are participating is broadly concerned with factors affecting 
social judgments, that is judgments which involve people or social issues. 
If you agree to participate, please sign and date this form after carefully reading the 
following section: 
I consent to taking part in a psychological experiment on social judgment. I understand 
that this will involve making judgments about statements on social issues. I also 
understand that I may withdraw from the experiment at any time without prejudice. 
I have read the information above and any questions I have asked have been answered 
to my satisfaction. 
I agree that research data gathered for the study may be published provided that I cannot 
be identified as a subject. 
Signature of participant 	  Date 	  
Name: 	  
Telephone Number: 	  
I have explained this project and the implications of participation in it to this volunteer 
and I believe that the consent is informed and that s/he understands the implications of 
participation. 
Signature of investigator 	  Date 	  
301 
Appendix D2: 	Questionnaire Booklet Experiment 6 
Notes 
Each questionnaire booklet was made up of a number of sections. 
The available sections were: 
a. Questions type "D&B", for 'self , 	 with scales 	(1+2 pp) 
b. Questions type "D&B", for 'self', without scales (2 pp) 
c. Questions type "D&B" for 'ay student' and 'self with scales 	(1+3 pp) 
d. Questions type "D&B" for 'ay student' and 'self' without scales (3 pp) 
e. Questions type "S&B" for 'self 	 with scales 	(1+2 pp) 
f. Questions type "S&B" for 'self without scales (2 pp) 
g. Questions type "S&B" for 'ay student' and 'self with scales 	(1+3 pp) 
h. Questions type "S&B" for 'ay student' and 'self' without scales (3 pp) 
i. Final mood rating 	 (1 p) 
j. Post-experimental questionnaire 	 (1 p) 
These sections are reproduced below in the above order (at 80% reduction). 
The questionnaire booklets used by participants were of four types, comprising the 
sections as listed. 
Type A: 
Type B: 
Type C: 
Type D: 
a. e. b. f. i. j. I (Counterbalanced order, 'self type). e. a. f. b. i. j. 
c. d. g. h. i. j. I (Counterbalanced order, 'average' and 'self type). d. c. h. g. i. j. 
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likelihood ratings (D& B) 
On the following pages are some questions about how likely you are to suffer from 
the effects of various practices which could be hazardous to health and about how 
confident you are that you could make various health-related changes. 
Whether or not you are actually trying to change your habits at present, please rate 
how confident you are that your would be able to make yourself do regularly the 
things suggested, if you wanted to. 
Please tell the experimenter when you are ready to continue. 
Do not turn over the page until told to do so. 
Q
uesti ons typ
e "D
&
B", f or 'self', with scal es (first page) 
Likelihood ratings (D&B) 
• Information: Excessive consumption of alcohol is associated with memory problems. 
Given your current and likely future use or non-use of alcohol, how likely do you think you 
are to have memory problems by the age of 70? 
111111111111111111111miliiiiliiilliiiii 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
What do you believe would be your chances of reducing your alcohol intake over the next six 	11111111111iiiiliiiiiiiiiIiiiiIiiiilititi  
months if you decided to? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
How likely do you think you are to have memory problems by the age of 70 if you 	 Iiiiiiiiitliiiiimilmilluilitilliiiil 
maintained your alcohol reduction in this way? 
	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Information: Regular exercise is associated with reduced risk of cardiovascular disease (heart attack or stroke). 
Given your current and likely future exercise level, how likely do you think you are to have 	IiiiiliiiilitililiiiiiiiiiIiiiiIiiiiIiiiii 
cardiovascular disease before the age of 70? 
	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
What do you believe would be your chances of sticking to a regular exercise program over 	111111111111Inliiiilmilliiilimilini  
the next six months if you decided to? 
	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
How likely do you think you are to have a heart attack by the age of 70 if you maintained a 	linilliiillitillitilitilliniiinthilti  
regular exercise program? 
	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Q
uestions t ype "D
&
B", for ' self
, with scales (second page) 
• Information: Excessive fat intake is associated with increased risk of cardiovascular disease (heart attack or stroke). 
Given your current and likely future fat intake, how likely do you think you are to suffer 
cardiovascular disease by the age of 70? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
What do you believe would be your chances of reducing your fat intake over the next six 
months if you decided to? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
How likely do you think you are to have cardiovascular disease by the age of 70 if you 
maintained your fat reduction in this way? Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Information: Daily intake of fresh fruit and vegetables provides protection against heart attack, stroke, cancer and other illnesses. 
Given your current and likely future fruit and vegetable intake, how likely do you think you 
are to have a heart attack, stroke or cancer before the age of 70? 
	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
What do you think are your chances of increasing your fruit and vegetable intake over the 	 II uttitti lilt iii 11111111111 tI iii hut iii 
next six months if you decided to? 	 very likely 	 Very unlikely 
How likely do you think you are to have a heart attack, stroke or cancer by the age of 70 if 	lu liii tutu it iii ti iii iii tutu tttj 
you maintained your increased fruit and vegetable intake? 
	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Information: Exposure of uncovered skin to ultra-violet rays from the sun is associated with increased risk of skin cancer. 
Given your current and likely future exposure to the sun, how likely do you think you are to 
have contracted skin cancer before the age of 70? 
What do you believe would be your chances of increasingyour use of blockout (15+) and/or 
wearing sun-protective clothing over the next summer if you decided to? 
How likely do you think you are to have contracted skin cancer by the age of 70 if you have 
used blockout (15+) and/or worn protective clothing? 
Q
uesti ons typ
e
 "D
&
B", f or 'self', w
ith
 scales (thi rd
 page) 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
It111111111111111111111111111111111111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Likelihood ratings (D& B) 
• Information: Excessive consumption of alcohol is associated with memory problems. 
Given your current and likely future use or non-use of alcohol, how likely do you think you 
are to have memory problems by the age of 70? 
What do you believe would be your chances of reducing your alcohol intake over the next six 
months if you decided to? 
How likely do you think you are to have memory problems by the age of 70 if you 
maintained your alcohol reduction in this way? 
• Information: Regular exercise is associated with reduced risk of cardiovascular disease (heart attack or stroke). 
Given your current and likely future exercise level, how likely do you think you are to have 
cardiovascular disease before the age of 70? 
What do you believe would be your chances of sticking to a regular exercise program over 
the next six months if you decided to? 
How likely do you think you are to have a heart attack by the age of 70 if you maintained a 
regular exercise program? 
Q
uestions typ
e "D
&
B" , for ' self
, without scales (first page) 
• Information: Excessive fat intake is associated with increased risk of cardiovascular disease (heart attack or stroke). 
Given your current and likely future fat intake, how likely do you think you are to suffer 
cardiovascular disease by the age of 70? 
What do you believe would be your chances of reducing your fat intake over the next six 
months if you decided to? 
How likely do you think you are to have cardiovascular disease by the age of 70 if you 
maintained your fat reduction in this way? 
• Information: Daily intake of fresh fruit and vegetables provides protection against heart attack, stroke, cancer and other illnesses. 
Given your current and likely future fruit and vegetable intake, how likely do you think you 
are to have a heart attack, stroke or cancer before the age of 70? 
What do you think are your chances of increasing your fruit and vegetable intake over the 
next six months if you decided to? 
How likely do you think you are to have a heart attack, stroke or cancer by the age of 70 if 
you maintained your increased fruit and vegetable intake? 
• Information: Exposure of uncovered skin to ultra-violet rays from the sun is associated with increased risk of skin cancer. 
Given your current and likely future exposure to the sun, how likely do you think you are to 
have contracted skin cancer before the age of 70? 
What do you believe would be your chances of increasing your use of blockout (15+) and/or 
wearing sun-protective clothing over the next summer if you decided to? 
How likely do you think you are to have contracted skin cancer by the age of 70 if you have 
used blockout (15+) and/or worn protective clothing? 
Q
uestio n
s typ
e
 "D
&B", for 'self
, w
i thou
t scales (second  page) 
Likelihood ratings (D& B) 
On the following pages are some questions about the likelihood of a person suffering 
from the effects of various practices which could be hazardous to health and about 
their confidence in making various health-related changes. 
For each item, please indicate on the scale, first, the ratings you think the average 
student would make, and, second, the ratings you would make (whether or not you 
are actually trying to change your habits at present). Please rate how confident you 
think they, and then you, would be that they/you would be able to do regularly the 
things suggested if they/you wanted to. 
Please tell the experimenter when you are ready to continue. 
Do not turn over the page until told to do so. 
Q
uesti ons typ
e "D&
B", for 'ay stud ent'  and  'self', with scales (fi rst page) 
• Information: Excessive consumption of alcohol is associated with memory problems. 
Likelihood ratings (D& B) 
Given their/your current and likely future use or non-use of alcohol, how 
likely do you think they/you are to have memory problems by the age 
of 70? 
What do you believe would be their/your chances of reducing their/your 
alcohol intake over the next six months if you decided to? 
How likely do you think they/you are to have memory problems by the 
age of 70 if they/you maintained your alcohol reduction in this way? 
Av. Uni student: 	11111111111111111itilitilliiiiiiiiiIiiiil 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Iiirrliii1111111111111iiiliiirlirtilirtil 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 	11111111111111111111111111111111millill  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 	Iiiiilitirliiii11111111111111[11111111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 
	
liii1111111111111111111111111111111111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 
Yourself: 
Section
 c.
 Q
uestions ty p
e
 "D
&
B" , for `ay
 student'  and ' sel f', w
ith
 scales (second  page) 
Yourself: 
How likely do you think they/you are to have cardiovascular disease by 
the age of 70 if you maintained their/your fat reduction in this way? 
Av. Uni student: 
Yourself: 
• Information: Regular exercise is associated with reduced risk of cardiovascular disease (heart attack or stroke). 
Given your/their current and likely future exercise level, how likely do 
you think they/you are to have cardiovascular disease before the age of 
70? 
How likely do you think they/you are to have a heart attack by the age of 
70 if they/you maintained a regular exercise program? 
Av. Uni student: 	hill111111111111111111111IIIIIIIIilliiil  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
11111111111111 iii ii ilitiiliiti liii iii iiil 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
----- -- 
Iiiirliiii 1 11111111111111111111111111 11 11 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
11111111111111111111111111111111111111111 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 	IIIIIIiIIIIIII11111111111111111iiiihilli  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
IiiiiIiiii11111111111111111111111illiiiii  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 	11111111111111111iiiiii111111111111111niil 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
11111hill1111111111111111111111111111111 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Iii tilt Ititlitili ii it iiiiliitlititltii ij 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Given their/your current and likely future fat intake, how likely do you 
think they/you are to suffer cardiovascular disease by the age of 70? 
What do you believe would be their/your chances of reducing their/your 
fat intake over the next six months if you decided to? 
Yourself: 
What do you believe would be their/your chances of sticking to a regular 	Av. Uni student: 
exercise program over the next six months if they/you decided to? 
Yourself: 
Av. Uni student: 
Yourself: 
• Information: Excessive fat intake is associated with increased risk of cardiovascular disease (heart attack or stroke). 
Yourself: 
Q
uestions type " D
&
B", for 'ay student'  and  'self
, with scales (third page) 
• Information: Daily intake of fresh fruit and vegetables provides protection against heart attack, stroke, cancer and other illnesses. 
Given their/your current and likely future fruit and vegetable intake, how 
likely do you think they/you are to have a heart attack, stroke or cancer 
before the age of 70? 
How likely do you think they/you are to have a heart attack, stroke or 
cancer by the age of 70 if they/you maintained your increased fruit and 
vegetable intake? 
Given their/your current and likely future exposure to the sun, how likely 
do you think they/you are to have contracted skin cancer before the age 
of 70? 
What do you believe would be their/your chances of increasing their/your 
use of blockout (15+) and/or weanng sun-protective clothing over the 
next summer if they/you decided to? 
How likely do you think they/you are to have contracted skin cancer by 
the age of 70 if they/you have used blockout (15+) and/or worn 
protective clothing? 
Av. Uni student: 	IIII1111111111111111111111111111111111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 	lintlirtili1111111111111111111111iIrrill  Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
iriirlirrtlirrilirilliritlirrilirrilirril  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
111111111111111111111111111111111111111ii  
Very unlikely 
I iirrIrrirlititlirrilirrilirirliiirlirirl  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
liii iii ii 	liii 11111 iii 	tilt Ii 1 1 111111 iiii 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 	111111111111111111111111111111111111mil 
	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
lin1111111111111ritirrithriltril11111111 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 	Jitiilllillilitliiillitiiliiiiltiiiltiiil 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 	11111111111111111111111111111111Iiillilil  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 	I1 	Ii till I itil in 	iii ilt it i tin liii ii 
Very likely Very unlikely 
Yourself' 	1111111111111111111111111111111111111111  Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Section
 c.
 Q
uesti ons ty
p
e " D
&
B", for 'ay
 student'  and ' self
, w
ith
 scales (fourth page) 
What do you think are their/your chances of increasing their/your fruit 	Av. Uni student: 
and vegetable intake over the next six months if you decided to? 
Yourself: 
Very likely 
Av. Uni student: 
Yourself: 
• Information: Exposure of uncovered skin to ultra-violet rays from the sun is associated with increased risk of skin cancer. 
Yourself: 
likelihood ratings (D& B) 
• Information: Excessive consumption of alcohol is associated with memory problems. 
Given their/your current and likely future use or non-use of alcohol, how 
likely do you think they/you are to have memory problems by the age 
of 70? 
What do you believe would be their/your chances of reducing their/your 
alcohol intake over the next six months if you decided to? 
How likely do you think they/you are to have memory problems by the 
age of 70 if they/you maintained your alcohol reduction in this way? 
Q
uesti ons type "D
&
B
", for ' ay student'  and  'self
, wi thout scales 
• Information: Regular exercise is associated with reduced risk of cardiovascular disease (heart attack or stroke). 
Given your/their current and likely future exercise level, how likely do 
you think they/you are to have cardiovascular disease before the age of 
70? 
What do you believe would be their/your chances of sticking to a regular 
exercise program over the next six months if they/you decided to? 
How likely do you think they/you are to have a heart attack by the age of 
70 if they/you maintained a regular exercise program? 
• Information: Excessive fat intake is associated with increased risk of cardiovascular disease (heart attack or stroke). 
Given their/your current and likely future fat intake, how likely do you 
think they/you are to suffer cardiovascular disease by the age of 70? 
What do you believe would be their/your chances of reducing their/your 
fat intake over the next six months if you decided to? 
How likely do you think they/you are to have cardiovascular disease by 
the age of 70 if you maintained their/your fat reduction in this way? 
Q
ue sti ons typ
e
 "D
&B", for 'ay student'  and  'self', w
ithout scales 
• Information: Daily intake of fresh fruit and vegetables provides protection against heart attack, stroke, cancer and other illnesses. 
Given their/your current and likely future fruit and vegetable intake, how 
likely do you think they/you are to have a heart attack, stroke or cancer 
before the age of 70? 
What do you think are their/your chances of increasing their/your fruit 
and vegetable intake over the next six months if you decided to? 
-..•---•----•,•-•.------- 
How likely do you think they/you are to have a heart attack, stroke or 
cancer by the age of 70 if they/you maintained your increased fruit and 
vegetable intake? 
• Information: Exposure of uncovered skin to ultra-violet rays from the sun is associated with increased risk of skin cancer. 
Given their/your current and likely future exposure to the sun, how likely 
do you think they/you are to have contracted skin cancer before the age 
of 70? 
What do you believe would be their/your chances of increasing their/your 
use of blockout (15+) and/or wearing sun-protective clothing.over the 
next summer if they/you decided to? 
How likely do you think they/you are to have contracted skin cancer by 
the age of 70 if they/you have used blockout (15+) and/or worn 
protective clothing? 
Q
uestions ty
p
e "D
&
B", for 'ay student'  and  'self', w
ithou
t scales 
likelihood ratings (S& B) 
For each of the following items, please use the scale to indicate the likelihood that 
you will experience the situation at some stage in your life. 
Please tell the experimenter when you are ready to continue. 
Do not turn over the page until told to do so. 
Q
uestions type "S&
B", for ' self
, with scales (fi rst page) 
• Being the victim of a violent street crime. 	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Developing high blood pressure. 
• Becoming an alcoholic. 
1111(1111111iirliiirlirrillitilliirlitrii 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Itiri111111111111111111111111111111111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
likelihood ratings (S& B) 
• Contracting some form of cancer. 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Being a victim of fire. 	 IrritIrrirltrirlirillirrilirrilliirlirril 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Achieving great cardiac fitness. 	 Ii ii tliiii ii tilittilili iii titl iii iii liii 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Regularly maintaining a well balanced diet. 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Q
uestions type "S&
B", for 'sel f
, with scales (second  page) 
• Developing diabetes. 	 It (111111 iii iiilt 'liii II iii it iliii iii iiii 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Regularly maintaining an exercise program. Irrirltritlitirlritilitillttirliiirliiill 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Lowering cholesterol levels. 
• Developing arthritis. 
hirillirilitillittillirrlirrilirrilliril 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
111111111111111111111iiir11111111111iiiil  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Being involved in a car accident. 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Having a stroke. 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Learning relaxation skills and reducing tension. 	11111111111111111IIIIIIIII111111111ffilii 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Reducing exposure to toxic substances. 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Q
uestions
 type "S&
B
", for `self, w
ith
 scales (third  page) 
likelihood ratings (S& B) 
• Contracting some form of cancer. 
• Being a victim of fire. 
• Achieving great cardiac fitness. 
• Being the victim of a violent street crime. 
• Developing high blood pressure. 
• Becoming an alcoholic. 
• Regularly maintaining a well balanced diet. 
Q
uestions type "S&
B", for ' self
 withou
t scal es (first page) 
• Developing diabetes. 
• Regularly maintaining an exercise program. 
• Lowering cholesterol levels. 
• Developing arthritis. 
• Being involved in a car accident. 
• Having a stroke. 
• Learning relaxation skills and reducing tension. 
• Reducing exposure to toxic substances. 
Q
uestions typ
e
 "S&
B", for 'self
 w
ithou
t scales (second  page) 
Likelihood ratings (S& B) 
For each of the following items, please use the scale to indicate, first, the likelihood 
that the average student your age would experience the situation in their lifetime and, 
second, the likelihood that you will experience the situation at some stage in your 
life. 
Please tell the experimenter when you are ready to continue. 
Do not turn over the page until told to do so. 
Q
uestions type " S&
B" , for 'ay student'  and  'self', with
 scales (first page) 
Likelihood ratings (S& B) 
Av. Uni student: 	11111111111iiiiiiitiliiii111111111111iiii  
Veil/ likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 1111111111111111[111111111111iliiiiltuti  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 	 m m 11111111111111111111111111ilillild 
	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 	Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 	II11111111111111111111111111111111111iiii  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 	Itttiittitittttittitltitiittttitttiitttil 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
1111111111/1111iI111111111111111111111111  
111111111111111 	tijitittitittititil Yourself: 	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Contracting some form of cancer. 
• Being a victim of fire. 
• Achieving great cardiac fitness. 
• Being the victim of a violent street crime. 
• Developing high blood pressure. 
S ecti on
 g.
 Q
uestions
 type "S&
B
" , for 'ay
 student'  and ' sel f', w
ith
 scales
 (second page) 
lirtillitiltiirliiiiiiiiiiiirtlirriliiiii 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Iiiirli iiiltitilirtillitillii ilir riltriti 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Becoming an alcoholic. 	 Av. Uni student: 
Yourself: 
Yourself: lirrilirrilirrilirriltitillitilitillirril 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: Itrirlirriliiiillirilittilirrili111111111 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 
Yourself: 	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: hilithiti1111111111111111111111111111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 111111111111111111111111111111111111iiiii  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 	J I tilt ill liiiil 111111 lit! 111111111111111 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student 	Phhhhuhhhhlhuhhuuuhhhhhuhhhhhhhhhl it iii 1 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
1v. Uni student: 	Ililiiirrli11111111111111111111111011111 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Regularly maintaining a well balanced diet. 
• Developing diabetes. 
• Regularly maintaining an exercise program. 
• Lowering cholesterol levels. 
• Developing arthritis. 
Q
uesti ons type " S
&
B
", for 'ay
 student'  and  'sel f', w
ith  scales (third  page) 
-  
Av. Uni student: 	lirirlitritirirlitirlitrillirrirrillitill  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 	Irrriltrill1111111111111ilitrilliirlirtri  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 	IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIHIIIIIIII I ii il iitiliiiil 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 
	
Iririlliiiii111111111millitiliiii111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 	IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII1111111111111111 Hifi 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 	irrirlirrilirtrIrrillirriliiirlirrillirri 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 	Iiiiiiiiitimiltillii1111111111111111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 
	
hrir1111111rirrIrrirlirirlirirlirrrilirrii 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Being involved in a car accident. 
• Having a stroke. 
• Learning relaxation skills and reducing tension. 
• Reducing exposure to toxic substances. 
Q
uestions type "S&
B
", for 'ay
 student'  and  'sel f
, w
ith  scales
 (fourth  page) 
-  
Likelihood ratings (S& B) 
• Contracting some form of cancer. 
• Being a victim of fire. 
• Achieving great cardiac fitness. 
• Being the victim of a violent street crime. 
• Developing high blood pressure. 
Q
uestions ty
p
e "S&
B", for 'a
y stud ent'  and 'self', w
ithou
t scales 
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Q
uestions type "S&
B
", for ' ay st udent'  and 'self', w
ithou
t scales 
• Becoming an alcoholic. 
• Regularly maintaining a well balanced diet. 
• Developing diabetes. 
• Regularly maintaining an exercise program. 
• Lowering cholesterol levels. 
• Developing arthritis. 
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Section h. 	Questions type "S&B", for 'ay student' and 'self, without scales 
(third page) 
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Please read the following word pairs and mark with an "X" the position on the scale 
that refers to you at this moment. 
Iiiiilittilliiiliiiiiiiiiliiiilliiiliiiii 
Alert 	 Drowsy 
IiiiilitilliiiiIiiiilitilliiiiiiiiiiiiiii 
Sad 	 Happy 
hitiliiiiliiiiIiiiiiiiiililithiiiiiiiii 
Dreamy 	 Attentive 
End of Experiment 
Thank you for your participation. 
Sw
im
  p
oo
w
  iv
ul
d  
Post - experimental questionnaire 
Has anything affected your mood over the last few days? Yes / No (Please circle). 
If yes, please indicate whether this is likely to have made you happier or sadder than usual: Happier / Sadder (Please circle). 
Before your debriefing, are there any other comments you would like to make? 
Post-experim
ental questionnaire 
Appendix E 
Protocols for Experiment 7 
Appendix El Participant Consent Form 
Appendix E2: Health Inventory 
Appendix E3: Mood Induction Scripts ("Autobiographical Memory Inventory") 
Appendix E4: . Questionnaire Booklet 
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Appendix El: 	Participant Consent Form for Experiment 7 
Health and Social Cognition Laboratory 
Participant Consent Form 
Information for participants in health judgment studies 
The research in which you are participating is broadly concerned with factors affecting 
social judgments, that is judgments which involve people or social issues. This 
particular experiment is concerned with health-related judgments. 
If you agree to participate, please sign and date this form after carefully reading the 
following section: 
I consent to taking part in a psychological experiment on health-related judgment. I 
understand that this will involve answering some questions and making judgments 
about statements on health-related issues. I also understand that I may withdraw from 
the experiment at any time without prejudice. 
I have read the information above and any questions I have asked have been answered 
to my satisfaction. 
I agree that research data gathered for the study may be published provided that I cannot 
be identified as a subject. 
Signature of participant 	  Date 	  
Name: 	  
Telephone Number: 	  
I have explained this project and the implications of participation in it to this volunteer 
and I believe that the consent is informed and that s/he understands the implications of 
participation. 
Signature of investigator 	  Date 	  
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Appendix E2: 	Health Inventory 
Health Inventory 
Below is a list of physical troubles. Please indicate which of these has bothered you during the 
past week, and which of these are also bothering you tody. 
Then rate how much discomfort, on average, each of these symptoms has caused you during 
the past week. 
Please rate them by circling the appropriate answer. 
Today Past Week 	Amount of discomfort 
None 	Little Some Moderate Severe 
1. Nausea 	 yes no 	yes no 
2. Headache 	 yes no 	yes no 
3. Neck aches and pains yes no 	yes no 
4. Flashes of hot and cold yes no 	yes no 
5. Aches and pains 	yes no 	yes no 
6. Shakiness 	 yes no 	yes no 
7. Difficulty sleeping 	yes no 	yes no 
8. Back aches 	yes no 	yes no 
9. Stomach trouble 	yes no 	yes no 
10. Stuffy nose 	yes no 	yes no 
11. Sore throat 	yes no 	yes no 
12. Excessive perspiration yes no 	yes no 
13. Runny nose 	yes no 	yes no 
14. Fever (high temperature) yes no 	yes no 
15. Feeling tired 	yes no 	yes no 
16. Itchy or watery eyes 	yes no 	yes no 
17. Muscular weakness 	yes no 	yes no 
18. Dizzy spells 	yes no 	yes no 
19. Difficulty breathing 	yes no 	yes no 
20. Sleeping to excess 	yes no 	yes no 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
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21. Difficulty swallowing yes no 	yes no 
22. Muscular tension 	yes no 	yes no 
23. Appetite changes 	yes no 	yes no 
24. Bowel trouble 	yes no 	yes no 
25. Vomiting 	 yes no 	yes no 
26. Chest pains 	yes no 	yes no 
27. Coughing 	 yes no 	yes no 
28. Sleepiness 	yes no 	yes no 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
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Appendix E3: 	Scripts for Autobiographical Mood Inductions. 
For Happy Mood Induction 
Autobiographical Memory Inventory 
Please think about a happy event in your life and write about it. As you do this, try to 
relive the feelings you had at the time. 
1. See all the details of the situation. Picture the surroundings and then write a 
description of them. 
2. See the people or objects and write a description of them. 
3. Hear the sounds and experience the event happening to you. Describe what you 
are experiencing. 
4. Think the thoughts you actually thought in this situation. What are they? 
5. Feel the same happy feelings you felt. Let yourself react as if you were actually 
there. Describe what is happening to you. 
Take your time as you will have ten minutes to write down your memories. 
For Sad Mood induction 
Autobiographical Memory Inventory 
Please think about a sad event in your life and write about it. As you do this, try to 
relive the feelings you had at the time. 
1. See all the details of the situation. Picture the surroundings and then write a 
description of them. 
2. See the people or objects and write a description of them. 
3. Hear the sounds and experience the event happening to you. Describe what you 
are experiencing. 
4. Think the thoughts you actually thought in this situation. What are they? 
5. Feel the same sad feelings you felt. Let yourself react as if you were actually 
there. Describe what is happening to you. 
Take your time as you will have ten minutes to write down your memories. 
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Appendix E4: 	Questionnaire Booklet 
Notes 
Each questionnaire booklet was made up of a number of sections. 
The available sections were: 
a. An instruction page for answering the visual analogue scales etc. 	(1 p) 
b. Questions type "D&B", for 'self', 	 with scales 	(1+2 pp) 
c. Questions type "D&B" for 'ay student' and 'self' with scales 	(1+3 pp) 
d. Questions type "S&B" for 'self 	 with scales 	(1+2 pp) 
e. Questions type "S&B" for 'ay student' and 'self' with scales 	(1+3 pp) 
f. Final mood rating 	 (1 p) 
g. Post-experimental questionnaire 	 1)) 
(Sections b. to e. each contain an extra, introductory, explanatory page.) 
These sections are reproduced below in the above order (at 80% reduction). 
The questionnaire booklets used by participants were of four types, comprising the 
sections as listed. 
Type A: 
Type B: 
Type C: 
Type D: 
a. b. d. f. g. I a. d. b. f. g. 	(Counterbalanced order, 'self' type). 
a. c. e. f. g I a. e. c. f. 	(Counterbalanced order, 'average' and 'self type). 
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A 44ealth Ratings Experiment 
You will be asked to answer a number of questions. 
You are asked to do this by putting a line through a scale to indicate your rating. 
For example, if you were asked to indicate your statistics ability, you would put a line through the scale at the appropriate place. 
If you were quite good at statistics you might put your line as shown. 
e.g. Indicate your statistics ability 	 11111111111111111111111111 	iiiiiiilliiil 
Hopeless 	 Exceptional 
You will also be asked to note down the time on the display clock at various stages during the experiment. It is important to note the time 
accurately. 
Please give your age: 	 (years) 
Are you: 	Male Female (please circle) 
Instruction page for answ
erin g
 the
 visual analogue scales
 etc. 
t-tealth Ratings Experiment 
On the following pages are some questions about how likely you are to suffer from 
the effects of various practices which could be hazardous to health and about how 
confident you are that you could make various health-related changes. 
Whether or not you are actually trying to change your habits at present, please rate 
how confident you are that your would be able to make yourself do regularly the 
things suggested, if you wanted to. 
Please note down the time from the display clock then turn over immediately and begin. 
Q
uestions type "D
&
B", for 'sel f
 (intro page) 
Likelihood ratings (D & B) 
• Information: Regular exercise is associated with reduced risk of cardiovascular disease (heart attack or stroke). 
Given your current and likely future exercise level, how likely do you think you are to have 
cardiovascular disease before the age of 70? 	 very likely 	 Very unlikely 
What do you believe would be your chances of sticking to a regular exercise program over 	liii iii u 1111111111111111111111111 111111 I 
the next six months if you decided to? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
How likely do you think you are to have a heart attack by the age of 70 if you maintained a 
regular exercise program? 	 very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Information: Excessive fat intake is associated with increased risk of cardiovascular disease (heart attack or stroke). 
Given your current and likely future fat intake, how likely do you think you are to suffer 	 Iiiiiliiiiliitiliiiiliiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiil  cardiovascular disease by the age of 70? 	 very likely 	 Very unlikely 
What do you believe would be your chances of reducing your fat intake over the next six 
months if you decided to? 
	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
How likely do you think you are to have cardiovascular disease by the age of 70 if you 
maintained your fat reduction in this way? 
	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Q
uestions typ
e "D
&
B", for 'self
 (first page) 
c,) 
Q
uestions typ
e
 "D
&
B", for 'self'  (second  page) 
• Information: Daily intake of fresh fruit and vegetables provides protection against heart attack, stroke, cancer and other illnesses. 
Given your current and likely future fruit and vegetable intake, how likely do you think you 
are to have a heart attack, stroke or cancer before the age of 70? 
Imiliii1111111111111111111111irrilirrii  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
What do you think are your chances of increasing your fruit and vegetable intake over the 	Iii 	iii i u ti 	ii nut iii utul u"'  
next six months if you decided to? 	 very likely Very unlikely 
How likely do you think you are to have a heart attack, stroke or cancer by the age of 70 if 	Iiitulutiilitiliuilnitiliiiilitiiliinil 
you maintained your increased fruit and vegetable intake? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Information: Exposure of uncovered skin to ultra-violet rays from the sun is associated with increased risk of skin cancer. 
Given your current and likely future exposure to the sun, how likely do you think you are to 
have contracted skin cancer before the age of 70? Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
What do you believe would be your chances of increasing your use of blockout (15+) and/or 	Iiiiiluiiuliuitluiutluutuluuiulcuuiltiiul  
wearing sun-protective clothing over the next summer if you decided to? 
	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
How likely do you think you are to have contracted skin cancer by the age of 70 if you have 
used blockout (15+) and/or worn protective clothing? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Please note down the time from the display clock 
I• 
min 	SRC then turn over. 
cia ce. t-) z.. o 
D 
Q
uestions typ
e " D&
B", for 'a y
 stud ent'  and  'self'  (i ntroductory page) 
Likelihood ratings (D & B) 
Please note down the time from the display clock I mm 
. . 
n 	sec I 
On the following pages are some questions about the likelihood of a person suffering 
from the effects of various practices which could be hazardous to health and about 
their confidence in making various health-related changes. 
For each item, please indicate on the scale, first, the ratings you think the average 
student would make, and, second, the ratings you would make (whether or not you 
are actually trying to change your habits at present). Please rate how confident you 
think they, and then you, would be that they/you would be able to do regularly the 
things suggested if they/you wanted to. 
then turn over immediately and begin. 
ce) 
Q
uestions type "D
&
B", for 'ay student'  and  'self'  (first pa ge) 
Likelihood ratings (D & B) 
• Information: Regular exercise is associated with reduced risk of cardiovascular disease (heart attack or stroke). 
Given your/their current and likely future exercise level, how likely do 
you think they/you are to have cardiovascular disease before the age of 
70? 
What do you believe would be their/your chances of sticking to a regular 
exercise program over the next six months if they/you decided to? 
How likely do you think they/you are to have a heart attack by the age of 
70 if they/you maintained a regular exercise program? 
Av. Uni student: 	IiiiIIIIIIII111111111111111111111111iiill  Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 	Iriri1111111111111111111111111111111iiiii  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
	
Av. Uni student: 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
I itti liii iii 111111111 iii iii titi iii iii ii  
Yourself: 	Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Information: Excessive fat intake is associated with increased risk of cardiovascular disease (heart attack or stroke). 
  
           
•- • - - • - • 	- • - - • - • • 	 - • • - • • • - 
Given their/your current and likely future fat intake, how likely do you 
think they/you are to suffer cardiovascular disease by the age of 70? 
What do you believe would be their/your chances of reducing their/your 
fat intake over the next six months if you decided to? 
How likely do you think they/you are to have cardiovascular disease by 
the age of 70 if you maintained their/your fat reduction in this way? 
Given their/your current and likely future fruit and vegetable intake, how 
likely do you think they/you are to have a heart attack, stroke or cancer 
before the age of 70? 
How likely do you think they/you are to have a heart attack, stroke or 
cancer by the age of 70 if they/you maintained your increased fruit and 
vegetable intake? 
Av. Uni student: 	1111111111111111111111111111101111111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 	Irirrlirrirlirrilli111111111111111rilirril  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 	I 1111111111111111111111111111111111111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 	111111111111u 111111111111111111111111111 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Ilittlirriltrill11111111iliiiiirrilltrill  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
	
Av. Uni student: 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
11111111111111111111111111111111111111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
11111111111111111111111111111111111111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
I titiliiiiirrillitriliiirlirril r111111111 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Iirrilirrilittilitirlirlilirilliiiilirril 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 
Yourself' 
• Information: Daily intake of fresh fruit and vegetables provides protection against heart attack, stroke, cancer and other illnesses. 
What do you think are their/your chances of increasing their/your fruit 	Av. Uni student: 
and vegetable intake over the next six months if you decided to? 
Yourself: 
Av. Uni student: 
Yourself: 
Q
uestions type "D
&B
", for 'ay student'  and  'self'  (second page) 
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• Information: Exposure of uncovered skin to ultra-violet rays from the sun is associated with increased risk of skin cancer. 
Given their/your current and likely future exposure to the sun, how likely 
do you think they/you are to have contracted skin cancer before the age 
of 70? 
What do you believe would be their/your chances of increasing their/your 
use of blockout (15+) and/or wearing sun-protective clothing over the 
next summer if they/you decided to? 
How likely do you think they/you are to have contracted skin cancer by 
the age of 70 if they/you have used blockout (15+) and/or worn 
protective clothing? 
Av. Uni student: 	Iiiiiliiiiliiiiliititiiiiltiiiliiiiliiiil Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 	111111111111iiiiiirrittirliirr11111111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
111111111111111111111111111111 	I 11 I I 	11 II 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
illirliiiilliriltrirlirriliirilirrilliiii 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 
Yourself: 
Yourself: 
Please note down the time from the display clock I min 	sec I then turn over. 
Likelihood ratings (s &B) 
For each of the following items, please use the scale to indicate the likelihood that 
you will experience the situation at some stage in your life. 
Please note down the time from the display clock 
• . I min 	sec I then turn over immediately and continue. 
Q
uestions
 type "S&
B
", for 'self
 (introductory page) 
Likelihood ratings (s & B) 
11111111111111111111111111111111111111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Irrilliiirliritliiirlirrilirirlirrilliril  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Iiiiilirrilittilirrilirrilirillirrilirril 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
IirrilliiiIrritIrrirliiiiliiiiiiiirlirril 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Becoming an alcoholic. 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Regularly maintaining a well balanced diet. 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Developing diabetes. Illiillilillilltillillitill11111111111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Regularly maintaining an exercise program. 	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Contracting some form of cancer. 
• Being a victim of fire. 
• Achieving great cardiac fitness. 
• Developing high blood pressure. 
Q
uestions type "S&
B", for 'self'  (first page) tk3 
• Learning relaxation skills and reducing tension. 	IIIIIIIiitIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII mil 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Maintaining ideal body weight. 	 1111111111111,11111111111111111inilimi  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Reducing exposure to toxic substances. 	 lirriliiiilitirlintii1111111111111111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Please note down the time from the display clock 
. . 
mm  r -7Fc— I 
• Lowering cholesterol levels. 
• Developing arthritis. 
• Being involved in a car accident. 
• Being in great physical shape. 
• Having a stroke. 
hitilitriliiirliiirlitriliiirliiiiliiiil  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
IrrirlirrilirrillirrirrirlririliiiiIiiiii 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
lull I i ii il I11111111111111111111111111111 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Iiiirlritilritilirrilirirlirtritrirlirril 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
IiiiihriiII1111111iiiiirlirril11111111ii  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
then turn over. 
C;) 
Q
uestion
s type "S
&
B
", for 'self'  (second page) 
   
then turn over immediately and begin. 
Likelihood ratings (S & B) 
For each of the following items, please use the scale to indicate, first, the likelihood 
that the average student your age would experience the situation in their lifetime and, 
second, the likelihood that you will experience the situation at some stage in your 
life. 
Please note down the time from the display clock 
Q
uestions type "S&
B
", for 'ay student'  and  'self'  (introductory
 page) 
Likelihood ratings (s&B) 
• Contracting some form of cancer. Av. Uni student 	IiiiIIIIII1111111111111111111111111111,111 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 
• Being a victim of fire. 	 Av. Uni student: 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 	IIIIIIIIIIIIIII111111111111111111111111 I 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Achieving great cardiac fitness. 	 Av. Uni student 	Iuuuuiiuiuiu 111111111111 Iuuuuliiuu till ii 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 	Irtrillirrlirillririlltrilirrilitrilirril Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Developing high blood pressure. 	 Av. Uni student: 	111111111111111111111111111itil  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 	1111111111j1111111111111111.1111111111 it 11 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Becoming an alcoholic. 	 Av. Uni student: 	IiiiiiiiiiIrriillirriiiiiIiiiiIiiirlirril  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Iiiriltiriliritliiiiiirrilutilirriltrill  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 
Q
uestions type "S&
B" , for ' ay student'  and `self'  (first page) 
Yourself: 
Av. Uni student: 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
rill 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 
Av. Uni student: 
4v. Uni student: 	1111111111111111111111111111111111111itil  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
I 	ir 	I 	it 11 r II 111 111111111111111111111111 
Very likely Very unlikely 
• Developing arthritis. Av. Uni student: 
Yourself: 	Itttiitiittttttiitttltuttittttititiittttl 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
•••-mm•-••---•-••^-----^^^-•------••••--•---•,-•••-•••---------- 
1 111.1 1111111111[mi 111111[111mill lid 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
I1111111111111111111111111111111111111111 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Being involved in a car accident. 	 Av. Uni student: 	1111111IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII 
	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 	1111111110111111111111111111111111111111  
- - Very likely 	
- 	
Very unlikely 
__.........--.------ ------ -....- 
Q
uestions type "S&
B
", fo r 'ay stud ent'  and 'self'  (second  page) 
• Regularly maintaining a well balanced diet. 
• Developing diabetes. 
• Regularly maintaining an exercise program. 
• Lowering cholesterol levels. 
Av. Uni student: 	Itill111111111111111111111111111111111iii  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 	1111111111111111111111111111111[111111111 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 
Q
uestions type "S&
B", for 'ay student'  and  `self'  (third  page) 
Yourself: Iiii111111111111111A11111111111111111111 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 
Av. Uni student: 	IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII111111111111111111111t1  
	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
I I 	1 11 1 11 11 11111111t111111111111111111iii 
Very likely Very unlikely 
• Maintaining ideal body weight. Av. Uni student: 	111111 iii iii itilt It lit itt lit tilt iii It ttt  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: lilt liii iii 11111111111111111 iii titi 	titi 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 
Yourself: 
• Reducing exposure to toxic substances. 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 	11111111111iiiiliiiiiiiiiliiii11111111111 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
11111111111111111111111111111111111111111 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
irii111111111111111iii1111111i11111111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Being in great physical shape. 
• Having a stroke. 
• Learning relaxation skills and reducing tension. 
Please note down the time from the display clock then turn over. 
Yourself: 
Av. Uni student: 
C4 
to 
r.:: 
CS* 
'74, 
Please read the following word pairs and mark, with a line through the scale, the position on the scale 
that refers to you at this moment. 
IiiiiIiiiiiiiiillitiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiil 
Alert 	 Drowsy 
Imiliiiiiiiiiltiiiiiitiliiitliiiillitti 
Sad 	 Happy 
IiiiiIiiiiliiiiltiiiiiitiliiiillitiliiiii 
Dreamy 	 Attentive 
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Please turn over the page and continue. 
Post - experimental questionnaire 
Has anything affected your mood over the last few days? Yes / No (Please circle). 
If yes, please indicate whether this is likely to have made you happier or sadder than usual: Happier / Sadder (Please circle). 
Before discussion with the experimenter, are there any other comments you would like to make? 
Please wait quietly for others to finish. Not all tasks are of equal length. 
End 
Thankyou for your participation. 
Post-experim
ent questionnaire 
Appendix F 
Protocols for Experiment 8 
for Participant Consent Form — See Appendix El 
for Scripts for Autobiographical Mood Inductions — See Appendix E3 
Appendix Fl: Questionnaire Booklets 
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Appendix Fl: 	Questionnaire Booklets 
Notes 
"Dobber" negative items were of four types, depending on the inclusion or omission of 
some initial words to the stem (cue in, cue out) and some closing words after the stem 
(age in, age out). "Dobber" positive questions, and "Salovey and Birnbaum" positive 
and negative items were of a single type. 
For each of these seven, there were two further versions, depending on item target 
(`Self only, 'Self and Average'). 
In summary, the available sections were: 
a. An instruction page for answering the visual analogue scales etc. 
b. An instruction page (used in Salovey & Bimbaum 'Self only versions of booklet). 
C. An instruction page (used in Dobber 'Self only versions of booklet). 
d. An instruction page ('used in Salovey & Bimbaum 'Self and Average' versions of booklet). 
e. An instruction page (used in Dobber 'Self and Average' versions of booklet). 
Self 	 'Self 
Positive items Negative items 
f. Salovey & Birnbaum 	h. Salovey & Birnbaum 
g. Dobber 	 i. Dobber, Cue in, Age in 
j. Dobber, Cue in, Age out 
k. Dobber, Cue out, Age in 
I. Dobber, Cue out, Age out 
'Self & 'AV 
Positive items 
m. Salovey & Bimbaum 
n. Dobber 
 
'Self & 'AV 
Negative items  
o. Salovey & Bimbaum 
p. Dobber, Cue in, Age in 
q. Dobber, Cue in, Age out 
r. Dobber, Cue out, Age in 
s. Dobber, Cue out, Age out 
 
t. Final mood rating 
u. Post-experimental questionnaire 
The questionnaire booklets were compiled from these sections in the following order: 
1 
1 
1 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. J 
11. 1 
12. J 
13. 1 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. J  
a. then 
a. then 	c. 	then 
a.• then 
a. then 	e. 	then 
I 	J  
h. 
f. 
i. 
9. 
then t. then u. 
then t. then u. 
then t. then u. 
then t. then u. 
I 
I. r 
b. 1 J 
1 
then 
     
     
1 
J 
1 
    
d. 
J 
1 
J 
1 
then 
    
    
Note: These sections are reproduced below, (at 80% reduction) from a. to u. 
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A 4ea1th Ratings Experiment 
You will be asked to answer a number of questions. 
You are asked to do this by putting a line through a scale to indicate your rating. 
For example, if you were asked to indicate your statistics ability, you would put a line through the scale at the appropriate place. 
If you were quite good at statistics you might put your line as shown. 
e.g. Indicate your statistics ability 	 111111 111111111111111111 	III toll toil 
Hopeless 	 Exceptional 
You will also be asked to note down the time on the display clock at various stages during the experiment. It is important to note the time 
accurately. 
Please give your age: 	 (years) 
Are you: 	Male Female (please circle) 
Instruction page for answering
 the
 visual  analogue scale
s etc. 
Likelihood ratings (s& B) 
For each of the following items, please use the scale to indicate the likelihood that 
you will experience the situation at some stage in your life. 
Instructions preceding
 Salovey &
  Birnb aum
 ' S elf'  only
 versions of b ooklets 
44ealth Ratings Experiment 
For each of the following questions please use the scale to indicate the likelihood of 
your suffering from the specified illnesses and how confident you are that you could 
make various health-related changes. 
Instructions preceding D
obber ' S elf
 only
 versions of booklets 
t-tealth Ratings Experiment 
For each of the following items please use the scale to indicate, first, the likelihood 
that the average student your age would experience the situation in their lifetime and, 
second, the likelihood that you will experience the situation at some stage in your 
life. 
Instructions preceding Salovey
 &
 Birnbaum
 'Self
 and  Av erage'  versions 
t-tealth Ratings Emperiment 
For each of the following questions please use the scale to indicate the likelihood of 
suffering from the specified illness and confidence in making various health-related 
changes, first for the average student your age, and second for yourself. 
Instructions preceding
 D
obber 'Self and Average'  versions 
I. 
ITIW Apt, I 
1 751.17  • API! I 
Salovey
 &
 B
irnbaum
 item
s, positive
 item
s, 'Self
 only 
Please note down the time from the display clock and start. 
• Achieving great cardiac fitness. 
• Regularly maintaining a well balanced diet. 
Iiii1111111111111111111111111111m111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
pririltrilltrirlirrillirrlirrilirtilrirri 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Regularly maintaining an exercise program. 	 Iiiiiiiiiiiiiiilliiiiiiiilliiihmliitli  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Lowering cholesterol levels. 	 lirirlirriltrifiririlirillirrairrilitirl  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Being in great physical shape. 	 IIIIIIHniiiiiiiiiihniiiiiiiIIIIIIIIII 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Learning relaxation skills and reducing tension. 	IrrirlirrilirrilirrilirtilirirltirtIrrill  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Maintaining ideal body weight. 	 Ititititilliiiiiiitiliiiiiitiiiiioilmil 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Reducing exposure to toxic substances. 	 lirtilirrillitillirritrilliiirtriril11111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Please note down the time from the display clock then turn over. 
Begin here. 
Begin here. Please note down the time from the display clock and start. I • min 	SP!! 
What do you believe would be your chances of sticking to a regular exercise 	program over 1111111111011111111111111111111 	lit, ill ii 
the next six months if you decided to? Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
What do you believe would be your chancesof increasing your use of blockout (15+) and/or 
wearing sun-protective clothing over the next summer if you decided to? Very likely Very unlikely 
What do you believe would be your chances of reducing your intake of salt/salty foods over Imilirrilirrilirriliirilirriliiirlirril 
the next six months if you decided to? Very likely Very unlikely 
What do you believe would be your chances of improving your intake of milk and dairy 
products over the next six months if you decided to? Very likely Very unlikely 
What do you believe would be your chances of increasing the amount of 	fibre in your diet 
over the next six months if you decided to? Very likely Very unlikely 
What do you believe would be your chances of improving your level of dental care over the 	Iiuuiluiiliiiiliuuiliiiiliiiitiiiiliiiil 
next six months if you decided to? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
What do you believe would be your chances of protecting your eyes from exposure to 	high 	Iliiu1iilililiilIuuiIlliili!ii1liIiI1ti ii 
levels of sunlight over the next summer if you decided to? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
What do you believe would be your chances of reducing your exposure to loud music/high 	IlrluIlllIIlulliuIIlIllllIlllliiltlIlllII  
sound levels over the next six months if you decided to? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Please note down the time from the display clock then turn over. 
 
I. 
a 
INF SPC 
D
obb e
r item
s, positive item
s, 'Self'  only 
1 -5—n15— API!  
Salove y
 &
 B
irnbaum
 item
s, negativ
e
 item
s, 'Self'  only 
Begin here. I 	• 11—Tlir son I Please note down the time from the display clock and start. 
• Contracting some form of cancer. 
• Being a victim of fire. 
• Developing high blood pressure. 
• Becoming an alcoholic. 
• Developing diabetes. 
• Developing arthritis. 
• Being involved in a car accident. 
• Having a stroke. 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
11111111111111111111111111111111111111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Iiiiilittilrirrliiiiiiirilirrillirilirril 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
111111 I iiiliiiiI iii iii till III ii 1 111111111 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Iiiii11111111111iiii111111111111111111 ,il 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Please note down the time from the display clock then turn over. 
Begin here. Please note down the time from the display clock and start. 
Given your current and likely future exercise level, how likely do you think you are to 
develop cardiovascular disease (heart attack or stroke) before the age of 70? 
1111111111111111111111111111111 titiliiill 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Given your current and likely future exposure to the sun, how likely do you think you are to 	i iii ii iii nil iiiiliiiili Ii ililillili  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Given your current and likely future use of salt/salty foods, how likely do you think you are 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Given your current and likely future intake of milk and dairy products, how likely do you 	linithiliiiiiillit11111111111iiiiiittill 
think you are to develop osteoporosis before the age of 70? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Given your current and likely future fibre diet, how likely do you think you are to develop 	11111iiiiiiiiiin11111111iiiiiiiiiiiiiill  
bowel disease before the age of 70? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Given your current and future likely level of dental care, how likely do you think you are to 	IIIIIIiiiill1111111111111111101111111111 
develop serious tooth or gum problems before the age of 70? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Given your current and future likely exposure to high levels of sunlight, how likely do you 	11111111111111111111111111111111111111111  
think you are to develop cataracts before the age of 70? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Given your current and future likely exposure to loud music/high sound levels, how likely do 
you think you are to develop deafness before the age of 70? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Please note down the time from the display clock then turn over. 
D
obber item
s , negati ve item
s , 'Self
 only
 (cu
e in, a g
e in) 
contract skin cancer before the age of 70? 
to develop high blood pressure before the age of 70? 
Begin here. 
I. . . 
111 1r set: 
Please note down the time from the display clock and start. 
Given your current and likely future exercise level, how likely do you think you are to 
develop cardiovascular disease (heart attack or stroke)? 
Given your current and likely future exposure to the sun, how likely do you think you are to 
contract skin cancer? 
Iiirili111111111111[111111111111111111111 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Given your current and likely future use of salt/salty foods, how likely do you think you are 
to develop high blood pressure? 
	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Given your current and likely future intake of milk and dairy products, how likely do you 	Iii iii ii iii ii hut iii ii lii tilt it iii itt1 
think you are to develop osteoporosis? 
	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Given your current and likely future fibre diet, how likely do you think you are to develop 	 iutituuuiiutuiiuitilriruiuuuuiuiiiiiriul  
bowel disease? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Given your current and future likely level of dental care, how likely do you think you are to 
develop serious tooth or gum problems? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Given your current and future likely exposure to high levels of sunlight, how likely do you 
think you are to develop cataracts? 
	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Given your current and future likely exposure to loud music/high sound levels, how likely do 
you think you are to develop deafness? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Please note down the time from the display clock then turn over. 
 
I 	
• • 
n1171 RPC I 
D
obber
 item
s, negative i tem
s , ' Self
 only
 (cue in, ag
e out) 
I. 
n1171 RPC I 
Begin here. I min 	RPt, 1 Please note down the time from the display clock and start. 
How likely do you think you are to develop cardiovascular disease (heart attack or stroke) 	limilliivilliiiiiiiiniiiiiiiIIIIIIHI  
before the age of 70? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
How likely do you think you are to contract skin cancer before the age of 70? IiiiiiiiiiiiiiiIiiiiiiiiiliiiiiiiiiliiiil 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
How likely do you think you are to develop high blood pressure before the age of 70? 	 lilitliiiiIiiii111111111111Hihmitilil 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
How likely do you think you are to develop osteoporosis before the age of 70? 	 Iiiiiiiiiiiiiiillitilliilluilhililinil 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
How likely do you think you are to develop bowel disease before the age of 70? 	 Imiliiiiiiiiiiiiithilinflitillitiiiii 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
How likely do you think you are to developserious tooth or gum problems before the age of 	iiiiiiiIIIIIIIIIiiiihtillmilliffiliiil  
70? 	 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
How likely do you think you are to develop eye cataracts before the age of 70? 	 Iiiiilliitliii111111111111iiiiIiiiiIiiiii 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
How likely do you think you are to develop deafness before the age of 70? I mill ii tl iiiiltiliii il iliii 11 1 ii 1 I itIll 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Please note down the time from the display clock then turn over. 
D
obber item
s , negative item
s, 'Self
 only
 (cue out, ag
e in) `t3 
Begin here. I MM 	sett 1 Please note down the time from the display clock and start. 
I llithrilliiiilirrrilirrIririlliirliiiil 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Imilliriltrillittilliiiilirrilirilltirri  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Iriirlirrillirrlirtiltrrilmillitillittil 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
iririlirirlirriltrtrirrirliritliirrltilil 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Imilliirliii11111111iithrirlirrillirri  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
IiiiiIiiiiirrirliritintilimliirrhirri 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Imiliiirlirrilirriltirrliirrliiirlirtil 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Iiirilliirliirillitifirillirrilimilliril 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
How likely do you think you are to develop cardiovascular disease (heart attack or stroke)? 
How likely do you think you are to contract skin cancer? 
How likely do you think you are to develop high blood pressure? 
How likely do you think you are to develop osteoporosis? 
How likely do you think you are to develop bowel disease? 
How likely do you think you are to develop serious tooth or gum problems? 
How likely do you think you are to develop cataracts? 
How likely do you think you are to develop deafness? 
D
obb er
 item
s, negative i tem
s , 'Self
 only
 (cu
e out, ag
e out) 
Please note down the time from the display clock then turn over. 
 
. • 
IlinF SW! 1 
Very likely Very unlikely 
Yourself: Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Begin here. Please note down the time from the display clock and start. 
Av. Uni student: 	Irrirlirrii111111111111111111111111111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 	ltttlIlllIIlttIIttttltIItltIttItlliIIIttI 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
liii IlillillI liii I 11111111111 ililillI rill 
Av. Uni student: 	litlilliiIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIiiilt111111111 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 	IrrirlirriliritIrriiiiiirlirrilirtilirril 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 	Ituuihuuuuhuihuuuuluuiuhiuiiiiuuthmutl Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Please turn over and continue. 
S alove y &
  Birnbaum
 item
s, posi ti ve i tem
s, 'Self'  and  'A
verage'  
• Achieving great cardiac fitness. 
• Regularly maintaining a well balanced diet. 
• Regularly maintaining an exercise program. 
• Lowering cholesterol levels. 
Yourself: 
11 	 - 
Yourself: 
Av. Uni student: 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Reducing exposure to toxic substances. Av. Uni student: 	Iiiiiii1111111111111111111111 ion III III 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 	11111111111111111111111111111111111111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• I n-7i ir  sec j Please note down the time from the display clock then turn over. 
Salove y &
  Bi rnbaum
 item
s, positive item
s, 'Self'  and  'A
verage'  
Av. Uni student: 	iiiiilliii111111111,111111111111111111111 	• 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
lirrilirittr111111111 m111;1111111111111 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student 	Itiiiltitilitttliiiitiiitlittiliittliiiil 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Being in great physical shape. 
• Maintaining ideal body weight. 
Yourself: 
Yourself: 	llllllliiilllilIIliiliIilIllllIilillIillJ  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Learning relaxation skills and reducing tension. 
Begin here. I mm SW" Please note down the time from the display clock and start. 
What do you believe would 	be your chances of sticking to a regular 
exercise program over the next six months if you decided to? 
What do you believe would be your chances of increasing your use of 
blockout (15+) and/or wearing sun-protective clothing over the next 
summer if you decided to? 
Av. Uni student: 
Yourself: 
Av. Uni student: 
Yourself: 
11111111111111111111111111111111111111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Iiiillirriltirrhirilirrill11111111111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
1111111111111111111111111111111111111m1 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
What do you believe would be your chances of 	reducing your intake of 
salt/salty foods over the next six months if you decided to? 
Av. Uni student: 
Yourself: 
Very likely Very unlikely 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
11111111111111111111111111111111Iiiimpl  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
What do you believe would be your chances of improving your intake of 
milk and dairy products over the next six months if you decided to? 
Av. Uni student: 
Yourself: 
Very likely Very unlikely 
Please turn over and continue. 
D
obber item
s, positive item
s, 'Self'  and  'A
verage'  
IillllitllIiiiili it 1111111 thu 	illrlirrii 
Very unlikely Very likely 
Av. Uni student: 
Yourself: lirrilitir111111111111111111111tritlirril 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Please note down the time from the display clock then turn over. 
D
obber item
s, posi ti ve i tem
s, 'Self
 and  'A
verage'  
What do you believe would be your chances of increasing the amount of 
fibre in your diet over the next six months if you decided to? 
What do you believe would be your chances of improving your level of 
dental care over the next six months if you decided to? 
Av. Uni student: 	Iiiirlitrilirrill111111111111111111111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Iirrillirrirrirlirriliiirlitirlirrilirril  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 	Ittttltiiiliittliiiiltittltttiltitilt tttl 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Irrirlirrilirrilirrillitilirrirlirirlirill  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 
Yourself: 
What do you believe would be your chances of protecting your eyes from 
exposure to high levels of sunlight over the next summer if you decided 
to? 
What do you believe would be your chances of reducing your exposure to 
loud music/high sound levels over the next six months if you decided 
to? 
Av. Uni student: 	Irrirlirrilirriltriliiii11111111111111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
litrilirrilitril111111111111111111111114 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 
- 
	I 
Yourself: 
Av. Uni student: 	IiiiiliiiiiiiiiIiiillitillmililillitill 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
111111111111111111iiiiiiilriii11111111111 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: IiiiiIiiiiliiirlirrilitilliiiiiiiiiIiiiii  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Please note down the time from the display clock and start. 
Av. Uni student: 	11111 1 111111111 1 111111111 1 111 11111111  it II 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
IiiillitilliiiiliiiiiiiiiIiiilliiiiliiiii  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
..... 	...._............................... 
Imiliiiiliiirlitilliiiilmiliiiilliiii  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
IiiiiIiiiilliiiliiiiiiiiiIiiiiliiiilliiil  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 	litillitillinilliiii11111111111111111111 Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Please turn over and continue. 
• Being a victim of fire. 
• Contracting some form of cancer. 
• Developing high blood pressure. 
• Becoming an alcoholic. 
Salo vey &
  B
i rnbaum
 item
s, negati ve item
s, 'Self
 and  "A
verage'  
Begin here. 
Yourself: 
Av. Uni student: 
Yourself: 
Yourself: 
Av. Uni student: 	1111111111111111111111111111111Iiiihnil 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
11111111111111111111IiiiiIiirilirrilirril  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 
Av. Uni student: 	Iitiiittiiiiiiiittiiliiiiiiiiiiiiiiiititl 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 	I11111 t till iii iii liii tiil iii iii 1111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Having a stroke. 
• 1 —rn —ier I Please note down the time from the display clock then turn over. 
Salovey &
  B
i rnbaum
 item
s, negative item
s, 'Self'  and  "A
verage'  (a
8v
d 
pu
oa
as
)  
• Developing diabetes. 	 Av. Uni student: 
Yourself: 
Iiiiilliii,1111111111iiiiihrillirrilr rill 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Iririliiiihirrliirillitilitrillitiltrill  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
• Developing arthritis. 
• Being involved in a car accident. 
Yourself: 
Begin here. 
I. 
—rnt-lr set? Please note down the time from the display clock and start. 
Given your current and likely future exercise level, how likely do you 
think you are to develop cardiovascular disease (heart attack or stroke) 
before the age of 70? 
Given your current and likely future exposure to the sun, how likely do 
you think you are to contract skin cancer before the age of 70? 
Given your current and likely future use of salt/salty foods, how likely do 
you think you are to develop high blood pressure before the age of 70? 
Given your current and likely future intake of milk and dairy products, 
how likelydo you think you are to develop osteoporosis before the age 
of 70?  
Av. Uni student: 	lirtillirr11111111111111111tirlirrilittil 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
11111111111111111111111111writrifirrul  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Irritlirrilirrillirrirrillrirrirrrilirill  
Very likely 	 Veryunlikely 
Av. Uni student: 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 	I I I I I I I II I 1 I II I I I II i i i  11 1 1 1 1 1 ii lilililVery likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Iirrilirrillirillirrirrtilirrillirrlirril 
Please turn over and continue. 
Yourself: 
Yourself: 
D
obbe
r item
s , negative item
s, 'Sel f'  and  'A
verage'  (cue in, ag
e in) 
Given your current and likely future fibre diet, how likely do you think 
you are to develop bowel disease before the age of 70? 
Given your current and future likely level of dental care, how likely do 
you think you are to develop senous tooth or gum problems before the 
age of 70? 
Given your current and future likely exposure to high levels of sunlight, 
how likely do you think you are to develop cataracts before the age of 
70? 
Given your current and future likely exposure to loud music/high sound 
levels, how likely do you think you are to develop deafness before the 
age of 70? 
Av. Uni student: 	iiii11111111111111iiiiitilii1111111111111 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 	IiiiiIiiiiIIIIIIIII 1111[11111111111111111 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 	'm1111111111111111111111111111111111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
IiiiiIiirilirilluriliiiiIiiiiliiiiIiiiii  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 	J 11 ' 111111111111111111111111111111111111 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
iiii11111111111111111111111111111111111t1  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 	Iiirtliiiiiiiirliiii11111111111iirilliiii 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
11111111111111111111111111111111111111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 
Yourself: 
Yourself: 
Please note down the time from the display clock then turn over. 
D
obber item
s, negative item
s, 'Self
 and  'A
verage'  (cue in, ag
e in) 
  
tt, 
Given your current and likely future fibre diet, how likely do you think 
you are to develop bowel disease? 
Given your current and future likely level of dental care, how likely do 
you think you are to develop serious tooth or gum problems? 
Given your current and future likely exposure to high levels of sunlight, 
how likely do you think you are to develop cataracts? 
Given your current and future likely exposure to loud music/high sound 
levels, how likely do you think you are to develop deafness? 
Av. Uni student: 	Iiiill11111111111111111111111111111111111 
	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 
	
Irtrilirrilirriliiiiiiiirliirilirriliiirl 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 	11111111111iii111111111111iiiiiiii1111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
111111111111111111111111111111111111iiiii  
Av. Uni student 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 	littilirrillitilirrilititliiirlirrilititi 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Iiiit11111111111111111111111111111111tril 
Please note down the time from the display clock then turn over. 
11 1 
Given your current and likely future fibre diet, how likely do you think 
you are to develop bowel disease? 
Given your current and future likely level of dental care, how likely do 
you think you are to develop serious tooth or gum problems? 
Given your current and future likely exposure to loud music/high sound 
levels, how likely do you think you are to develop deafness? 
Av. Uni student: 	IititjiitiittiitiitttttitttiititiitiiiI 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
11111111111111111111111111111111111111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 
	
iiiiiIrrilltirilritilitilltriiiiitilirril 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 	Illtrlirrilifitlirrillirrlirt.rliiillititi  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Given your current and future likely exposure to high levels of sunlight, 	Av. Uni student: 	Iiiiitiltili111111[1111111111[11111111111 
how likely do you think you are to develop cataracts? 
Yourself: 
Please note down the time from the display clock then turn over. 
D
obber item
s, negative item
s, 'Self'  and  `A
verage'  (cue in, ag
e out) 
  
Ce) 
Begin here. I 	• 11-771 	ger: I  Please note down the time from the display clock and start. 
How likely do you think you are to develop cardiovascular disease (heart 
attack or stroke) before the age of 70? 
How likely do you think you are to contract skin cancer before the age of 
70? 
Av. Uni student: 	11111111111(111111111111t1111111111111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
11111111111111111111111111111111111111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 	hut liii 111111 1 111 iii III hititli ltilittli 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
JIll iltilillitilt II iii ii 11111111111 liii  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 
Yourself: 
Av. Uni student: 
Yourself: 
How likely do you think you are to develop high blood pressure before 
the age of 70? 
How likely do you think you are to develop osteoporosis before the age of Av. Uni student: 
70? 
Yourself: 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
I iIIlIlIlIII!i1IIllIIII1l II 11111111111  II 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Please turn over and continue. 
Ce1 
How likely do you think you are to develop bowel disease before the age 
of 70? 
How likely do you think you are to develop serious tooth or gum 
problems before the age of 70? 
Av. Uni student: 	1111111111111111iiiiiiiii1111111111111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. tin! student: 	11111111111i  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 
Av. Uni student: 
Yourself: 
Av. Uni student: 
Yourself: 
Irirrlirrilirrillirtiriirliirrlirrilirril  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
111111111111trilliirlirrilirrilirriliiiii 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely How likely do you think you are to develop eye cataracts before the age 
of 70? 
How likely do you think you are to 	develop deafness before the age of 
70? 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
lirrillirrItiiiliiitiiiirtriirliirtIrrill 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Very likely Very unlikely 
Please note down the time from the display clock then turn over. 
 
• 
Irrthr -1ZE- 
   
Begin here. I n—TIF API! I Please note down the time from the display clock and start. 
   
   
How likely do you think you are to develop cardiovascular disease (heart 
attack or stroke)? 
How likely do you think you are to contract skin cancer? 
How likely do you think you are to develop high blood pressure? 
How likely do you think you are to develop osteoporosis?  
Av. Uni student: 	IiIII1111111111111111IIIilitrulriffiritri  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
I 	rifirrilli111111111111illit iltrir I mil 
Very likely Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 	lirrillirrIrrrillirrirrirlitrillrirlirrii  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
11111111i11111111111111111m111111lirril 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
	
Av. Uni student: 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Pit 	111111 iii iii tuuillIli 	liii u liii iii it  
IirrillirrIrrirlirrilliiiIrrirlirrilitril  Yourself: 	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
-- 
11111111111tri1111111111111111111111iiiii  Av. Uni student: 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
lirriliri111111111111111111111111111IIIii  
Yourself: 	
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 
Yourself: 
Please turn over and continue. 
c., 
R., 
OC) 
D
obber item
s, neg. item
s, 'Self'  and  'A
verage'  (cue out ag
e out) 
Yourself: 
Av. Uni student: 	1111111111111IIIIIIIiiiiil iiii11111111111 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
11111111111111111ml irrihrtill111111111 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 
Av. Uni student: 	1111111111111111111111Itilirri11111111111  
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 	itill111111111111111111111111111111111111 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
1111111111111ifiritilirriliirrI1111111111 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Av. Uni student: 	111111111111111111111111111111111111111[1 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
Yourself: 	111111IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII11111111111111 1 I 
Very likely 	 Very unlikely 
How likely do you think you are to develop bowel disease? 
How likely do you think you are to develop serious tooth or gum 
problems? 
How likely do you think you are to develop deafness? 
Yourself: 
Please note down the time from the display clock then turn over. 
How likely do you think you are to develop cataracts? 
_ 
Please read the following word pairs and mark, with a line through the scale, the position on the scale 
that refers to you at this moment. 
Iiiiihrirlirrihniirililiiirlirrilititil 
Alert 	 Drowsy 
Iritillirilliirlinilliriltirilitilltritil 
Sad 	 Happy 
IttillririliiiihritirrilliiiiIrrirliiril  
Dreamy 	 Attentive 
Please turn over the page and continue. 
Post - experimental questionnaire 
Please write a few lines about the thoughts you were having about your own health when you were answering the questions about health issues. 
(Refer back to the relevant pages if you wish, but do not change your ratings.) 
First set of ratings 	  
Second set of ratings 	  
Are there any other comments you would like to make? 
Please wait quietly for others to finish. Not all tasks are of equal length. 
End 
flankyou for your participation. 
P
ost-experim
enta
l questionnaire 
